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ABSTRACT
This is a study of the economic behavior of firms manu-
facturing medical diagnostic imaging equipment, machines that
take diagnostic pictures. The basic conditions, market
structure, and firm conduct are used to analyze industry per-
formance and to evaluate the effects of various government
policies. Two new data sets were utilized in the research:
a survey of firms in the industry and a constructed data file
of industry composition and firm characteristics over a ten
year period.
After an introduction outlining the study, Chapter 1 pre-
sents the basic conditions of the industry, including product
descriptions, supply and demand conditions, and the regula-
tory environment. Quality characteristics are found to be
especially important in this market. Market structure is
analyzed in Chapter 2. This is an unconcentrated industry
which has been characterized by steady growth of real sales
and a substantial amount of net entry over the past ten years.
In Chapter 3, an examination of firm conduct, the pivotal
role of innovation in this industry is revealed. And, it is
found that firms compete not only on the basis of price, but
also on the basis of quality, service facilities, and innova-
tion.
Chapter 4 uses the results of the previous chapters to
assess industry performance. Overall, medical imaging equip-
ment appears to be sold in a competitive market, due to the
ease of entry combined with the high degree of product diff-
erentiation and the rapid rate of innovation. In Chapter 5
the impacts of various government regulatory programs are
examined. Neither radiation safety regulation nor medical
device regulation was found to have adversely affected market
structure or innovation in this industry. And demand for
medical imaging equipment does not appear to have been de-
creased by hospital regulation.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Paul L. Joskow
Title: Professor of Economics
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INTRODUCTION
The subject of this study is medical diagnostic imaging
equipment, machines that take diagnostic pictures, and the
firms which manufacture these machines. In particular, it
is an industry study, using the basic conditions of the in-
dustry, market structure, and firm conduct to analyze indus-
try performance and to evaluate the effects of various gov-
ernment policies.
An industry study has intrinsic merit as a way of under-
standing the economy. This industry is particularly inter-
esting because it exhibits two characteristics of special
interest currently. In the first place, it is what is some-
times called a "high technology" industry, the product is
technologically complex and there is a rapid rate of techni-
cal change. Secondly, it is a part of the health care sec-
tor, a source of national concern due to rapidly rising
health care costs. With respect to the medical care sector,
there has been little work done on the supply of non-labor
inputs, a category encompassing medical imaging equipment.
Finally, the existing literature on product safety regula-
tion consists largely of studies of the pharmaceutical in-
dustry. Given that safety regulation has become common
during the past 20 years, examination of another industry
will provide a useful point of comparison for the effects
of this type of regulation.
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The study utilizes two new data sets in addition to a
variety of secondary sources. In the first place, first-hand
information about a variety of issues was obtained from a
survey of firms in the industry. Secondly, a data file of
industry composition and firm characteristics over the period
1971 to 1981 was constructed by correlating and cross-checking
information from over twenty-five different sources, includ-
ing a weekly trade newsletter, the financial press, industry
reports by others, and government publications.
In Chapter 1 the basic conditions of the industry are pre-
sented. This includes product descriptions, supply and de-
mand conditions, and the regulatory environment. Chapter 2
analyzes market structure, beginning with a history of indus-
try and product sales and an overview of the firms which sell
in this market. Then the patterns of concentration are exa-
mined, followed by a discussion of barriers to entry. Fin-
ally, changes in industry composition over time are described.
Chapter 3 explores the conduct of firms in this industry.
First the pricing behavior of firms is described, followed
by an examination of marketing strategies. The nature of
innovation receives special attention, including a history of
important technical developments, an analysis of innovation
inputs and outputs, and a consideration of the use of innova-
tion as a competitive strategy. Finally, the various bases
for nonprice competition in this industry are examined.
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In Chapter 4 the results of the previous chapters are
used to assess industry performance. Finally, Chapter 5 is
an investigation of the impacts of various government regula-
tory programs on this industry. Specifically, both the
effects of direct regulation of imaging equipment firms via
radiation safety and medical device programs, and the in-
direct effects of hospital regulation are analyzed.
-14-
CHAPTER 1: BASIC CONDITIONS
The basic conditions are the fundamental circumstances
of an industry which firms must take into account when making
decisions. After a discussion of the relevant market, the
nature of the products is described. Then supply conditions,
such. as the production technology and inputs, and demand con-
ditions, such as the nature of the buyers, price elasticities,
and utilization rates, are examined. Finally, government
policies affecting the industry are discussed.
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MARKET DEFINITION
The relevant market must be defined in order to provide
a boundary for the analysis. In the lexicon of economic
theory, a market is simply a context within which trans-
actions or exchanges occur and an industry consists of all
firms producing the same good or service. These definitions
are straightforward when products are homogeneous, or per-
fectly substitutable, a condition that rarely holds. When
products are not homogeneous, the task is to determine what
products are sufficiently substitutable to belong to the
same market.
The antitrust approach to market definition involves
first defining a provisional product market which includes
those products considered to be good substitutes at current
prices. Then a small but significant market price increase
is hypothesized. If available substitutes are sufficiently
attractive that the price rise would not be profitable, then
the market is defined too narrowly. This process is contin-
ued until the market is defined by the ability of a hypothe-
tical single seller to raise price profitably (U. S. Depart-
ment of Justice, 1982). Landes and Posner (1981) and Schmal-
ensee (1982) present in more formal terms the argument that
own-price elasticity of demand is the key element in the
problem of market definition.
Important criteria in evaluating product substitutability
are buyers' and sellers' perceptions as to product substitut-
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ability, similarities in usage, design, or technical charact-
eristics, and similarities in price movements (U. S. Depart-
ment of Justice, 1982). Other factors such as similar tech-
nologies, identical inputs to-production, or close geographi-
cal location may play a role. And, the time frame is also
important; for example, individual firm demand is more price-
elastic in the long run than in the short run (Schmalensee,
1982).
Medical diagnostic imaging equipment is used to take
pictures which help physicians determine a patient's medical
condition. There are four primary types of equipment included
in this market: X-ray equipment, CT scanners, ultrasound de-
vices, and nuclear scanning equipment. These machines are
used primarily by radiologists, doctors who specialize in the
use of radiant energy for both diagnostic and therapeutic
purposes. And in the radiology literature, "diagnostic
imaging" and "medical imaging" are accepted labels for the
class of clinical procedures which utilizes these types of
1
machines.
There is some potential for substitution between medical
imaging equipment and other types of diagnostic equipment.
For instance, thermographic equipment is effective for detec-
tion of breast cancers and endoscopes can be used to actively
view portions of the anatomy accessible via one of the body
orifices, However, general diagnostic equipment, including
such. machines as ele.ctrocardiographs and blood chemistry
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analyzers, offers little opportunity for substitution because
different clinical information is obtained by different types
of equipment. In general, diagnostic imaging is one of the
very few ways the physician can gain information about struc-
tures within the body. For example, if the doctor wants to
pinpoint the location of a tumor within the body, exploratory
surgery is usually the only viable alternative to medical
imaging. And a small rise in the price of imaging equipment
is unlikely to affect the choice between diagnostic imaging
and exploratory surgery.
With regard to the four types of imaging equipment, each
type of equipment has preferred uses and, from an antitrust
perspective, the product line is likely to be the relevant
market (.see the discussion of antitrust action against mergers
i:n Chapter 21. There is, nevertheless, also substantial
functional overlap and potential for substitution among the
product lines (this is discussed in detail in the next sec-
tion1. Consequently, in addition to considering the medical
diagnostic imaging equipment industry as a whole, each product
ltne will be discussed separately in the ensuing analysis.
-18-
PRODUC TS
This section is devoted to a detailed description of
each of the types of medical diagnostic imaging equipment.
For each product there is a discussion of the scientific
principles behind the technology, a description of a typical
machine, and an account of the relevant medical applications.
The potential for substitution among the various imaging
techniques is also discussed. Lastly, two emerging techno-
logies which may well lead to the introduction of new pro-
ducts in this market are described.
-19-
X-Ray Equipment
X-rays are a form of electromagnetic radiation, with a
wavelength such that they can pass through many materials
that would block the passage of light waves (e.g., soft
tissue), but are stopped by metals (such as the calcium in
bones). If X-rays are beamed through the body toward a
piece of photographic film covered with a silver-salt (metal)
solution, then the rays which can pass through the body will
expose the film, resulting in an image of that portion of
the body (Bleich, 1960).
Soft tissues, such as internal organs, are often not
distinguishable on a standard X-ray. However, clear X-ray
images of soft tissues can be obtained by injecting or in-
gesting substances containing metals, called contrast
materials, into the organ of interest (Miller, 1982).
Fluoroscopy is a type of X-ray technique in which a
continuous image is obtained. In this procedure the X-rays
are beamed through the body toward an X-ray-sensitive
fluorescent screen (Hendee et al., 1977).
An X-ray machine consists basically of an X-ray source
and a detector. The source is an X-ray tube, which produces
an X-ray beam by accelerating electrons to high speeds and
then directing them onto a metal target (Hendee et al., 1977).
The detector is either film (for static imaging) or a
fluorescent screen (for fluoroscopy). Other important com-
ponents include timers, grids (to remove scattered radiation),
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and generators.
X-rays were discovered in 1895 by Wilhelm Roentgen, for
which he received the first Nobel prize in physics. The
medical potential of this discovery was recognized almost
immediately, and within a year X-rays were being used in
clinical applications (Bleich, 1960). In the early 1900's
various improved X-ray tubes were introduced, and by the
1920's the basic type of tube still used today (rotating
anode) had been developed (Thompson, 1978). Since that time,
there have been advances in film quality and the development
of image intensifiers for fluoroscopy.
In the 1970's, the application of computer technology
to the medical imaging field led to the development of
digital radiography, a technique in which the information
contained in an X-ray image is stored in a computer (digi-
talized). The data can then be processed and enhanced in
various ways. For example, digital subtraction techniques
involve making a digitalized image before and after injection
of contrast material and then electronically subtracting one
from the other to eliminate superfluous structures (Miller,
1982).
There are well-established clinical procedures using
X-ray equipment for a large number of medical conditions.
These range from a simple bone X-ray for a fracture to con-
trast media studies of the gastrointestinal tract for the
detection of a tumor. In standard radiology texts, the
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bulk of discussion is devoted to conventional X-ray techni-
ques.2 And, although newer techniques are more publicized,
the basic X-ray still constitutes the majority of radiology
procedures (Miller, 1982), and is the "bread and butter" of
any radiology department.
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CT Scanners
Computed tomography (CT) scanning is a relatively recent
innovation in the field of radiology. Invented by G. N.
Hounsfield of EMI, Ltd. in 1967, the first clinical trials
took place in London in 1971. The technology was so success-
ful at imaging lesions of the brain that it was demonstrated
at professional meetings in 1972 and was commercially avail-
able by mid-1973 (Banta and Sanes, 1978).
CT scanning is a technique in which X-ray equipment and
an on-line computer are used to produce cross-sectional images
of the body. X-rays are beamed through the patient and the
radiation which passes through the body is recorded by de-
tectors placed opposite the radiation source. This process
is repeated at a number of different positions. The measure-
ments at each position are recorded in the computer and then
the complete set of readings is used in a series of complex
mathematical calculations to determine the density of each
small area of the body scanned. This information is then
used to form an image of a thin slice of the body (Miller,
1982).
CT scanners consist of four basic components: (1) a
source, or X-ray tube, which produces the beam of X-rays;
(2) a detector to pick up the radiation; (3) a computer to
process the information; and (4) an imaging device, often a
television screen, to display the image (Banta and Sanes,
1978).
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The scanning procedure can be accomplished in various
ways and there are three methods of CT scanning currently
in use: (1) the X-ray tube and detectors are linked and
both rotate around the patient; (2) the X-ray tube and detec-
tors move across the body, then rotate until 1800 has been
covered; and (3) the X-ray tube rotates, but the detectors
are stationary (Hounsfield, 1979). Fixed anode, oil-cooled
X-ray tubes are used for 20-second or slower scanners, while
for faster scanners, rotating anode, air-cooled X-ray tubes
are the norm. And, there are two types of detectors currently
in use: crystal scintillation and gas ionization, with
crystal scintillation detectors having a higher detection
efficiency, but being more expensive (Walmsley, 1979).
As mentioned previously, the initial application of CT
scanning was in evaluation of lesions of the brain. And, in
a short time CT scanning emerged as the major diagnostic tool
of neuroradiology. CT technology has also been extended to
scanning of the body, and is frequently used for studies of
the liver, pancreas, kidneys, and chest masses (Miller, 1982).
The advantages of CT scanning are that it improves
image resolution (gives a clearer image) and is less invasive
than alternative techniques such as exploratory surgery
(Miller, 1982). Note, however, that contrast media are
coming to be used more often in CT scanning and the use of
contrast media is a relatively invasive procedure (Banta
and Sanes, 1978). The primary disadvantage of CT scanning
-24-
is that it is generally more costly than alternative image
procedures (Miller, 1982).
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Ultrasound Devices
Ultrasound is not a type of electromagnetic energy,
rather it is mechanical vibration at frequencies above the
range of human hearing. In an ultrasound diagnostic proced-
ure, these high frequency sound waves are passed through the
body and the echoes of those signals are used to construct
an image of that portion of the body (Miller, 1982).
Bats and porpoises use ultrasound for echolocation, but
ultrasound was not used by humans until Pierre Curie dis-
covered the piezoelectric properties of certain crystals.
Piezoelectric crystals are crucial to ultrasound technology
because they both generate and detect ultrasonic waves.
By the early 1900's the first echolocation device had been
developed by the French engineer Paul Langeuvin. This work
eventually culminated in sonar techniques for the detection
of underwater objects (Fleischer and James, 1980).
After World War II ultrasound techniques were used in
medical therapy for the treatment of cancer. By the late
1950's, diagnostic applications of ultrasound were being
proposed. However, it was the need for a nonradioactive
imaging procedure for the fetus that was the major force
behind the development of ultrasound imaging techniques in
the early 1960's (Fleischer and James, 1980).
The most important component of an ultrasound device
is the transducer which contains a piezoelectric crystal.
This crystal has the property of producing ultrasound when
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electrically excited and of producing electrical signals in
response to ultrasonic waves. The transducer thus acts both
as the generator and the detector of ultrasonic signals (Wells,
1979a). The electrical signals are then amplified, processed,
and displayed (Fleischer and James, 1980).
The nature of the processing and display equipment de-
pends on the type of ultrasound procedure being performed.
A-scope displays are used to present straightforward time vs.
amplitude information, whereas a B-scope can detect intensity
modulations. The B-scan is especially useful because it is
the basis of both time-position recording (for the study of
changes in structure) and of two-dimensional scanning (which
produces a cross-sectional image). Another type of ultrasound
procedure is real-time imaging, with which it is possi-
ble to study moving structures. Lastly, there are Doppler
scanners, which operate by measuring the shift in the fre-
quency of sound waves reflected from a moving object and
which are used primarily for blood flow studies (Wells, 1979b).
A major innovation in ultrasound was the development of
gray scale imaging, a technique which allows a range of echo
amplitudes to be expressed as various shades of gray, rather
than as the previous dots of set intensity. This technique
was introduced by George Kossoff in the late 1960's (Fleischer
and James, 1980) and gray-scale ultrasound equipment was
commercially available by 19 7 4 (Meire, 1979).
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As mentioned previously, ultrasound was first used for
imaging of the fetus and in utero procedures continue to be
the major use of diagnostic ultrasound procedures. Other
important applications are evaluation of the liver, gall-
bladder, and cardiac walls and valves (Kreel and Meire, 1979).
Ultrasound is particularly effective for the identification
of cystic structures and thus is often used to analyze the
nature of masses already located by other imaging modalities
(Miller, 1982).
The primary advantages of diagnostic ultrasound are
that it is nonradioactive, noninvasive, does not require the
use of potentially toxic contrast media, and is generally
less expensive than other imaging procedures (Fleischer and
James, 1980). The main disadvantages are that ultrasound
displays can be confusing and that it requires considerable
experience to accurately interpret ultrasound images (Miller,
1982).
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Nuclear Scanning-Equipment
Nuclear scanning procedures are unique in the radiologi-
cal repertoire in that the energy source is a radioactive
substance which is inside the patient. These radioactive
substances are termed radiopharmaceuticals, and nuclear medi-
cine is the branch of radiology concerned with the diagnostic
and therapeutic use of radiopharmaceuticals. Nuclear medicine
includes both in vivo (in body) and in vitro (in glass) pro-
cedures, but only the equipment associated with in vivo
testing will be considered here.
Henri Bequerel and Pierre and Marie Curie are credited
with the discovery of radioactivity in the late 1890's, for
which they jointly received the 1903 Nobel prize for physics
(Dewing, 1962). By the early 1930's, the development of the
cyclotron made it possible to produce artificial radioiso-
topes, but it was not until the introduction of the nuclear
reactor in the 1940's that it became practical to produce
radioisotopes in quantity. In 1938 a group headed by Robley
D. Evans investigated the uptake of iodine-128 in the thyroid
of the rabbit, and application to the imaging of the human
thyroid gland, the first concern of nuclear medicine, was
not far behind (Lange, 1973). Medical uses of radioisotopes
expanded over the years to the extent that nuclear medicine
formally became a medical specialty in 1971 with the estab-
lishment of a certification board (Epstein and Grundy, 1974).
-29-
Radioactive substances emit, among other things, gamma
rays, a type of electromagnetic radiation with very short
wavelengths similar to X-rays. In nuclear scanning, a radio-
pharmaceutical is ingested or injected into the patient.
The pattern of radioactivity (emission of gamma rays) that
results is detected and then transformed to a visual display
(Miller, 1982).
Most nuclear scanning equipment uses sodium iodide
scintillation crystals. These crystals and various detectors
are housed in a camera or a scanner. There are two basic
types of scintillation (gamma) cameras: the Anger type with
one large crystal surrounded by many detectors, and the
multi-crystal type with many smaller crystals and one detec-
tor associated with each crystal position. And, there are
two principal types of scanners: the rectilinear scanner
(largely outmoded now), in which the detector moves across
the patient's body in a series of parallel lines; and the
multi-crystal whole body imager which makes one comprehensive
scan (Frost and Sullivan, 1979). A collimator is often used
to prevent the detection of extraneous radiation, and the use
of a computer to process the information coming from the
detecting system has become commonplace (Spencer, 1979).
The key to nuclear scanning lies in the discovery (or
production) of radiopharmaceuticals which will tag only
particular organs or which have different rates of absorption
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for healthy and diseased tissues (Russell, 1978). Other
desirable properties of radioisotopes include a short half-
life, availability at a low cost, and emission of the type
of radioactivity detectable by standard instrumentation.
These requirements severely limit the set of radioisotopes
suitable for medical imaging and, in practice, technetium-99m
is generally used in clinical applications (Spencer, 1979).
It is estimated that in 1978 over 80 per cent of all in vivo
procedures utilized technetium-99m. Other important radio-
isotopes include iodine-131, iodine-123, xenon-133, thallium-
201, selenium-75, and gallium-67 (Frost and Sullivan, 1979).
As noted previously, evaluation of the thyroid gland
was the first medical application of nuclear scanning, and
radioisotope scanning is still the standard procedure for
studying that organ (Miller, 1982). Other primary uses are
for the detection of pulmonary emboli and bone metastases
(Kreel and Meire, 1979). Also important are cardiac and
liver function tests. It is estimated that, in 1982, cardiac
and lung perfusion studies, bone scanning, and liver function
tests accounted for about 70 per cent of all nuclear imaging
procedures.3
Since the choice of radiopharmaceutical depends on the
organ and function being studied, nuclear scanning technology
consists of a set of diagnostic tests for particular medical
conditions. In fact, this provision of functional, rather
than structural, information is what sets nuclear scanning
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apart from the other imaging techniques (Robinson, 1979).
The advantages of nuclear scanning techniques are that
they are low-risk, and especially useful for detection of
functional disturbances (Robinson, 1979). The primary dis-
advantage is that the resolution of a radioisotope image is
relatively low compared to standard radiographic images
(Miller, 1982).
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Substitution Among Medical Imaging Techniques
The focus of the market definition section was the common
function of all types of medical imaging equipment, i.e., the
production of diagnostic imaging tests. The potential for
substitution among the types of imaging equipment depends
entirely on the potential for substitution among imaging tech-
niques. This section is a consideration of the medical po-
tential for substitution among diagnostic imaging techniques.
It is important to note that the purpose of a given pro-
cedure is to image a particular part of the body. In other
words, the decision to perform an imaging test is based on
the patient's particular medical problem, and the choice of
imaging modality will depend primarily on what specific ques-
tion is being asked about the patient's condition (Kreel and
Meire, 1979). Also note that, although standard radiography,
CT scanning, and ultrasound can be used to image any part of
the body (however effectively), radioisotope scanning is
limited to a particular set of procedures defined by the
type of radiopharmaceutical used and by the organ into which
the tagged substance is injected or ingested.
Until about 15 years ago, X-ray tests were the standard
imaging procedure. With the advent of other techniques, an
image can now be obtained in several different ways. On the
one hand, this means that there are greater opportunities for
substitution. On the other hand, specialized techniques have
developed for particular medical conditions. In general,
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each imaging technique has specific uses for which it is
clearly superior and the method of choice. These will be
presented and then the areas of overlap will be discussed.
Standard radiographic techniques are preferred for
imaging of the chest and lungs, the skeleton (except when
cancer is suspected), and the gastrointestinal tract (Miller,
1982). X-ray examinations are the least expensive type of
imaging procedure and the image depicts clear details of
structural anatomy in the above cases (Robinson, 1979).
CT scanning is the acknowledged method of choice for
neurological problems. Its preeminence for this purpose is
indicated by the effects on alternative techniques after CT
scanning was introduced. Although sources refer to different
time periods and there is disagreement about the actual
magnitude of the effect (see Table 1-1), it is clear that
the introduction of head CT scanning decreased the utiliza-
tion of radioisotope scanning of the brain, pneumoencephalo-
graphy (X-ray visualization of the brain with contrast pro-
vided by injections of carbon dioxide), and cerebral angio-
graphy (X-ray visualization of blood vessels in the brain
with the aid of injection of contrast materials).
CT scanning of the body does not enjoy the clear super-
iority over other procedures that CT head scanning does for
neurodiagnostic purposes (McNeil, 1981). When used for body
scanning there is a tradeoff between the sometimes clearer
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Table 1-1
Effects of the Introduction of Head CT Scanning
on Alternative Medical Imaging Techniques
Alternative Techniques
Radioisotope
Scanning
Source of Brain
Pne umo en-
cephalography
Cerebral
Angiography
Arthur D. Little
(1976)
Banta and Sanes
(1978)
Kreel and Meire
(1979)
45%
decrease
35%
decrease
effectively
eliminated
70%
decrease
60o%
decrease
80%decrease
decrease
20%
decrease
15%
decrease
60o%
decrease
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image produced by CT technology and the fact that CT scans
are the most expensive type of imaging procedure (Kreel and
Meire, 1979).
Ultrasound is the accepted imaging procedure for obste-
trical purposes. This is because X-rays are dangerous to the
fetus and because the suspension of the fetus in the amniotic
fluid is particularly conducive to clear ultrasonic imaging
(Fleischer and James, 1980). Ultrasound also dominates other
techniques in imaging of the movements of the cardiac walls
and valves (Kreel and Meire, 1979).
Radioisotope scanning is the modality of choice for the
detection of pulmonary emboli and as a screening procedure
for bone metastases. It is particularly suited for these
purposes since it reveals function, rather than structural
anatomy (Kreel and Meire, 1979).
For many medical conditions, there is no generally
accepted standard specifying which imaging technique should
be used. It should be noted that the physician does not
always know ex ante the nature of the patient's complaint,
and which procedure is used will depend initially on the
tentative diagnosis. The choice of modality will also be
influenced by a number of other factors. First, it must be
determined whether functional or structural detail is
more important; radioisotope scanning being preferable for
collection of information about function (Robinson, 1979).
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It also must be decided whether a cross-sectional image is
necessary. And, acceptable levels of risk must be determined:
X-radiation is known to be dangerous to the fetus and there
is always the possibility of an adverse reaction when contrast
media are used. Other factors to consider are image resolu-
tion (or clarity) and ease of interpretation (Kreel and Meire,
1979). The cost of the examination is also important in the
choice of diagnostic imaging modality (although not as impor-
tant as might be expected due to methods of third-party pay-
ment for hospital expenses). Lastly, availability of
equipment and personal preference on the part of the doctor
will influence the imaging technique decision.
Although the emphasis in this section is on substitution
among techniques, it should be noted that doctors often order
multiple tests for the same diagnosis. This is because the
reading of a diagnostic image is not cut and dried, there is
a substantial amount of variation in the interpretation of
any given image. Ordering a different type of procedure
reduces uncertainty about the diagnostic conclusion. Defen-
sive medicine is another reason for the use of multiple
modalities, i.e., given the possibility of a malpractice suit,
the doctor tends to accumulate evidence to justify his or her
decisions.
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Since the demand for a given type of medical imaging
equipment is directly related to the demand for the procedure
which uses that equipment, the preceding discussion of the
substitution among techniques makes it clear that medical
imaging machines are not homogeneous, perfectly substitutable
products. Rather, they fit the description of a differentiated
product, that is, one for which the price may rise without the
loss of all sales. For instance, interpretation of the
image takes up the radiologist's time. Therefore,
ultrasound, which is relatively difficult to interpret, has
a higher (time) price to the radiologist than other imaging
techniques. In spite of this higher price, ultrasound is
still an integral part of the radiologist's repertoire. For
each imaging modality, there is some dimension in which that
modality's "price" is higher, and yet there is substantial
demand for each type of equipment. In general, the notion of
differentiated products is especially suitable for describing
this market.
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New Technologies
In addition to the established imaging techniques
described previously, there are two emerging imaging tech-
nologies which deserve attention. These are nuclear magnetic
resonance and positron emission tomography. And, although
positron emission tomography is still very much in the ex-
perimental stage, nuclear magnetic resonance is currently
being clinically evaluated and is expected to be commercially
available within a few years.
Nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) technology is based on
the fact that in a strong magnetic field the nuclei of certain
elements will align themselves with the field. When radio-
waves of a specific frequency are applied, energy is released.
This energy can then be detected and used to form an image
that gives both structural and functional information
(Portugal, 1982).
Although the principles of NMR have been known since the
late 1940's, it is only very recently that the technology
has been applied to medical imaging. The advantages of NMR
are that it produces very sharp images (much contrast detail),
is relatively safe since it uses non-ionizing radiation, and
can provide chemical, as well as structural, information.
The disadvantages are that it is extremely costly (between
$1 million and $2 million for a single unit) and that there
are technical problems, largely involving production of the
magnetic field (Brody, 1982).
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The primary clinical applications of NMR are expected to
be in the early diagnosis of ischemic brain disease, the de-
tection of multiple sclerosis, and differentiation between
malignant and benign tumors (Brownell et al., 1982). Although
NMR is still being clinically evaluated, firms in the industry
are actively developing equipment for this market, and some
orders have already been placed (Portugal, 1982).
Another developing technology is positron emission
tomography (PET). This technique utilizes certain radioiso-
topes which emit positrons (positively charged electrons).
When a positron collides with an electron, two photons are
produced which'are emitted at 1800 from one another. By posi-
tioning multiple detectors around the source, the location
and depth of the original positron can be plotted (Brownell
et al., 1982).
The chief advantage of PET is that it can reveal cellular
activity as well as structure. This is expected to be parti-
cularly useful for evaluating brain damage and mental dis-
orders, such as schizophrenia and Alzheimer's disease
(Portugal, 1982). However, there are problems which limit
PET to experimental uses at this time. The major difficulty
is that the radioisotope to be used in the procedure is quite
short-lived and must be produced very near the site of the
procedure. In general this means that there must be a cyclo-
tron close to the hospital, a requirement that makes this
technique prohibitively costly at this time (Miller, 1982).
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SUPPLY CONDITIONS
An important aspect of the basic conditions in an indus-
try is the nature of supply, the topic of this section. The
production technology is discussed first, with emphasis on
the central role of electronics in this industry. Then there
is a description of the various inputs to the production pro-
cess. Lastly, the distribution of supply is examined, includ-
ing patterns of plant size and value of shipments, as well as
changes over time in the cost of materials and production
wages as a proportion of value of shipments.
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Production Process
Any piece of medical diagnostic imaging equipment is com-
posed of a number of different components. For example, a
diagnostic X-ray system may include an X-ray tube, high-voltage
generator, control panel, table, film changer, cassette holder,
and collimator. The production process varies by type of com-
ponent. There are two general types of production techniques
which are important in the manufacture of medical imaging
equipment: mechanical and electronic.
The mechanical side of the production process involves
ordinary sheet metal (fabrication) work, as well as more de-
tailed punch drilling and other machine tooling. By these
means, the basic construction is performed, i.e., the housing
of the equipment is fabricated. The techniques involving
electronics, on the other hand, produce the workings, or inner
mechanism, of the equipment. There are two types of elec-
tronics processes which are important: general electronics
assembly and computer systems.
General electronics assembly is used to manufacture
components such as X-ray tubes and gamma radiation detectors.
This may involve hand work or an automated process. For
example, circuit boards may be hand installed and soldered on
a predrilled board, or there may be equipment which automati-
cally performs the installation and soldering.
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Computers have become more and more important in the
manufacture of diagnostic imaging equipment. In the first
place, micro computers are often used as process controllers.
For example, a CT scanner uses micro-processors to control
the rotation of the X-ray tube and detectors. Secondly,
many types of medical imaging equipment now use a computer
for data processing and analysis. For instance, there is a
wide variety of data processing systems available for use
with nuclear scanning equipment, and computerized data pro-
cessing is an integral part of CT scanning and digital
radiography.
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Inputs
The capital inputs used to produce medical diagnostic
imaging equipment include raw materials, inputs manufactured
by others, and capital equipment. The most important raw
materials are aluminum and steel, with copper and silicon
also playing a role. Producer goods purchased from other
firms include plastics, insulating media, and, most importantly,
electronic components. And, capital equipment covers sheet
metal equipment and drill presses, as well as all the basic
plant and equipment associated with a manufacturing estab-
lishment.
Much of the labor in the production process is semi-
skilled, in which on-the-job training is provided by the
company. For example, the construction of X-ray tubes invol-
ves a great deal of hand work. At many of the larger plants,
the production workers are represented by the International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers. Skilled labor is used
for quality control, supervisory tasks, and staff positions.
Trained technicians are often used to perform the quality
assurance procedures, while production engineers oversee the
production process. Scientists, design engineers, and managers
are all staff personnel.
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Distribution of Supply
Information on the distribution of establishments (plants)
producing medical diagnostic imaging equipment is contained in
the Census of Manufactures, which is published every five
years and which uses the Standard Industrial Classification
(SIC) code. The 4-digit SIC group of interest here is 3693
which in 1967 and 1972 was titled "X-Ray Apparatus and Tubes."
Although some other medical equipment was included (e.g., EEG
equipment), in general the classification is quite close to
imaging equipment. However, in 1977 the title of SIC 3693
was changed to "X-Ray, Electromedical, and Electrotherapeutic
Apparatus" and data on a number of new categories of medical
equipment (such as pacemakers, automated blood analyzers, etc.)
were included. Nevertheless, comparison of various statistics
for 1967 to 1977 is informative because the focus here is on
where imaging equipment is manufactured, and the SIC code em-
phasized the supply side. In fact, similarity of production
processes is a criterion for SIC industry definition. More-
over, almost all the products made in SIC 3693 plants are pri-
mary products, i.e., few products properly assignable to other
industries are manufactured in these establishments.
Tables 1-2 and 1-3 reveal that in this industry small
plants account for a large proportion of the total number of
establishments, but a very small proportion of total value of
shipments. Looking at the distribution of the size of estab-
lishment (measured by number of employees) both by number of
establishments and by value of shipments over time provides
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Table 1-2
Industry 3693
Employment Size Distribution of Establishments
Number of
Employees per
Establishment
1-4
5-9
10-19
20-49
50-99
100-249
250-499
500-999
1000-2499
TOTAL
Number of Establishments
1967(Number) FT
30 36.6
6.1
7.3
14 17.1
10 12.2
10 12.2
3.7
2.4
2.4
82
26 25.0
16 15.3
7.7
21 20.2
7.7
15 14.4
4
4
2
104
19 7
Number (O)
66 27.2
32 13.2
19 7.8
28 11.5
27 11.1
38
3.9
3.9
1.9
15.6
7.0
3.3
3.3
243
From: Census of Manufacturers, Industry Series, U. S. Depart-
ment of Commerce, Table 4, 1967, 1972, 1977.
192(Number)7f
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Table 1-3
Industry 3693
Distribution of Value of Shipments
by Employment Size of Establishment
Number of
Employees per
Establishment
Value of Shipments (1967$)
1967(million$) f 1972(million$) (%) 1977(million$)
1.0
5-9
10-19
20-49
50-99
100-249
250-499
500-2499*
TOTAL
2.0
8.8
17.1
34.7
26.4
142.4
233.2
.3 2.2-
.9 3.1
3.8 20.5
7.3 14.3
14.9 74.3
11.3 47.0
61.1 214.1
.2 2.4
.6 6.8
.8 8.7
5.5
3.8
33.1
47.8
19.7 180.8
12.5 175.0
56.9 511.4
376.4 966.0
*Categories combined to
individual companies.
avoid disclosing figures for
Derived from: Census of Manufacturers, Industry Series,
U. S. Department of Commerce, Table 4, 1967,
1972, 1977; nominal values adjusted by Whole-
sale Price Index for Industrial Commodities
(1967=100), Wholesale Prices and Price Indexes,
U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics, 1972, 1977.
(%)
3.4
5.0
18.7
18.1
52.9
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information about possible changes in the production techno-
logy. If neither the percentage of plants in each plant size
class nor the percentage of value of shipments in each plant
size class has changed, then it is unlikely that the produc-
tion technology has changed significantly. For example, if
a new production process was introduced which had a major
effect on the minimum efficient scale of production, then
this change would affect both the size distribution of plants
and the distribution of value of shipments by plant size.
Figures 1-1 and 1-2 plot the percentage of plants in
each employment size category and the percentage of value of
shipments in each employment size category, respectively.
The distributions of plant size and value of shipments are
shown to have been quite stable over the period 1967 to
1977,5 and it can be concluded that it is unlikely that the
production technology changed significantly over that period.
Information about other aspects of the nature of supply
is presented in Table 1-4. The first thing to notice is the
large increase in the total number of plants between 1972 and
1977. This was largely due to the change in industry defini-
tion. Even with the addition of these new equipment cate-
gories, it can be seen that multi-plant firms are not very
prevalent in this industry, with the average number of pro-
duction establishments per firm ranging from 1.05 in 1967 to
1.15 in 1977.
The total number of employees and the number of produc-
tion workers has increased as the number of plants has grown,
-48-
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Table 1-4
Industry 3693
Selected Statistics
1967
Number of Companies
Number of Establishments
Establishments per
C ompany
Total Number of Employees
Number of Production
Workers
Production Workers as
% of Total Employees
Value of Shipments,
1967$ (million$)
Cost of Materials,
1967$ (million$)
Cost of Materials as
% of Value of Shipments
Production Wages,
1967$ (million$)
Production Wages as
% of Value of Shipments
78
82
1.05
7900
4300
54.4
233.2
104.0
44.6
26.3
11.3
1972
95
104
1.09
12,100
6900
57°0
376.4
124.9
33.2
47.1
12.5
Derived from: Census of Manufacturers, Industry Series,
U. S. Department of Commerce, Table la, 1977;
nominal values adjusted by Wholesale Price
Index for Industrial Commodities (1967=100),
Wholesale Prices and Price Indexes, U. S.
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics, 1972, 1977.
1977
211
243
1.15
30,900
17,100
55.3
966.o
372.5
38.6
100.2
10.4
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but the number of production workers as a proportion of total
employees has been steady over the period 1967 to 1977. Like-
wise the value of shipments has been growing, but the constant
dollar cost of materials and production wages as a proportion
of value of shipments has been relatively stable over the
period.
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DEMAND CONDITIONS
The market for medical diagnostic imaging equipment con-
sists of firms which supply the machines and hospitals and
physicians' offices 6 which demand them. As Figure 1-3 illus-
trates, the machines are demanded for the flow of services,
or diagnostic imaging tests, which. they provide. These tests
are. then an input into the production function for medical
care. The final product of medical care is demanded by con-
sumers and supplied by hospitals or physicians' offices.
In this section the nature of demand for medical imaging
equipment is examined. This begins with a discussion of the
role of health. insurance in the market for medical care.
Then the distribution of demand, or who the buyers are, is
investigated. Next, the determinants of demand are analyzed,
with. hospitals and physicians' offices treated separately.
Finally, the. nature of demand is explored by looking at the
price elasticity of demand and utilization rates.
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Health Insurance
One of the most important features of the medical care
market is that payment for services rendered is generally
made by a third party, i.e., by a private insurance company
or a public program such as Medicare. The percentage of the
population in the U. S. covered by some type of health insur-
ance has increased steadily from about 50% in 1950 to over
80% in 1980.7
The relevant price of medical care is the net price, or
what the patient actually pays. Health insurance reduces the
effective price of medical care to the consumer. For the
individual, health insurance means a lower price--the consumer
moves down his or her demand curve. However, the aggregate
effect is an outward shift of the demand for medical care
(Feldstein, 1979). This implies that demand for inputs to
medical care, such as imaging equipment, is also increased.
Moreover, given such extensive insurance coverage, the method
of reimbursement chosen by third-party payers will affect
resource allocation (and thus demand for inputs) by the
suppliers of medical care (Joskow, 1981).
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Distribution of Demand
As noted previously, both hospitals and physicians' off-
ices demand medical imaging equipment. The economic behavior
of these buyers may differ (see next section) and it is use-
ful to know the relative importance of these buyers. One
source of information about the distribution of demand is
the survey of firms in the industry (see Appendix A). One
of the questions in the survey asked about the distribution
of sales. The responses, reported in Table 1-5, show that,
for the 25 companies responding to the question, about half
of imaging equipment sales are to hospitals, about a quarter
to physicians' offices, and the remainder to other companies
and other. The relatively high percentage of sales to other
companies (15%) is due to responses from firms which produce
only imaging equipment components (see Chapter 2). The res-
ponses for the multiproduct firms, which are more represen-
tative of firms selling imaging systems, show that about 80%
of imaging equipment sales are to hospitals and about 15% are
to physicians' offices. This is consistent with the estimate
by International Resource Development (1978) that hospitals
account for about 85% of total U. S. purchases of medical
imaging systems.
With respect to X-ray equipment, Miller (1977) reports
that less than 40% of all medical diagnostic X-ray systems
are located in hospitals. And, a FDA report 8 estimated that
over 60% of all X-ray procedures in 1970 were performed in
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hospitals. Since larger, more expensive X-ray equipment will
tend to be found in hospitals, it is expected that annual
sales of X-ray equipment to hospitals will be at least half
of total sales. This agrees with the survey finding that
slightly over half of X-ray equipment sales are to hospitals.
The situation is rather different for sales of CT scan-
ners. Banta and Sanes (1978) report that as of August 1976,
83% of the scanners they were able to identify were located
in hospitals and 17% were operated in private physicians'
offices and clinics. This agrees with a survey by the Na-
tional Electrical Manufacturers Association which found that,
of the CT scanner units installed in the U. S. as of December
1977, approximately 85% were in hospitals and 15% were in
physicians' offices and clinics. 9 And by May 1980, the Off-
ice of Technology Assessment reported that 78% of the opera-
tional CT scanners in the U. S. were located in community
hospitals.1 0 The survey results correspond to these findings
after a firm which produces CT components is excluded from
the tabulation; the four remaining firms report that about
80% of CT scanner sales are to hospitals and about 15% are
to physicians' offices.
The demand for ultrasound devices is similar to that
for X-ray equipment. Both technologies are long established,
and the machines are relatively inexpensive and easy to use.
Particularly since the dosage levels used in diagnostic
ultrasound are not considered to be dangerous (Fleischer
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and James, 1980), many private physicians specializing in ob-
stetrics have ultrasound devices in their offices. Portugal
(1982) estimated that about 60% of ultrasound units are sold
to hospitals, the remainder going primarily to physicians'
offices, a conclusion in accordance with the survey results.
For the five nuclear scanning equipment manufacturers
responding to the survey, about 50% of sales are to hospitals
and about 25% are to physicians' offices. The large percen-
tage of sales to other (21%) is due to one company which sells
all its equipment for clinical research. When this firm is
excluded, the remaining four firms report that 65% of sales
are to hospitals and about 30% to physicians' offices.
The distribution of demand thus varies by type of equip-
ment, with hospitals accounting for most CT scanner sales.
For X-ray equipment, ultrasound devices, and nuclear scanning
equipment, on the other hand, physicians' offices are also an
important component off demand.
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Determinants of Demand -
There are two components of the decision to purchase
medical diagnostic imaging equipment: the decision to pur-
chase and the choice among alternative pieces of equipment.
The periodic nature of the decision to purchase is a result
of the fact that diagnostic imaging machines are durable
goods. This is a technical decision, the buyer can be thought
of as solving an optimal stock purchase problem given flow
characteristics of the machines and final demand for flow
services,
In standard derived demand analysis, demand for an input
being supplied to a cost-minimizing producer will depend only
on input prices and the level of final output. In the case
of medical care, however, "output" is multidimensional, with
both quantity and quality being important aspects of the level
of output. Quality in this context is determined both by the
level of inputs used and by the range of services provided
(Joskow, 1980). For example, the quantity "100 bed-days of
hospital care" could be associated with many different levels
of quality as measured by such things as number of nurses per
bed, in-house clinical chemistry capabilities, number of
tntensive care beds, etc. The producers of medical care, in
choosing the level of output, thus choose both a level of
quantity and a level of quality. This choice, along with
input prices, will determine the demand for inputs.
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Hospitals
A number of early papers modeled hospitals as striving
to maximize some economic variable subject to various con-
straints. As Jacobs (19741 observes, these models can be
identified by the fact that they treat the hospital as an
"organism" or monolithic decision-making entity. The maxi-
mand in these models ranges from net revenue (Davis, 1971) to
net income of staff physicians (Pauly and Redisch, 1973).
A major drawback of the "organism" models is that they assume
that production decisions in the hospital are made either by
the hospital administrator or by the medical staff. In fact,
as Harris (1977, 1979L demonstrates, the most relevant fact
for understanding hospital behavior is the largely autonomous
dual lines of authority that characterize the organizational
structure of the hospital.
The medical staff makes the clinical decisions about
medical care and thereby allocates hospital resources, while
the hospital administration is responsible for making the
resources available to doctors, getting supplies from outside
sources to the appropriate hospital personnel. The adminis-
txation in principle faces a budget constraint and must pay
attention to input costs in making purchase and budget deci-
si.ons. For example, in considering the purchase of a piece
of medical imaging equipment, the administration must look at
the difference between hospital revenues (projected number of
diagnostic imaging tests times expected reimbursement per test)
(· )
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and costs (price of the machine, operating costs, physician
and technician labor costs). However, when third-party pay-
ment is cost-based, the expected reimbursement per test is
tied to the price of the machine (and other costs) and the
nominal budget constraint is nonbinding over time. As for
the doctors, with the exception of a loose departmental bud-
get constraint (which generally does not cover capital ex-
pendituresl, there is no incentive for taking input costs
into account when making clinical decisions.
Consumers of hospital care pay very little of the costs
of hospital care out of their own pocket. Joskow (1981)
estimates that 80% to 9Q% of the population in the United
States has insurance coverage for about 95% of hospital
charges. This means that the price of care is not very
important in the consumer's choice among hospitals. It
also means that hospitals must shift the basis of their com-
petition for patients to something other than price. And
hospitals have found that competition on the basis of quality
and scope of services provided is an effective means of
attracting patients CJoskow, 19801.
Quality competition in the medical care market influences
the demand for inputs into the production of medical care.
Because medical imaging equipment is technologically complex,
there are. numerous dimensions to the quality of such a machine.
Foremost are aspects of the image itself, such as clarity,
lack of artifact, and resolution. Properties of the machine,
such. as speed, ease of operation, reliability, and service
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and maintenance characteristics are also important Csee
Chapter 2 for further detail).11 And, quality will also be
a very important determinant of the demand for medical imag-
ing equipment because both lines of authority in the hospital
have an incentive to emphasize quality in the choice among
alternative pieces of equipment.
As argued above., the pervasiveness of third-party payment
and cos.t-based reimbursement methods makes the price of diag-
nostic equipment a secondary consideration for the hospital
administration. And, administrators can point to up-to-date
diagnostic facilities as tangible evidence of the quality of
care provided by their hospital.
For the doctors, a better quality image is thought to
lead to a better diagnosis, and thus to a higher quality of
medical care. The availability of high quality, state-of-
the-art equipment also enhances the radiologist's reputation
as a specialist, thereby increasing his or her potential in-
come, and is a protection against malpractice actions. And
the. staff physicians can reassure their patients that the
latest diagnostic advances are at their service.
A study by Cromwell et al. (19761 supports this line
of reasoning. They found that factors such as improvements
tn patient care and patient safety tended to be much more
important than price in a hospital's decision to adopt a new
piece of equipment. This is consistent with a Frost and
Sullivan (C19741 report which. finds that the choice of diag-
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nostic equipment depends-on (in order of importance1: per-
formance, safety, service, ease of use, and price.
Thus, the hospital's choice among alternative pieces of
medical imaging equipment will be determined primarily by
perceived quality variations. However, hospitals account for
only a portion of the demand for this type of equipment, with
physicians' offices accounting for the remainder.
K. )
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Physicians,! Offices
Physicians in private practice, like hospitals, must
choose levels of both quantity and quality when making
"output" decisions. In a review of the literature on phy-
sician behavior, the National Academy of Sciences (1979)
reported that physicians were influenced by income, prestige,
leisure, ethics, and the quality of medical care. More
formally, Zweifel (19811 presents a model of physician
behavior in which utility depends on labor income, leisure
time, and an ethical variable, For Zweifel's purposes, the
ethical variable is defined in terms of the doctor's time and
the patient's symptom severity level. It is easy to see,
however, that production costs as a signal of quality could
enter the utility function positively through the ethical
variable, as well as negatively through. the income variable.
By emphasizing quality in the choice of inputs, the physician
can avoid giving the appearance of providing "cut-rate" care
and can fulfill the ethical commitment to put the welfare of
the. patient first.
Patients are. often ignorant about the prices charged by
various doctors (Newhouse, 19701. This raises the question
of how doctors compete for.patients, if not on the basis of
price. As with. hospitals, quality competition is likely to
be an effective means of attracting patients. And, the
possession of highly visible, technologically sophisticated
equipment is a signal of quality care by the doctor.
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It is important to note that physician's offices appear
to operate under a more rigid budget constraint than do hos-
pitals. Sloan and Stei-nwald (1975) found that insurance
coverage for surgical procedures and in-hospital visits is
much. more complete. than that for outpatient visits. This
means that patients will pay more of the cost of office visits
out of their pocket. They also found that cost-based reim-
bursement procedures were not the norm for physician repay-
ment, rather they present evidence that insurers! fee sche-
dules are generally set well below physicians' mean fees.
This means that physicians" offices will tend to be more
sensitive to price than hospitals when choosing among alter-
native pieces of medical equipment Cbut less sensitive than
a producer without thi'rd-party payments,
As a result of both ethical considerations and competi-
tion for patients, quality will be an important determinant
of the demand for medical diagnostic imaging equipment by
physicians! offices. However, because reimbursement pro-
cedures tend not to be cost-based, the demand by physicians'
offices will be more price-sensitive than the demand by
hospitals.
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Price Elasticity of Demand
Hicks (1963) derives Marshall's rules for the determinants
of derived demand elastibity in the two factor case. He finds
that demand for the input is more elastics
(1) the more readily substitutes are obtained,
(2) the larger that input's share in total cost (provided
that the elasticity of final demand exceeds the elas-
ticity of substitution),
(3) the more elastic the demand for the final product, and
(4) the more elastic the supply of other inputs.
This is a convenient way of assessing the price elasticity of
the derived demand for medical diagnostic imaging equipment.
Each of the determinants will be considered in turn.
As was discussed in the market definition section, there
is little opportunity for substitution between medical imaging
equipment and other types of diagnostic equipment or services.
This is because medical imaging equipment provides the physi-
cian with a unique type of clinical information, Diagnostic
imaging tests allow the doctor to visualize internal organs.
The only potential substitutes are exploratory surgery, endo-
scopic examinations, and thermographic (heat sensitive) diag-
nostic tests. There are serious dangers and costs associated
with exploratory surgery and endoscopy and thermography are
viable only for particular medical conditions. This suggests
that, for most diagnostic uses, there would have to be very
extreme price changes in order to induce any significant
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substitution between medical imaging equipment and other inputs
into the production of medical care.
In terms of the share of diagnostic imaging tests in the
total costs of medical care, Theta Technology Corp. (1978)
estimated that the radiology department accounts for approxi-
mately five per cent of total hospital costs. This is consis-
tent with a Frost and Sullivan(1980b) report that, on average,
diagnostic imaging operating costs accounted for about 4.5 per
cent, and imaging labor costs about 5.3 per cent, of the
respective hospital totals for those costs.
Feldstein (1979) reviewed the extensive literature on the
demand for medical care and found that medical care is demand
inelastic. The price elasticity for hospital patient days
ranged from -.2 to -.7, for hospital admissions from -.03 to
-.5, and for physician visits from -.1 to -.2.
There is little empirical work on the supply elasticity
of the inputs into medical care. Given this and the fact that
there are no strong a priori grounds for assessing relative
supply elasticities, it will be assumed that the supply elas-
ticity of other inputs is not a predominant determinant of
the price elasticity of medical imaging equipment.
Putting the various effects together, we find that:
(1) there is little substitution among diagnostic imaging
tests and other inputs into the production of medical
care,
(2) the costs of medical imaging do not account for a
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significant share of the total costs of medical care,
and
(3) the final output, medical care, is demand inelastic.
This suggests that the demand for medical diagnostic imaging
equipment will tend to be relatively price inelastic.
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Utilization Rates
Changes in the rate of utilization of diagnostic imaging
procedures technically do not give information about changes
in demand, rather they tell how the equilibrium quantity posi-
tion has changed. But, when demand is relatively inelastic
and prices have not decreased, conditions which hold in this
market, increases in utilization will be associated with out-
ward shifts of the demand curve.
In general, the utilization of non-labor inputs (includ-
ing diagnostic imaging equipment) has increased over the past
15 years.12 In particular, a National Academy of Sciences
(1979) study found that the use of equipment-intensive ancil-
lary services (including diagnostic imaging procedures) has
increased over the past ten years.
Turning to the utilization rates of specific procedures,
Epstein and Grundy (1974) present evidence that 108 million
people received an X-ray examination in the U. S. in 1964
and that by 1970 this had increased to 129 million people.
The Food and Drug Administration estimates that by 1979 this
had increased to 160 million people. 13 Epstein and Grundy
(1974) also show that the number of X-ray procedures in the
U. S. increased from 173 million in 1964 to 210 million in
1970. This had increased to 240 million X-ray procedures per
year by 1977 (Theta Technology Corp., 1978).
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Banta and Sanes (1978) estimated that in August 1976
there were 320 CT scanners in use in the U. S., and that by
the beginning of 1978 1200 machines were in operation. They
also estimated that, early in 1976, the average machine per-
formed 3000 scans annually. By May 1980 there were 1470
scanners in operation in the U. S.14 Provided that the aver-
age number of scans per machine per year did not decrease sub-
stantially (an unlikely prospect), this implies that the num-
ber of CT scans performed per year increased substantially
over the period 1976 to 1980.
Frost and Sullivan (1974b, 1979) estimated that there
were 4.2 million in vivo radiodiagnostic procedures performed
in the U. S. in 1971, 7.5 million in 1973, and 8 million in
1977. And, Michela (1976) found that between 1971 and 1975
the number of nuclear medicine procedures per 100 hospital
admissions increased from 11.7 to 22.2.
These various pieces of evidence demonstrate that the
utilization rate of diagnostic imaging procedures has in-
creased over the past 15 years. And, they are consistent
with an increase in the demand for medical imaging equipment
over the period.
-71-
REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT
There is an extensive set of government regulations which
have an impact on the market for medical diagnostic imaging
equipment. In the first place, there are two federal regula-
tory programs which directly affect the manufacturers of medi-
cal imaging equipment. These are:
(1) radiation safety regulation by the Food and Drug Admin-
istration (FDA), a program covering all radiation-
emitting electronic products in order to protect the
public from the hazards of radiation exposure; and
(2) medical device regulation by the FDA, a program designed
to provide for the safety and efficacy of all medical
devices.
There are also a number of regulatory programs which
affect the demanders of diagnostic imaging equipment. Hospi-
tals, in particular, are subject to a wide array of regula-
tions at the federal, state, and local levels. These regula-
tions can be classified as pertaining to hospital investment,
expenditure, utilization, or safety. Hospital investment is
regulated primarily by certificate-of-need (CON) programs and
hospital expenditures by reimbursement controls. Utilization
regulation includes such programs as Professional Standards
Review, designed to evaluate the appropriateness of health
care provision. Safety is regulated by a variety of programs,
such as state safety inspections and licensure of medical
users of radioactive materials by the Nuclear Regulatory
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Commission. Regulatory constraints on physicians' offices
are limited primarily to reimbursement controls in the Medi-
care and Medicaid programs.
In this section the legislative history, purpose, and
provisions of radiation safety and medical device regulation
will be described. Then CON and reimbursement regulation
of hospitals will be discussed. The purpose of this section
is to specify the web of regulatory constraints affecting the
medical diagnostic imaging equipment market; a consideration
of the impacts of these programs is postponed to Chapter 5.
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Radiation Control Act
The Radiation Control foL Health and Safety Act of 1968
(P.L. 90-602) provides for federal regulation of all radiation-
emitting electronic products. In the U. S., X-ray examina-
tions account for over 90 per cent of the population's total
exposure to man-made ionizing radiation (Epstein and Grundy,
1974) Public concern about the potential for excessive radia-
tion dosage from medical and dental X-ray procedures and the
emission of X-rays from televisions and microwave ovens re-
sulted in passage of this legislation.15
The purpose of radiation safety regulation is to protect
both patients and imaging equipment operators from the hazards
of long-run low-level exposure to radioactive materials. For
example, medical X-ray examinations use a radiation dosage for
which there are no immediately observable effects. However,
although expert opinion on the biological effects of radiation
is by no means unanimous, it is generally agreed that the eff-
ects are cumulative over time (Epstein and Grundy, 1974). The
social concern, therefore, is with the long-term effects of
radiation exposure such as an increased incidence of cancers
and the potential for genetic defects.
The radiation safety regulatory program is administered
by the National Center for Devices and Radiological Health
of the FDA, and operates primarily by means of performance
standards which set minimum safety standards for any radiation-
emitting electronic product. Although the authorizing legis-
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lation was passed in 1968; the performance standards were not
announced until 1972, and did not become effective until 1974.
In terms of medical imaging equipment, X-ray equipment,
CT scanners, and ultrasound devices all fall within the auth-
ority of this regulation. However, the potential radiation
hazard to health of diagnostic ultrasound devices was not con-
sidered to be serious enough to warrant the imposition of per-
formance standards for this class of equipment. Note that
nuclear scanning equipment is not covered because the radia-
tion associated with a nuclear scan comes not from the equip-
ment, but from the ingested or injected radioactive material.
Thus, radiation safety regulation affects only the manufac-
turers of diagnostic X-ray equipment (a term which includes
both conventional X-ray equipment and CT scanners).
The salient aspects of radiation safety regulation are:16
(1) Safety performance standards.
Directions for maximum allowable radiation leakage,
maximum allowable exposure time, limitation of the beam
until adjusted to the image receptor size (called
"positive beam limitation"), minimum allowable source
to skin distance, safety interlocks, etc.
(2) Labeling and safety information requirements.
Directions for content and placement of warning and
identification labels, provision of detailed technical
information, safety instructions, and necessary main-
tenance schedules, etc.
-75-
(3) Specified quality control procedures.
Required characteristics of equipment used to measure
compliance (e.g., aperture size), directions for the
number, timing, and range of measures of compliance,
etc.
(4) Recordkeeping and reporting requirements.
Requirements for records of quality control procedures,
results of compliance tests, and distribution of pro-
ducts; and submission of initial and annual reports
on safety testing procedures.
Radiation safety regulation affects the manufacturers
of X-ray equipment and CT scanners. The most notable feature
of the program is the use of standards as a means of pro-
tecting the public from the hazards of long-run low-level
radiation exposure.
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Medical Device Amendments
The Medical Device Amendments of 1976 to the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act (P.L. 94-295) authorized federal regulation
of all medical devices in order to assure safety and efficacy.
Interestingly, this rather sweeping legislation (it is esti-
mated that as many as 5000 products may be affectedl7) was
enacted at a time when deregulatory sentiment was strong in
Congress (Baram, 1978). The legislation was initiated in
response to public fears about rapid technological change in
medical devices and the potential harm to users without fed-
eral standards. Rapid diffusion of the use of intrauterine
devices, specifically the Dalkon shield (later shown to have
potentially serious side-effects), was of particular concern.18
Medical device regulation, like radiation safety regula-
tion, is administered by the National Center for Devices and
Radiological Health, an agency which is the result of a recent
merger of the Bureau of Medical Devices and the Bureau of
Radiological Health within the FDA. The enabling legislation
calls for devices to be classified into one of the following
groups according to the extent of regulatory control: Class I,
General Controls; Class II, Performance Standards; and Class
III, Premarket Approval. In addition, there are general re-
porting and recordkeeping requirements.
The rationale behind medical device legislation is that,
as medical devices become more technologically sophisticated
and more complex, premarket testing and quality control stan-
-77-
dards are necessary to ensure safety and efficacy. There is
a role for the government because many devices are so compli-
cated that even highly trained users, such as doctors, are
unable to evaluate their performance. 1 9
Class I devices are subject only to general regulatory
controls such as prohibitions against adulterated or misbranded
devices. Devices in Class II must comply with safety standards
governing their performance. And, Class III devices must pass
approval requirements, involving in some cases clinical in-
vestigations, before they can be marketed. Expert advisory
panels have been established to advise on the classification
of devices. To date, the final classification has been pub-
lished only for devices in the following general categories:
hematology and pathology; cardiovascular; general hospital and
personal use; neurological; and obstetrical and gynecological. 2 0
FDA device categories are narrowly defined. For example,
what is here called X-ray equipment includes a large number of
device categories ranging from Electrostatic X-Ray Imaging
System to Cine Fluorographic X-Ray Camera to Chest X-Ray Unit
to Diagnostic X-Ray High Voltage Generator. In general, medi-
cal diagnostic imaging equipment is Class II, with safety per-
formance standards for X-ray equipment, CT scanners, and
ultrasound devices already established as a result of radia-
tion safety regulation.
All medical devices are subject to the general provisions
of the regulations. These are such things as labeling re-
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quirements, establishment registration and device listing for
manufacturers, premarket notification procedures, applications
for investigational device exemptions, and compliance with
good manufacturing practice standards (quality control and
testing, recordkeeping). It is important to note that a manu-
facturer must submit a premarket notification form (510-K)
before the introduction of a "new" product. If the manufac-
turer can demonstrate that the product is substantially equi-
valent to a device already being sold, then premarket approval
is not required. If, however, it is a truly "new" product,
then premarket approval is required. In this case the manu-
facturer must present evidence that the device is both safe
and efficacious. 2 1
Regulation of medical devices is similar in some ways to
drug regulation by the FDA. However, the medical device
amendments were written with an eye to avoiding some of the
problems associated with the regulation of pharmaceuticals.
Thus, for example, the use of three classes, to differentiate
between levels of potential risk. And, the advisory expert
panels were established to encourage flexibility and respon-
siveness by the FDA (National Academy of Sciences, 1979).
It is interesting to note that the medical devices indus-
try actually supported the establishment of safety standards
for medical devices.22 The rationale was that this would
serve as a guarantee against the possibility of irresponsible
actions by a few firms which could greatly harm the reputation
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of the industry (Baram, 1978). On the other hand, firms in
the industry are adamantly opposed to the premarket approval
provisions of the regulation, arguing that they will lead to
a significant retardation in innovation. 23
Medical device regulation affects the manufacturers of
all types of diagnostic imaging equipment. Manufacturers
must ensure the safety and effitacy of their medical devices
by compliance with safety performance standards for estab-
lished products and by receipt of premarket approval for
new products.
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Hospital Regulation
The rapid rise of health care expenditures is a well-
known source of public concern. The increases in total expen-
ditures are a result of both price and quantity increases.
For example, over the period 1970 to 1980, personal health care
expenditures increased at a 12.9% average annual rate when mea-
sured in nominal terms, and at a 4.3% average annual rate when
measured in constant dollars. -24
The attempt to control these medical care expenditure in-
creases has focused almost exclusively on the hospital. One
of the reasons for this emphasis on the hospital is that over
the period 1970 to 1980 the consumer price index for a hospital
room not only increased much faster than the consumer price
index for all items, but also increased substantially faster
than the consumer price index for all medical care.25
As was mentioned previously, there are several different
types of hospital regulations: investment, expenditure, util-
ization, and safety. The certificate-of-need (CON) program
(investment) and reimbursement controls (expenditure) will be
discussed in detail, because they are directly related to the
issue of controlling hospital costs and thus have an impact
on the firms which supply inputs to the hospitals.
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Certificate-of-Need Programs
Under a certificate-of-need (CON) program, a hospital2 6
must demonstrate to a state or local health systems agency
that certain need criteria have been met before making a
capital expenditure of over $100,000 or $150,000.27 The pur-
pose of CON review is to control hospital cost inflation by
preventing excess capacity and restraining "unnecessary"
expansion (Salkever and Bice, 1979). There are some common
characteristics, but CON programs differ substantially from
state to state, and thus the objectives and implementation of
the program will also vary by state (Russell, 1979).
Although some states already had programs, CON became
widespread after the passage of the National Health Planning
and Resource Development Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-641), which
provided for the withholding of certain federal funds if a
state did not establish a CON program meeting given standards.
This legislation reinforced and extended the intent of Section
1122 of the Social Security Amendments of 1972, which auth-
orized the denial of reimbursement for capital expenditures
under Medicare and Medicaid without approval of the appropriate
health systems agency (Joskow, 1981).
As of January 1980, 47 states had passed CON laws. These
programs all meet the federal guidelines. Beyond that, how-
ever, there are substantial differences among states. In the
first place, agency objectives vary, with some states focusing
on regional health planning needs and others emphasizing strict
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control of facility duplication or expansion. The stated
criteria for approval also differ from state to state, as
well as agency budgets and the extent of information that
must be provided by the applicants (Joskow, 1981).
CON has the potential to significantly affect the demand
for medical diagnostic imaging equipment. The price of many
medical imaging machines exceeds the CON threshold and, in
these cases, purchase of the machine becomes contingent upon
receiving CON approval. Although firms will often work with
the hospital to prepare a CON application, the final impact
on the manufacturers depends on how the CON criteria are
interpreted by the regulatory agency. The effects of CON
on the industry will be analyzed in Chapter 5. In the mean-
time, CON, as an important part of the regulatory environment,
must be kept in mind when analyzing the structure, conduct,
and performance of the medical imaging equipment industry.
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Reimbursement Regulation
Since over 80 per cent of the population in the U. S.
has insurance coverage for about 95 per cent of hospital
charges (Joskow, 1981), the method of third-party reimburse-
ment is a very important link in the chain of hospital costs.
In the past, cost-based retrospective reimbursement, in which
the hospital was repaid on the basis of a markup over actual
costs incurred, was common. When costs are fully reimbursed,
hospitals have no incentive to conserve resources or hold
down costs.
Beginning in the early 1970's, there was a movement toward
prospective reimbursement, in which repayment rates are set in
advance. Prospective reimbursement is sometimes the result
of rate-setting regulation at the state level and sometimes
the result of private rate regulation programs, usually Blue
Cross (Dowling, 1977). Although there are various methods for
setting prospective reimbursement rates, the general purpose
is to force hospitals to face a binding budget constraint.
The price controls stemming from the Economic Stabiliza-
tion Program in the early 1970's were the first widespread
effort to constrain hospital budgets. The Carter administra-
tion attempted to extend this initiative by proposing a hos-
pital cost containment program. However, this legislation
was not passed by Congress, and, as a result, responsibility
for controlling hospital inflation reverted to the state level.
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The lack of federal leadership has resulted in a great
deal of variation among states in hospital reimbursement
policies. As of the end of 1980, only eight states had man-
datory rate regulation programs; four states had mandatory
rate review programs, and there were private rate regulation
programs in 12 states. Even among the mandatory programs,
there were significant differences in the method of rate
determination, coverage, and organizational structure
(Joskow, 1981).
Prospective reimbursement of hospitals can affect the
demand for medical imaging equipment. In the first place,
effective prospective rate-setting will reduce the utiliza-
tion rate of growth for diagnostic imaging tests and thus,
prices held constant, will reduce the quantity of medical
imaging equipment demanded. A binding budget constraint may
also affect the choice among alternative machines, i.e.,
since price will play a larger role in the purchase decision
relative to quality, which machine is chosen may change.
The effect of various public policies, including reimburse-
ment regulation, on the medical diagnostic imaging equipment
industry will be examined in Chapter 5.
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FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER 1
1For example, there is a medical journal called Diagnos-
tic Imaging and a radiology reference entitled Medical Imaging
(Kreel, 1979), both covering exactly these types of procedures.
2See, for example, Introduction to Clinical Radiology
(Miller, 1982) or A Textbook of Radiology and Imagin , Third
Ed. (Sutton, 1980).
3Changing Medical Markets, 50 (February 1983), pg. 5.
4 The primary product specialization ratio, the ratio of
primary product shipments to the sum of primary and secondary
product shipments, for SIC 3693 was 98% in 1977, 95% in 1972,
and 93% in 1967 (U. S. Department of Commerce, Census of Manu-
factures, Industry Series, 1967, 1972, 1977).
5 An analysis of variance was used to test the null hypo-
thesis that the average number of employees per establishment
was the same in 1967, 1972, and 1977. The F statistic was
insufficient to reject the null hypothesis. However, this
test is not valid because the underlying populations are not
normally distributed with the same standard deviation. A
Kruskal-Wallis nonparametric analysis of variance was not
feasible due to the nature of the data (reported in averages
for employment size ranges).
6 Although medical clinics also demand medical imaging
equipment, they will not be considered separately in this
analysis. Clinics may be organized on either a non-profit or
a for-profit basis. If they are non-profit, then they are
similar to hospitals; if they are for-profit, then they are
similar to physicians' offices. Therefore, the nature of
demand can be examined by considering only hospitals and
physicians' offices.
7Derived from Source Book of Health Insurance Data, 1981-
82, Washington, D.C.: Health Insurance Association of Ameri-
ca, pg. 12; and Statistical Abstract of the United States,
1981, U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.
8U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare,
"Population Exposure to X-Rays, U.S. 1970," November 1973.
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9Cited in the "Gray Sheet" (Medical Devices, Diagnostics,
and Instrumentation Reports), May 1, 1978.
10 Ibid., February 23, 1981.
11This refers to the quality of a given piece of equip-
ment. Quality of a radiology department will depend not only
on characteristics of individual- machines, but also on the
range of services provided.
12Health, U.S., 1982, pg. 147.
13Federal Regulation of Radiation Health and Safety,
Committee on Governmental Affairs, U. S. Senate, 1978,
pg, -158,
14The "Gray Sheet," February 23, 1981.
15U. S. Code Congressional and Administrative News,
90th Congress, 2nd Session, 1968, pg. 5947.
16Summarized from relevant sections of Code of Federal
Regulations, Title 21,
17U. S, Department of Commerce C1979), pg. 61.
18U. S. Code Congressional and Administrative News,
94th Congress, 2nd Session, 1976, pg. 1071.
19Ibid., pg. 1075.
20Summarized from relevant sections of Code of Federal
Regulations, Title 21.
21Ibid
.
22Baram (1978C, pg. 195; National Academy of Engineering
(1971L, pp. 39-40; U. S. Congressional Record--Senate,
February 1, 1974, pg. 1794.
U. S. Department of Commerce (11979), pg. 65.
24Derived from Health., U.S., various years.
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25See Statistical Abstract of the United States, various
years; and Health, U.S., various years.
26 n addition to hospitals, the programs apply to nursing
facilities, health maintenance organizations, kidney treat-
ment centers, and ambulatory surgical facilities (National
Academy of Sciences, 1979).
27 The threshold varies by state.
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CHAPTER 2: MARKET STRUCTURE
This chapter is an examination of structure in the medical
diagnostic imaging equipment industry. The first section pro-
vides a broad overview of the industry, both market size and
the nature of the firms selling imaging equipment are investi-
gated. Then concentration patterns are explored, by product
line and for the industry as a whole. Barriers to entry are
the next aspect of structure analyzed. In particular, absolute
cost advantages, economies of scale, and product differentiation
are considered as sources of entry barriers. Finally, patterns
of entry, exit, and merger are surveyed.
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OVERVIEW OF THE INDUSTRY
The firms which supply medical diagnostic imaging equip-
ment are assumed to be profit-maximizing entities: they are
legally for-profit, usually incorporated, and often traded on
the major stock exchanges. Medical imaging equipment is
"supplized" both- by original equipment manufacturers and also
by firms which. buy components from the manufacturers and then
assemble the components at the purchase site. The industry
to be analyzed here consists of the firms which manufacture
imaging equipment.
This section is a foundation for the analysis of market
structure in this industry. A broad overview of the industry
is provided, beginning with a description of the extent of
the market, both. in the aggregate and by product line, along
with changes in market size over time. Then the nature of
the sellers is examined by looking at the number of sellers,
the prevalence of multiproduct suppliers, the size distribu-
tion of sellers, and a description of the primary firms in
the. industry.
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Market Size
Before considering the extent of the market for medical
imaging equipment, it is informative to put this market in
perspective by describing its position within the economy.
Over the years 1969 to 1980, the size of the health care
sector increased relative to other sectors of the economy, as
indicated by the increase in the proportion of gross national
product accounted for by national health expenditures from
7.1% to 9.5%. Within the health care sector, medical equipment
and supplies as a proportion of national health expenditures
increased slightly from 3.1% to 3.5%. And, medical imaging
equipment's share of the medical equipment and supplies market
remained steady at about 10% over the period.1 Thus, the
relative share of the diagnostic imaging equipment industry
in the economy's output increased over the years 1969 to 1980.
Aggregate sales of medical imaging equipment in the United
States were calculated by International Resource Development
(1978) for selected years over the period 1969 to 1978 (see
Table 2-1). According to these estimates, medical imaging
equipment sales grew at an average annual nominal rate of
14.8% and at an average annual real rate of 7.1% over the
years 1969 to 1978.2 These computations for aggregate sales
are consistent with those of other sources: total sales in
1977 and 1978 of $780 million and $850 million, respectively,
are cited in the "Gray Sheet,"3 and Frost and Sullivan (1980b)
estimated 1980 shipments of diagnostic imaging equipment at
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$900 million.
For the breakdown of sales by product line, however, the
estimates of International Resource Development (1978) do not
always agree with those of other sources. In regard to X-ray
equipment, the 1972 sales figure of $240 million shown in
Table 2-1 is relatively close to the Frost and Sullivan (1974a)
calculation of $192 million for the same year. But, for the
later years, International Resource Development estimates are
consistently below those from other sources. Theta Technology
Corp. (1978) assessed 1976 and 1977 sales of X-ray equipment at
$467 million and $506 million, respectively; a 1978 sales figure
for conventional X-ray equipment of $500 million was cited in
the "Gray Sheet,"4 and Frost and Sullivan (1980b) put 1980
shipments of X-ray equipment at $549 million.
For CT scanners, on the other hand, the estimates shown
in Table 2-1 are generally high in comparison with assessments
by other sources. In the first place, since the CT scanner was
first commercially placed in the United States in mid-1973
(Banta and Sanes, 1978), the appraisal of CT sales in 1972 at
$10 million is obviously incorrect. For the years after 1974,
Frost and Sullivan (1975a) assessed 1975 CT scanner sales at
$20 million, and Theta Technology Corp. (1978) calculated that
1976 and 1977 sales were $79 million and $108 million, respec-
tively. For 1978, the estimate of $215 million shown in Table
2-1 is relatively close to the Hale and Hale (1978) figure of
$195 million, but both are substantially higher than the
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$100 million estimate cited in the "Gray Sheet."5 Finally,
Frost and Sullivan (1980b) put 1980 shipments of CT scanners
at $114 million.
The size of the diagnostic ultrasound market as computed
by other sources in general conforms with the figures shown in
Table 2-1. Frost and Sullivan (1975b) calculate that sales of
diagnostic ultrasound devices were $4.7 million, $8.4 million,
$13.3 million, and $24.7 million in 1971, 1972, 1973, and 1974,
respectively. However, the 1978 sales estimate of $125 million
in Table 2-1 is higher than the $100 million figure quoted in
the "Gray Sheet," and the Hale and Hale (1978) estimate of
$95 million. And, for 1980, Frost and Sullivan (1980b) put
shipments at $122 million.
For nuclear imaging equipment, the Frost and Sullivan
(1974b) assessment that 1973 sales were $41 million agrees
with the figures in Table 2-1, but Frost and Sullivan (1979)
calculations that 1975, 1976, and 1977 sales were $71.1
million, $79.6 million, and $92 million, respectively, are
significantly higher than the estimates in Table 2-1. 1978
sales of $100 million are cited in the "Gray Sheet," 7 and
Frost and Sullivan (1980b) put 1980 shipments at $115 million.
Information from a variety of sources indicates that the
size of the medical diagnostic imaging equipment market has
steadily increased from approximately $240 million in 1969 to
about $900 million in 1980. And, there have been significant
changes in the relative positions of the various product lines
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over this period. In 1969, X-ray equipment dominated industry
sales, accounting for approximately 83% of total sales, with
nuclear imaging and diagnostic ultrasound equipment accounting
for about 15% and 1%, respectively. By 1980 there had been a
major shift in relative product shares, with X-ray equipment
accounting for about 61% of total industry sales, diagnostic
ultrasound for about 14%, and CT scanners and nuclear imaging
equipment for about 13% each. Nuclear imaging equipment main-
tained its share of the market over the period 1969 to 1980,
with the market share gains for CT scanners and ultrasound
devices coming at the expense of conventional X-ray equipment.
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Sellers
Using a variety of sources, a data file of firms in the
medical imaging equipment market for the period 1971 to 1981
was constructed. This file is the basis for the descriptive
statistics presented in this section. Included in the file is
information on each firm's medical imaging product line in any
given year. Table 2-2 shows the total number of firms manu-
facturing medical imaging equipment for the years 1971 to 1981,
along with a breakdown of the total by single product and
multiproduct sellers, i.e., whether a firms sells one or more
than one of the four types of diagnostic imaging equipment,
respectively.
Over this period, the total number of firms in the indus-
try increased steadily from 42 in 1971 to a high of 87 in 1979,
after which there was a slight decrease to 79 firms in 1981.
Also over this period the proportion of multiproduct firms in-
creased from 12% in 1971 to a high of 26% in 1977, after which
the proportion remained steady at 23% for the years 1978 to
1981.
Note that this movement toward multiproduct sellers
parallels the decline of X-ray equipment's share of total
sales: as other products accounted for a greater share of
sales, more firms began to supply these other products. The
forces behind the rapid expansion in the number of sellers
will be analyzed in the section on entry patterns.
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Table 2-2
Number of Manufacturers
of Medical Diagnostic Imaging Equipment,
By Number of Medical Imaging Product Lines, 1971-81
Single Product*
(Number)
37
43
46
49
54
57
66
67
Multiproduct**
(%) (Number)
5
5
7
8
13
17
20
20
20
19
18
88
89
86
85
79
76
74
77
77
77
77
Total
(%) (Number)
12
11
14
15
21
24
26
23
23
23
23
42
46
50
54
62
71
77
86
87
82
79
*Firm manufactures only one type of imaging equipment.
**Firm manufactures more than one type of imaging
equipment.
See footnote (8).
Year
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
Derived from:
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It is also instructive to consider the breakdown of sellers
by product line. This is shown in Table 2-3, along with the
proportion of total number of firms producing each type of
medical imaging equipment. The decline in the sales share of
X-ray equipment is here reflected in the fact that the propor-
tion of firms in the industry supplying that product declined
from 71% in 1971 to 65% in 1981, even though the number of
X-ray producers increased over this period. The proportion of
firms selling nuclear scanning equipment also decreased over
the period, with the number of suppliers remaining approximately
the same. Firms producing CT scanners and ultrasound devices,
on the other hand, increased in terms of both number of firms
and proportion of total firms in the industry.
Recall from the discussion of supply conditions that any
piece of medical diagnostic imaging equipment is composed of a
number of different components. The example was given of a
diagnostic X-ray system which may include an X-ray tube, high-
voltage generator, control panel, table, film changer, cassette
holder, and collimator. This distinction between components
and systems is important for the medical imaging equipment in-
dustry because some firms manufacture only components. This is
especially true for X-ray equipment, as can be seen in Table
2-4 which gives the breakdown by product line of whether firms
produce components or systems.
Of the firms manufacturing X-ray equipment, in 1971 20%
produced components and by 1981 this had increased to about
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30%; the number of firms producing components also increased
over this period. For CT scanners, both the number (2) and
proportion (about 10%) of components firms remained about the
same over the period 1975 to 1981. The number of ultrasound
firms making components was approximately constant over the
years 1971 to 1981 (1 or 2 firms), but as a proportion of the
total, components production decreased from 14% in 1971 to 3%
in 1981. And for nuclear scanning equipment, all the firms
manufacture systems.
The concentration of components production in the X-ray
equipment segment of the industry is a function of the size of
the market and technology. The trend toward specialization is
limited by the extent of the market, but as we have seen, there
is a large sales volume for medical X-ray equipment (approxi-
mately $550 million in 1980, Frost and Sullivan, 1980b). It
should also be noted that the dental and industrial X-ray
equipment markets, which include many of the same components,
are also sizeable. For example, in 1980 the value of product
shipments for irradiation equipment, a category covering medi-
cal, dental, and industrial X-ray equipment, as well as X-ray
tubes, accessories, and components, was $798 million.9 Another
factor is that X-ray technology for basic components has been
quite stable over the past ten years, with the development of
more advanced peripheral equipment (such as data processing
systems) accounting for the bulk of innovation (see Chapter 3).
Thus there has been an opportunity for specialization within
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the X-ray segment of the market, while in the other market
segments the potential for specialization has been -limited by
the high rate of technological change and a substantially
lower sales volume.
Another notable characteristic of the firms in this in-
dustry is their tendency to be diversified, i.e., also active
in industries other than medical imaging equipment. In gen-
eral, the medical imaging equipment firm is a subsidiary or
division of the larger firm, Table 2-5 shows that over the
period 1971 to 1981, about 60% of the firms in the industry
were diversified and that the proportion was relatively stable
over the period.
Table 2-5 also shows the importance of foreign-based
firms in this industry. For the years 1971 to 1981, approxi-
mately 30% of the firms had company headquarters located out-
side the United States.
The size distribution of firms is another important as-
pect of the industry. Due to the prevalence of firms which
are diversified, there are two measures of firm size which
are of interest. Table 2-6 shows the size distribution of
firms measured both by sales of medical imaging equipment
and by total firm sales, where total sales refer to the parent
company in the case of subsidiaries and divisions. The pro-
portion of small firms measured in terms of medical imaging
equipment sales increased from about 70% in 1971 to about
80% in 1981, while the proportion of small firms measured in
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Table 2-5
Number of Manufacturers
of Medical Diagnostic Imaging Equipment,
By Diversification and Company
Base of Operations, 1971-81
Diversified*
Company
Base of Operations
Yes
(#) (%)
No
(#) (W)
U.S.
(#) ()
Foreign
(#) ()
24 57 18 43
28 61 18 39
30 60o 20 40
33 61 21 39
35 56 27 44
41 58 30 42
47 61 30 39
53 62 33 38
53 61 34 39
50 61 32 39
46 58 33 42
30 71 12 29
31 67 15 33
34 68 16 32
36 67 18 33
43 69 19 31
49 69 22 31
54 70 23 30
59 69 27 31
59 68
54 66
28 32
28 34
52 66 27 34
*Firm is diversified if it also sells in other industries.
Derived from: See footnote (8).
Year
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
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Table 2-6
Number of Manufacturers
of Medical Diagnostic Imaging Equipment,
By Medical Imaging Equipment
and Total Firm Sales, 1971-81
Sales of Medical
Imaging EquipmentYear Total Firm Sales
Small
(<$5million)
(#) (%)
Large
(>$5million)
(#) (M)
Small
($100million)
(#) (M)
Large
(>$100million)
(#) (W)
71 12 29
34 .74
38 76
12 26
12 24
41 76 13 24
49 79 13 21
58 82 13 18
62 81 15 19
69 80 17 20
70 80 17 20
66 80 16 20
64 81 15 19
21 50
21 46
23 46
26 48
33 53
37 52
36 47
40 47
47
38 46
37 47
21 50
54
54
28 52
29 47
34 48
41 53
46 53
46 53
44 54
42
See footnote (8).
301971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
Derived from:
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terms of total firm sales remained steady at about 50% over
the period. The forces behind these patterns will be dis-
cussed further in the section on changes in industry compo-
sition.
In general, the diagnostic imaging equipment industry can
be characterized as having a three-tier structure: there are
the components-producing firms, fringe firms, and primary
firms. A primary firm has annual medical imaging equipment
sales that exceed 5% of total industry sales, while a fringe
firm's sales are less than 5% of total industry sales. There
have been between six and nine primary firms in any given year
over the period 1968 to 1981 and collectively the primary
firms account for between 75% and 80% of total industry
sales.10 In general, primary firms are active in more than
one market segment, while fringe firms tend to produce only
one type of imaging equipment.
As of 1981, the set of primary firms consisted of seven
companies, all but two of which are associated with a very
large, multinational, broadly diversified corporation. Table
2-7 lists these firms, along with a brief description. The
connection to the electronics industry is striking: GE, GEC
Ltd., Philips, and Siemens are all giant conglomerates with
a major interest in electronics and they compete world-wide
in many markets. It is also interesting to note that four
of the seven primary firms are foreign-based operations.
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Table 2-7
Medical Diagnostic Imaging Equipment
Primary Firms, 1981
COMPAGNIE GENERALE DE RADIOLOGIE (CGR Medical Corporation)
1979 sales about $400 million (latest available data)
French producer of radiological equipment. CGR supplies
all but one type of medical imaging equipment in the U.S.
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. (Medical Systems Division)
1981 net sales $27 billion
One of the largest industrial firms in the world, manufac-
turing a wide range of electrical and electronic products.
Supplies all four types of medical imaging equipment.
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. LTD. (Picker Corporation)
1981 sales approximately $7 billion
British producer of electrical and electronic products,
bought Picker from RCA in April 1981. Picker supplies all
four types of medical imaging equipment.
JOHNSON & JOHNSON (Technicare Corporation)
1981 total sales $5 billion
Major producer of consumer products and health care equip-
ment and supplies. Technicare, purchased by J&J in 1978,
supplies all four types of medical imaging equipment.
N.V. PHILIPS GLOEILAMPENFABRIEKEN (Philips Medical Systems)
1981 sales approximately $17 billion
Dutch-based firm with world-wide operations in the elec-
trical and electronics fields. Supplies all four types
of medical imaging equipment.
SIEMENS AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT (Siemens Corporation)
1981 net sales approximately $15 billion
West German electronics and electrical engineering firm.
Supplies all four types of medical imaging equipment.
XONICS, INC.
1981 sales $77 million
U. S. firm with over 90% of sales in medical imaging.
Supplies two types of medical imaging equipment.
Derived from: See footnote (8).
-106-
In summary, over the period 1969 to 1980, constant-dollar
sales of medical imaging equipment increased, as did the rela-
tive share of the industry in the economy's output. The share
of industry sales accounted for by X-ray equipment decreased
over the period, while that of nuclear scanning equipment re-
mained about the same, and the shares of CT scanners and
ultrasound devices increased.
Over the years 1971 to 1981 the number of firms manufac-
turing diagnostic imaging equipment increased, as did the pro-
portion of firms producing more than one type of imaging equip-
ment. In terms of product lines, the proportion of firms in
the industry producing X-ray and nuclear scanning equipment
decreased, while the proportion producing CT scarnners and
ultrasound devices increased. The industry includes a substan-
tial number of firms which produce only components for X-ray
equipment, and the proportion of components-producing firms
increased over the period.
The majority of firms in the medical imaging equipment
industry are diversified, and foreign-based corporations play
an active role in the industry. The proportion of small firms
as measured in terms of imaging equipment sales increased over
the period; and about half the firms were small as measured by
total firm sales, this proportion was steady over the period.
Finally, the diagnostic imaging equipment industry has a
three-tier structure: there are components-producing firms,
fringe firms, and primary firms. Several primary firms are
connected to the electronics industry.
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CONCENTRATION PATTERNS
Concentration indices measure the size distribution of
firms in the industry, and thereby provide information about
market structure. The most widely used measure of concentra-
tion is the four-firm concentration ratio, the percentage of
total industry sales attributable to the four firms with the
largest market shares. From a theoretical perspective, a
comprehensive concentration measure, which takes all the firms
in the industry into account, is preferable. A number of
these summary indic-es have been proposed, the Herfindahl index
being the most widely used. The difference among the vari-
ous summary measures lies in the underlying assumptions about
the weighting of market shares. For example, in the Herfin-
dahl index, the distribution of sales among the larger firms
is a more important determinant of industry concentration than
is the distribution of sales among the smaller firms. It is
also interesting to note that Dansby and Willig (1979) demon-
strated that a transformation of the Herfindahl index mea-
sures potential improvement in industry performance in a
Cournot quantity model with identical firms.
The Herfindahl (H) index is defined as the sum of the
squares of the market shares for all firms in the industry:
H = (si)2 where si = market share of firm i
n = number of firms in the
industry
H eS (0, 10,000
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Note that calculation of H requires that the market share of
every firm in the industry be known. When the shares of
smaller firms are not known, the H index is sensitive to al-
ternative assumptions about the distribution of shares among
these firms (Schmalensee, 1977).
Since market share data were not available for all firms
in the medical diagnostic imaging equipment industry, the
"true." H index cannot be calculated. Therefore, two measures
of concentration are presented in this section: the standard
four-firm concentration ratio and the H index assuming equal
market share distribution among the smaller firms (the number
of firms having known market shares will be given in foot-
notes).
The strong emphasis on concentration as a component of
industry structure derives from the links among concentration,
pricing behavior, and performance. A highly concentrated
industry is often taken as evidence that firms in the indus-
try have market power, or the ability to raise price above
marginal cost. However, it must be remembered that size dis-
tribution says nothing about welfare per se, the cost struc-
ture and entry conditions of the industry must be examined
before any conclusions about market power can be reached.
Chapter 4 is devoted to an assessment of industry perfor-
mance, and evidence on concentration will be utilized in
that analysis. The purpose of this section is to describe
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concentration patterns in this industry. Measures of concen-
tration will be presented and discussed for each product line.
Then the overall pattern of concentration will be described.
Finally, the level of concentration in the medical imaging
equipment industry will be assessed in light of the critical
concentration levels used for antitrust policy.
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X-Ray Equipment
Market shares for the six largest producers of X-ray
equipment in 1974 and 1978 are shown in Table 2-8. The four-
firm and six-firm concentration ratios changed little over
these years, with CR4 decreasing from 69% to 64% and CR6 de-
creasing from 89% to 86%. H was also essentially unchanged,
declining from 1460 in 1974 to 1340 in 1978.11
The set of market leaders likewise was stable over this
period, with Xonics taking the place of Litton after purchasing
Litton's X-ray business in early 1978. Even the ranking of
firms by market share was stable, the only change being
Philips' move from fourth to third position, exchanging places
with Litton/Xonic s.
Note that all the firms described in the previous section
as primary firms, with the exception of Technicare, are
also leaders in the X-ray equipment market segment. Also note
that in 1974 the remaining 11% of X-ray equipment sales was
shared among 29 firms, and in 1978 the remaining 14%o was shared
among 46 firms. In other words, although there was substantial
entry over this period, the market shares of the leading X-ray
firms were largely unaffected.
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Table 2-8
Market Shares for Major Manufacturers
of X-ray Equipment, 1974 and 1978
1974
Market Share
22.5
20.0
13.8
12.5
10.0
10.0
<2.0
CR 4 = 68.8%
CR6
H
= 88.8%
= 1460
1978
Market Share
21.4
15.7
Sold X-ray business
to Xonics in 1978
14.3
11.4
10.0
12.9
CR 4 = 64.3%
CR6 = 85.7%
H = 1340
Derived from: Hale and Hale (1975), pg. 469; Hale and Hale
(1978), pg. 669; sources listed in footnote (8).
Firm
GE
Picker
Litton
Philips
Siemens
C GR
Xonics
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CT Scanners
As is frequently the case for a new product, market shares
for manufacturers of CT scanners have been quite volatile, es-
pecially in the period immediately after the new technology was
introduced. This was compounded by extremely rapid diffusion
of CT scanners during 1975 and 1976, followed by a sudden de-
cline in the diffusion rate in 1979 and 1980.12
CT scanning was invented by an employee of EMI, Ltd. (U.K.)
and virtually all the machines sold in 1973 and 1974 were manu-
factured by EMI. Other diagnostic imaging firms were quick to
pick up on this opportunity and by mid-1977, EMI was competing
with six other suppliers.13 As the market continued to grow,
so did the number of suppliers, and by 1978 there were 18 firms
selling CT scanner systems (see Table 2-4). This peak number
of firms coincides with the peak of CT scanner sales. As sales
declined in 1979 and 1980, due primarily to market saturation,
the number of CT manufacturers also declined.
Assessing market shares is difficult in such a rapidly
changing market. Table 2-9 presents market shares for the
major producers of CT scanners in 1978. In this particular
year, the CT scanner market had a CR4 of 80%, a CRg of 94%,
and H amounted to 1 8 3 0. 1 4 However, there was a great deal of
change in the market subsequent to 1978; EMI left the CT mar-
ket in 1980, Pfizer departed in 1981, and Artronix exited in
1979. Thus, within three years, firms accounting for almost
40% of the CT sales in 1978 had left the market. And, al-
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Table 2-9
Market Shares for Major Manufacturers
of CT Scanners, 1978.
Firm
Ohio-Nuclear
EMI
PfIizer
GE
Siemens
Picker
Artronix
Philips
1978
Market Share
30.8
20.5
15.4
12.8
5.1
4.1
2.6
2.6
CR4 = 79.5%
CR8 = 93.9%
H = 1830
Derived from: Hale and Hale (1978), pg. 669; sources listed
in footnote (8).
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though both EMI and Pfizer sold their CT scanner businesses to
smaller CT firms, the surviving large CT firms were the pri-
mary beneficiaries of these exits. It is also interesting
to note that the five firms remaining after these exits are
primary firms. Although not a measure of sales concentration,
it is suggestive that a report by the Office of Technology
Assessment estimated that three manufacturers (EMI, Ohio-
Nuclear, and General Electric) accounted for almost 90% of
the scanners in operation in the U. S. as of May 1980.15
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Ultrasound Devices
Market shares for the largest producers of ultrasound
devices in 1974 and 1978 are shown in Table 2-10. Concen-
tration appears to have decreased over these years, with
the CR4 declining from 69% to 61% and H declining from 1410
to 1260.16
There was also a significant amount of change in the
set of market leaders over this period. Five of the largest
ultrasound firms in 1978 were not important market partici-
pants only four years before, and two of the largest ultra-
sound firms in 1974 were purchased in 1976 by primary firms
in the industry. And, at the same time that there was a
large net inflow of firms into the ultrasound market,
primary firms were accounting for a greater proportion of
the largest ultrasound firms (1 of 5 in 1974, 5 of 8 in
1978).
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Table 2-10
Market Shares for Major Manufacturers
of Ultrasound Devices, 1974 and 1978
1974
Market Share.M%Firm
1978
Market Share
26.322.3Picker
Unirad 20.2 Purchased by
Technicare in 1976
SmithKline
Roche
Rohe
Searle
Advanced Diagnostic
Research
Varian
Advanced Technology
Laboratories
16.2
10.1
10.1 Purchased by
Philips in 1976
Siemens
8.4
3.2
2.1
10.5
15.8
8.4
5.3
3.2
3.2
CR4 = 68.8%
CR 5 = 78.9%
H = 1410
CR4
CR
5
= 61.0%
= 69.4%
CR 8 = 81.1%
H = 1260
Derived from: Frost and Sullivan (1975b), pg. 6; Hale and
Hale (1978), pg. 670; sources listed in
footnote (8).
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Nuclear Scanning Equipment
Market shares for the eight largest producers of nuclear
scanning equipment in 1973 and 1977 are shown in Table 2-11.
Measures of concentration decreased over this period, with the
CR4 falling from 85% to 79%, the CR8 declining from 97% to
93%, and H decreasing from 2560 to 2010.17 The top three
firms were solidly entrenched in this market over the years
1973 to 1977, while the composition and ranking of the re-
maining market leaders were more variable.
Primary firms accounted for three of the eight largest
nuclear imaging firms in 1973 and four of the eight largest
in 1977. And, all three of the leading triad of firms were
primary firms in 1977. It is interesting to note that in
1979 Searle announced its intention to sell its nuclear medi-
cal equipment business to Siemens, another primary firm. The
Justice Department filed suit to block the purchase, claiming
that the proposed acquisition would lessen competition in the
niliear medical equipment market.18 However, a request for
an injunction enjoining the sale was denied, and the sale
was completed in May of 198019 (see the discussion on mergers
for further detailL.
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Table 2-11
Market Shares for Major Manufacturers
of Nuclear Scanning Equipment, 1973 and 1977
Firm
Searle
Picker
Ohio-Nuclear
(Technicare)
1973
Market Share(%)
42.2
19.3
18.3
1977
Market Share(M)
32.9
23.6
16.7
<2.04.9Raytheon
Baird 2.3
Nuclear Data
Medical Data Systems
GE
4.0
2.4
2.0
Union Carbide
ADAC 42. 0
Sold nuclear medical
equipment business
to GE in 1975
5.4
5.0
3.7
3.3
CR4 = 84.7%
CR = 97.1%
H = 2560
CR4 = 78.6%
CR 8 = 92.9%
H = 2010
Derived from: Frost and Sullivan (1974b), pp. 86-88; Frost and
Sullivan (1979), pp. 13, 165; sources listed
in footnote (8).
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Comparing concentration patterns for the various product
lines, we find that ultrasound is unambiguously the least con-
centrated market segment. This is true in spite of the fact
that there were fewer manufacturers of ultrasound devices in
any given year than there were manufacturers of X-ray equip-
ment. The X-ray market is more concentrated than ultrasound,
but less so than CT. And, the nuclear imaging market is the
most concentrated.
In terms of changes in concentration, the X-ray market
experienced little change in concentration over the period
1974 to 1978, a pattern consistent with a long-established
market. Concentration in the CT market decreased over the
period 1974 to 1978 as other firms entered to compete with
EMI, and probably increased after 1978 in the consolidation
after the exit of three of the largest CT firms. And, con-
centration decreased over the period 1974 to 1978 in the
ultrasound and nuclear imaging markets.
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Industry Concentration
Market shares for the largest producers of medical diag-
nostic imaging equipment in 1974 and 1978 are presented in
Table 2-12. Concentration patterns were quite stable over
this period, with CR4 decreasing from 52% to 50%, CR 8 falling
from 78% to 77%, and H decreasing from 950 to 890.20 The
primary firms maintained their collective market share in
spite of a net increase in the number of firms in the indus-
try from 54 in 1974 to 86 in 1978 (see Table 2-3).
There was a substantial amount of change in the set of
the eight largest firms. In the first place, two members of
this set in 1974 were replaced by 1978. In one case, there
was a substitution of Xonics for Litton, largely as a result
of Xonic's purchase of Litton's X-ray business. In the other
case, EMI dropped out of the group, and was replaced by Tech-
nicare. Secondly, although the top two firms maintained a
solid lead over this period, there was substantial change
below this rank. Technicare catapulted from the ninth to
fourth position in only four years, Philips moved from fourth
to third, and Xonics rose from about fifteenth to sixth. It
is also notable that individual market shares were quite
variable--this was clearly not a static industry over this
period.
With respect to the Census of Manufactures SIC data, the
4-digit SIC industry closest in definition to the medical
imaging equipment industry is 3693. As noted in Chapter 1,
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Table 2-12
Market Shares for Major Manufacturers
of Medical Diagnostic Imaging Equipment, 1974 and 1978
Firm
Picker
GE
Litton
Philips
Siemens
CGR
EMI
Searle
Unirad
Technicare
Xonics
1974
Market Share
18.9
15.5
9.3
6.8
6.8
6.2
5.8
2.5
2.5
0.8
CR4 = 52.1%
CR8 = 77.8%
H = 950
1978
Market Share
15.8
15.4
Sold X-ray business
to Xonics in 1978
10.1
8.0
5.9
3.6
5.7
Purchased by
Technicare in 1976
8.4
7.6
CR 4 = 49.7%
CR 8 = 76.9%
H = 890
Derived from: Tables 2-8 through 2-11; International Resource
Development (1978), pg. 44; the "Gray Sheet"
(Medical Devices, Diagnostics, and Instrumenta-
tion Reports), November 13, 1978; sources
listed in footnote (8).
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the title of 3693 was changed in 1977 from "X-Ray Apparatus
and Tubes" to "X-Ray, Electromedical, and Electrotherapeutic
Apparatus" and data on a number of new categories of medical
electronic equipment were added. Also in 1977, data on 5-digit
SIC group 36931 entitled "Irradiation Equipment," which corres-
ponds to the previous 3693 classification, were included.
Therefore, the proper approach is to compare pre-1977 data
for SIC 3693 with post-1977 data for SIC 36931.
In 1972 the CR4 for SIC 3693 was 54% and the CR 8 was 75%.
These figures are very similar to those shown in Table 2-12.
In 1977 the CR4 for SIC 36931 was 63% and the CRg was 79%,
not as consistent with the data for medical imaging equipment.
Recall that the SIC classification is closer to the definition
of the X-ray equipment market segment than to that for the
industry as a whole. By 1977 X-ray equipment had ceased to
completely dominate the medical imaging equipment industry,
leading to the discrepancy between the two statistics in that
year.
It is interesting to note that in 1968 the largest firms
in the X-ray equipment market (accounting for at least 80%
of industry sales21 ) were: General Electric, Picker, Philips,
Siemens, CGR, and Litton (Theta Technology Corp., 1978). In
1974 these same six firms held the top six positions in the
diagnostic imaging equipment industry ranking. By 1978,
Technicare had become the fourth largest imaging equipment
firm, Xonics had moved to sixth position, and CGR had been
-123-
bumped to seventh place. The point is that during a period
in which X-ray equipment came to account for a significantly
lower proportion of industry sales, and CT scanning and ultra-
sound increased their industry shares, the leading X-ray firms
managed to maintain their position as primary firms in the
industry. And it is notable that over this same period these
firms expanded their product lines. In 1974 the bulk of sales
for the six largest medical imaging equipment firms was
accounted for by sales of X-ray equipment. By 1978 all had
significant portions of total sales attributable to non-X-ray
business. Also, by 1978 it was possible for Technicare to
become a primary firm without playing an active role in the
X-ray market.
With respect to changes in industry concentration after
1978, two firms (EMI and Searle), accounting for almost 10%
of industry sales in 1978, left the industry in 1980. Sec-
ondly, Searle sold its diagnostic imaging businesses to
Siemens, another large firm. Therefore, although precise
market share information is not available for this period,
it is likely that industry concentration has increased
somewhat since 1978.
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In summary, concentration in the medical imaging equip-
ment industry was stable over the period 1974 to 1978, but
there was a significant amount of change in the membership
and ranking of the set of leading firms. In the past there
was a one-to-one correspondence between the largest X-ray
firms and the largest industry firms. This link has been
weakened by the relative decline of X-ray equipment as a
share of industry sales. But most of the largest X-ray firms
have managed to maintain their positions as primary firms
by diversifying into other diagnostic imaging product lines.
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Critical Concentration Levels
In order to assess the level of concentration in the
diagnostic imaging equipment industry, what constitutes
"highly concentrated" must be defined. This is a contro-
versial topic within the economics profession and there are
basically two schools of thought on this subject. One, based
on Bain's original work on the relationship between profits
and concentration, argues that it is possible to define a
critical level of concentration. A number of studies have
estimated a single critical concentration level, usually
found to be around 50% for the CR4 and 70% for the CR8
(see Kwoka, 1978). Along these same lines, Bradburd and
Over (1982) developed a model based on organizational costs
with two critical levels of concentration. The integrative
level is where a cooperative equilibrium will become attain-
able as concentration increases, the disintegrative level is
where an existing cooperative equilibrium will break down as
concentration decreases. The maximum likelihood estimates
were 68% for the integrative CR4 level and 46% for the dis-
integrative CR4 level. The other school of thought on criti-
cal concentration points out that what really matters is the
relationship between price and marginal cost and that to de-
fine a critical level across the economy without considering
particular industry characteristics is meaningless.
For antitrust purposes, the U. S. Department of Justice
(1982) divides the range of market concentration (as measured
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by the Herfindahl (H) index) into three regions: H less than
1000, unconcentrated; H between 1000 and 1800, moderately con-
centrated; and H greater than 1800, highly concentrated. By
this classification, the medical imaging equipment industry is
unconcentrated. Note, however, that the X-ray and ultrasound
product markets are moderately concentrated, the CT market is
moderately to highly concentrated, and the nuclear imaging
market is highly concentrated.
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The pattern of concentration in the medical imaging equip-
ment industry can be described as follows: in the first
place, there are differences in concentration among the
various product lines, with ultrasound being the least con-
centrated, followed by X-ray and CT, with nuclear imaging
being the most concentrated. Secondly, the changes in con-
centration over the period 1974 to 1978 also varied by product
line: concentration in the X-ray market basically did not
change, while it decreased in the CT, ultrasound, and nuclear
imaging markets.
For the industry as a whole, the CR4 was about 50%, the
CR8 about 75%, and the H index about 1000 in both 1974 and
1978. Shares of individual firms were relatively volatile
for such a short period as four years, but, in general, the
primary firms maintained their position over these years.
Finally, the medical diagnostic imaging equipment industry
is unconcentrated by the standards of the U. S. Department
or Justice, while the. product markets are moderately to
highly concentrated.
-128-
BARRIERS TO ENTRY
The existence of barriers to entry in an industry is
indicated by the ability of established sellers to consis-
tently raise price above marginal cost without attracting
entry. The degree of entry barrier is measured by the diff-
erence between the selling price and marginal cost. The con-
djtion of entry is a crucial aspect of market structure be-
cause it is directly related to industry performance: the
"higher" the entry barrier, the less competitive the industry.
Three potential sources of entry barriers will be exa-
mined i:n this section: absolute cost advantages, economies
of scale, and product differentiation. It is assumed that
in general the condition of entry is stable over time and
cannot be affected by prospective entrants. The exception
to this is the case of a pathbreaking new product introduc-
tion, which. can alter the condition of entry, particularly
if an entrant is the source of the innovation.
Strategic conduct can also, under certain conditions,
lead to entry barriers. For example, Spence (19771 argues
that entry is deterred in an industry when existing firms
have enough. capacity to make a new firm unprofitable in the
event of entry. Investment in excess capacity is effective
Because i't is irreversible and a highly visible demonstration
of commitments by established firms. The strategy can be
used when products are differentiated if established firms
invest in advertising or other means of securing customer
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loyalty, rather than in plant and equipment. Dixit (19791,
on the other hand, emphasizes the role of fixed costs in
entry-deterring behavior. Using a duopoly model with an
established firm and a prospective entrant, he demonstrates
that fixed costs can enlarge the range within which an estab-
lished firm chooses to deter entry by limit pricing. And
Schmalen'see (1981L shows that durable capital, commitment to
excess capacity in advance, and scale economies are all
necessary for an established firm to profitably deter entry
by limit pricing,
Ideally, comprehensive price and cost data would be used
to directly measure the extent of barriers to entry in the
industry, Lacking such. complete. information, each potential
source of barriers to entry will be discussed, and an argu-
ment developed as to the expected condition of entry in the
medical imaging equipment industry. Then in the next section
evidence on entry patterns will be examined. Assessment of
the effect of entry barriers on industry performance will be
discussed in Chapter 4.
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Absolute Cost Advantages
Established sellers enjoy an absolute cost advantage over
potential rivals if the long-run average cost curve of the
prospective entrant lies everywhere above that of the estab-
lished firms. The costs referred to here are production costs,
any significant differences in promotion costs are the result
of product differentiation and will be discussed in that section.
There are three major sources of absolute cost differences
between entrants and established firms:
(1) Unique production technology, usually protected by
patents or secrecy;
(2) Imperfect factor markets, most commonly ownership of
some strategic input; and
(3) Limited factor supply relative to demand, such that
input prices will rise if entry occurs.
Patents have been widely used in the diagnostic imaging
equipment industry. For example, the scintillation camera was
patented by developer Harold Anger, and the exclusive license
granted to Nuclear-Chicago (later bought by Searle Radiographics)
has undoubtedly been the key to that firm's success in the
nuclear imaging market. Another example is EMI, which not only
patented its CT scanner technology, but also vigorously de-
fended the patents by filing a series of patent infringement
suits against other major CT manufacturers (Ohio-Nuclear,
Pfizer, and General Electric).
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There is, however, a divergence of opinion within the
industry as to the effectiveness of patent protection. In the
survey of firms in the industry, 13 of the 25 firms responding
to the question replied that patents were not important for
medical imaging equipment, while 12 companies answered that
patents were important (see Appendix A). In commenting on why
patents might not be important for imaging equipment, the
phrases "easily circumvented" and "unenforceable" appear in
several of the firms' replies. The scientific principles
underlying most medical imaging technology are long-established,
and although specific engineering techniques can be patented,
there is frequently "more than one way to skin a cat."
The importance of trade secrets is also emphasized in the
firms' comments. When there is extremely rapid technical change,
the lag induced by trade secrecy will often be sufficient to
ensure that a new product will have been introduced by the time
a rival has caught up with the previous development. In this
industry a good example of rapid product improvements is the
reduction in the time from the start of a CT scan through the
completion of picture reconstruction. EMI's first generation
scanner (introduced in 1973) required 16 minutes for picture
reconstruction, while fourth generation scanners (available in
1978) had reduced this to an initial reconstruction time of
less than 15 seconds and single slice scanning times of less
than two seconds (Theta Technology Corp., 1978). Note, however,
that although EMI protected its product designs by both trade
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secrecy and patents and even though EMI's scanners were on the
cutting edge of CT technology, these rapid changes by no means
insulated the firm from vigorous competition in the CT market
during the late 1970's.
Overall, control of production techniques can be expected
to give some established-medical imaging equipment firms a cost
advantage in the short run. But experience in the industry to
date indicates that, with a few exceptions, it is not long
before some resourceful engineer with a rival firm finds a way
to sidestep patent protection or penetrate the veil of trade
secrecy.
Factor supplies are not a basis for cost differentials in
the diagnostic imaging equipment industry. In the first place,
all potentially "strategic" inputs (primarily aluminum, steel,
and electronic components) are readily available from a variety
of outside sources. Secondly, there are effectively no limita-
tions on the supply of these inputs, given the small quantities
needed relative to the total factor market. Think, for instance,
of the use of micro-processors in medical imaging equipment in
comparison to those used in video games (only one of the many
alternative employments of this input).
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In the medical imaging equipment industry, the use of
patents and trade secrets to protect production techniques
does lead to the potential for absolute cost differentials
between established sellers and prospective entrants. But,
this advantage is rarely long-lived because the basic scienti-
fic principles underlying medical imaging technology are long-
established and thus unpatentable. And trade secrecy is fre-
quently circumvented by ingenious engineering. Therefore,
absolute cost differences are not the source of a significant
barrier to entry in the diagnostic imaging equipment industry.
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Economies of Scale
A second potential source of barriers to entry is econo-
mies of large scale, which exist when the firm's long-run
average cost decreases as output increases, at least over some
range of output. The firm's minimum efficient scale (MES) is
defined to be the smallest output at which the lowest average
cost is achieved. If the MES represents a significant portion
of the total industry output, then costs would rise if entry
occurred and the established sellers can charge a price above
marginal cost without attracting entry: a barrier to entry
exists.
There. are a number of possible sources of scale economies.
These include: fixed setup costs which do not vary with ex-
pected output; gains from specialization of factors as output
increases; the fact that costs tend to be proportional to the
materials needed for construction Carea), while output tends
to be proportional to capacity Cvolume); factor indivisibili-
ties below some level of utilization; and the use of automa-
tion at large output levels, Economies of scale can be ex-
perienced in any stage of the manufacturing process: produc-
tion, distribution, promotion, or sales and service. There
is also the potential for scale economies in research and
development, but this will be discussed as an aspect of
innovation in this industry (see Chapter 3).
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The concept of scale economies must be re-examined when
more than one product is manufactured in the same plant (see
Panzar and Willig, 1977). In this case, economies of scope,
which exist if the average cost of joint production is less
than the sum of the average costs of separate production, must
also be considered.
Although cost and output data are unavailable for medical
imaging equipment firms, there are several pieces of evidence
which can be used to gauge the extent of scale economies. The
most important source of information on this subject is the
survey of firms in the industry (see Appendix A).
One of the questions in the survey asked how production
costs vary with increases in output. The responses, shown in
Table 2-13, present a picture of an industry in which production
economies of scale are not considered to be significant. Only
four of the total 40 responses claimed that average cost de-
creases substantially as output increases. It is particularly
striking that two of the four "a lot" responses were from firms
manufacturing only components. It is also notable that none of
the multiproduct sellers (likely to be the larger, most estab-
lished firms) who responded to the questionnaire considered
production scale economies to be sizeable.
The finding that firms in the industry do not experience
significant economies of scale in production is partially ex-
plained by the fact that the production process for medical
imaging equipment differs in several important ways from the
-136-
Table 2-13
Responses to the Medical Diagnostic Imaging Equipment
Industry Questionnaire, Economies of Scale Question
Question: "Regarding production, does the cost of one
unit of output decrease as volume increases --
a little, some, or a lot?"
Number Responding
"a little" "some" "a lot"
Total Number
of Responses
X-Ray
Equipment
CT Scanners
Ultrasound
Devices
Nuclear
Scanning
Equipment
TOTAL
Multiproduct
Firms Only
154
(27%)
1
(17%)
2
(15%)
0
7(18%)
5(24%)
11
(73%)
4
(67%)
9(69%)
5(83%)
29
(72%)
16
(76%)
13
1
(17%)
2
(15%)
1
(17%)
4(
(10%)
40
21
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process for products typically subject to substantial economies
of scale (think, for example, of ball bearings or automobiles).
In the first place, the unit volume for any given medical
imaging equipment firm is relatively low. For example, Theta
Technology Corp. (1978) estimated that in 1977 60 head CT units
and 180 whole body CT units were sold in the United States.
Even if a firm had a third of the market, the total annual pro-
duction of CT head scanners would be only 20 units (60 for
whole body scanners). Secondly, continuous process techniques
are generally not used in the manufacture of diagnostic imaging
equipment. And lastly, a portion of the total output, particu-
larly some of the more specialized equipment, is manufactured
to order.
There is disagreement among economists as to the potential
for economies of scale in promotion activities, specifically in
advertising. There are those who claim that promotion scale
economies do exist because advertising expenditures must reach
a "take-off" level before they are effective and because the
impact of advertising is cumulative over time (Clarkson and
Miller, 1982). On the other hand, Ornstein (1977) reviews the
empirical work on this subject and concludes that there is no
evidence supporting the existence of scale economies in adver-
tising. A large portion of medical imaging equipment adver-
tising is spent on conventions, a type of promotion expen-
diture for which advantages of large scale are likely to
be insignificant. And therefore, promotion activities
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in the medical imaging equipment industry are not expected to
be subject to significant scale economies (see Chapter 3 for
a detailed examination of advertising in this industry).
Finally, sales and service operations may be a source of
scale economies. Expensive, technologically sophisticated
products tend to be sold on a direct basis. This is primarily
due to the salesman's role as an "interpreter"--making the
technical specifications of the product comprehensible to the
buyer. Access to a service and repair organization also tends
to be very important for these types of products because break-
downs are costly to the owner and call for specialized, highly
skilled repairmen (National Academy of Engineering, 1971).
For such complex, costly goods, there will be scale
economies in sales, largely because the more competent salesmen
will be attracted to higher volume routes (larger firms). In
addition, there are likely to be substantial cost savings for
a high volume firm due to the large fixed costs associated with
a service establishment. For example, a fully-equipped service
outfit requires specialized tools, a large inventory of repair
parts, and a staff of highly skilled service engineers and
technicians (Scherer, 1980).
Medical imaging equipment clearly fits into this class of
expensive, technically complicated products. And, most firms
sell imaging equipment on a direct basis. This is revealed in
the analysis of the industry survey responses and is confirmed
by industry observers (see Chapter 3 for a discussion
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of selling methods). In addition, service is repeatedly
stressed as being extremely important in this market. For
example, on the basis of a survey of hospital imaging depart-
ments, Frost and Sullivan (1980b) report that service charact-
eristics are key factors in the purchase decision. Medical
imaging equipment sales and repair require highly skilled
personnel and an extensive parts and tools inventory. As a
consequence, there are advantages to operating an imaging
equipment sales and service organization at large scale; and
there are thus likely to be economies of scale in sales and
service for medical imaging equipment manufacturers.
Neither production nor promotion activities in the medical
imaging equipment industry exhibit significant economies of
scale and therefore they do not lead to a barrier to entry.
There are, on the other hand, cost-saving aspects to large-
scale sales and service operations and these put prospective
entrants at a disadvantage relative to established sellers.
Service characteristics are also an important basis for product
differentiation in this industry. The interaction of scale
economies and product differentiation in service, as well as
the effect of this on entry conditions, will be discussed in
the next section.
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Product Differentiation
The last potential source of barriers to entry to be
considered is product differentiation. If, at a given price,
buyers prefer the products of established sellers, then pros-
pective entrants face the alternatives of selling at a lower
price (at least until their product is accepted) or having
higher selling costs than firms already in the industry.
Product differentiation exists when products sold in the
same market are not perfect substitutes. A firm's product is
differentiated if a rise in price does not result in the loss
of all sales. Product differentiation is both an aspect of
market structure and a component of conduct. Certain product
characteristics which are associated with a high degree of
product differentiation will be discussed with reference to
medical diagnostic imaging equipment and conclusions drawn
about the condition of entry in this industry. Product diff-
erentiation as a method of nonprice competition will then be
investigated in Chapter 3.
There are four bases for product differentiation: loca-
tion of the firm, physical attributes of the product, provision
of repair and maintenance services, and subjective image
(Scherer, 1980). Location differentiation is not relevant for
diagnostic imaging equipment and will not be considered here.
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Differentiation on the basis of physical attributes in-
volves variations in product design and quality. Particularly
for a complex product, quality will be multi-dimensional and
firms can be thought of as positioning themselves in product
characteristics space (Lancaster, 1966). Also for technically
complicated equipment, access to repair and maintenance services
can be very important to a buyer. The service factor will be
more important as the cost of a breakdown, in terms of lost
revenues, is larger. The performance of some goods is diffi-
cult to assess prior to purchase. For these goods, firm repu-
tation, a type of image differentiation, serves as a signal of
quality and reliability. Finally, there is often a product
differentiation premium associated with being the first to
introduce an innovative new product (Bond and Lean, 1977).
These first-mover advantages are a form of image differentia-
tion if they persist even after other firms offer objectively
equivalent products.
Some products are inherently more "differentiable" than
others. Salient characteristics are: product complexity such
that assessments or comparisons by buyers are difficult, rela-
tively high price per unit, durability such that the need for
service is likely, and infrequency of purchase. Products with
these characteristics tend to be associated with a high degree
of product differentiation (Bain, 1956; Needham, 1978; Scherer,
1980).
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Medical imaging equipment clearly fits this description:
it is expensive, technologically sophisticated, and infre-
quently purchased. Breakdowns are a matter of serious concern,
not only due to lost revenues, but also because of the poten-
tially grave consequences for patients. And, both highly
skilled technicians and specialized equipment are necessary
for repair and maintenance activities. The primary bases for
product differentiation in the diagnostic imaging equipment
industry are product quality attributes and the provision of
repair and maintenance services.
There are a number of quality characteristics which are
relevant for diagnostic imaging equipment. The most important
have to do with image quality, since that is crucial for the
doctors who use the equipment. Clarity, spatial resolution,
contrast discrimination, and lack of artifact are the charact-
eristics of interest in this regard. It should be noted that,
for a given machine, picture quality varies according to the
portion of the body being imaged (Kreel, 1979). Thus, image
quality can only be defined in relation to how the equipment
will be used.
Another important set of product attributes have to do
with the rate of throughput of the imaging system, i.e., the
time it takes to produce a final picture. This includes not
only the speed of the scan, or "picture-taking" itself, but
also the time to process and display the image. In general, a
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faster throughput rate is desirable because it means a higher
potential utilization rate (and higher potential revenues) and
because faster image processing means more rapid diagnosis,
which can be decisive in life-threatening situations.
Other significant quality characteristics are image dis-
play and storage options. For example, the final output can be
hard copies, film, or a video display. The widespread use of
computers in diagnostic imaging has increased the variety of
options available to the purchaser. Software programs for
data processing can be tailored to the user's particular needs
and, in some cases, the computer's display and storage capabi-
lities have obviated the need for film or paper copies of the
image. Other important features are ease of operation and
the degree of mobility of the equipment.
The existence of such a large number of quality charact-
eristics which matter to purchasers is in itself evidence of
product differentiation. And it is clear that firms have
responded to this multi-dimensionality of diagnostic imaging
equipment quality by positioning themselves differently with
respect to the various product features. For example, there
are a couple of firms which specialize in the manufacture of
mobile X-ray systems. Other companies emphasize image quality
or software options.
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Access to maintenance and repair services is also an
aspect of quality and one which is very important to the owners
of medical imaging equipment. In some cases, large hospitals
have an in-house service engineer in charge of maintaining diag-
nostic imaging equipment (Frost and Sullivan, 1980b). However,
the training of such staff repairmcn becomes quickly outmoded
in such a rapidly changing field, it is sometimes difficult to
obtain parts from the manufacturers, and most hospitals cannot
offer salaries comparable to those of the manufacturers' service
organizations (Thompson, 1978). In addition, small hospitals
do not have enough work to keep a full-time repairman occupied.
Another means by which hospitals arrange for repair and
maintenance is by signing annual service contracts with the
manufacturer. Frost and Sullivan (1980b), in a survey of 400
hospitals, found that slightly over a quarter of the hospitals
had a total or partial service contract covering diagnostic
X-ray equipment. Hospitals not having an in-house serviceman
or service contract depend on as-needed calls to the manufac-
turer's (or dealer's) service organization. And the existence
of a widespread and reputable service operation is a major
factor in the purchase decision (Kreel, 1979 and Frost and
Sullivan, 1980b). Note, however, that small firms often
cannot support a widespread sales and service organization.
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The products of the various medical imaging equipment
manufacturers are differentiated on the basis of quality attri-
butes such as image clarity and system throughput rate and on
the basis of repair and maintenance services provided by the
manufacturer. Although there is a high degree of product
differentiation on the basis of product quality characteristics,
this is not the source of substantial barriers to entry. That
product differentiation tends not to deter entry in this case is
due to the fact that successful product designs are easily
imitated and also because there is such a rapid rate of inno-
vation in this industry--consumer preferences change as new
products are introduced.
There is, on the other hand, a barrier to entry in this
industry that is the result of the importance of service as a
basis for product differentiation combined with the economies
of scale associated with a widespread sales and service organ-
ization. Recall, for example, that several of the primary
firms are companies with connections to the electronics indus-
try, in which technical sales and repair services are also
quite important. In general, firms which cannot offer exten-
sive service facilities will face a market in which they must
accept either a price discount or a smaller market share at a
given price. It must be stressed, however, that an innovative
firm can sidestep this barrier by offering a product with
such desirable product attributes that the importance of ser-
vice takes a backseat. And this has happened in the medical
imaging equipment.industry, as we will see.
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In an industry like this, it is particularly difficult to
disentangle the influence of product differentiation, which can
block entry, and that of innovation, which often promotes entry.
In such a situation, the central issue is the condition of
effective entry. To assess this, not only which firms enter,
but also which firms survive must be considered. The next
section examines entry, exit, and merger patterns and the
importance of service characteristics will once again emerge.
-147-
CHANGES IN INDUSTRY COMPOSITION
Changes in the set of firms in an industry over time are
an important aspect of industry structure. In the first place,
freedom of entry (in order to take advantage of profit oppor-
tunities) and freedom of exit (in order to escape losses) are
primary mechanisms of the competitive model. This means that
entry and exit patterns are useful in assessing industry per-
formance. Moreover, an examination of merger patterns provides
additional detail by investigating entry and exit movements
which leave the total industry output unchanged.
In addition, as mentioned in the previous section,
barriers such as scale economies or product differentiation
can deter entry, while innovation can make entry easier. In
an industry such as this one, facing a rapidly changing environ-
ment, a consideration of effective entry, or which firms survive
in the long run, can be used to disentangle the opposing forces
of barriers to entry and innovation.
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Entry and Exit
Although there has been relatively little empirical work
on this topic, it is generally agreed that the most important
determinant of the rate of net entry is the rate of growth of
industry demand (Scherer, 1980). A rapidly growing industry
often experiences short-run profits and attracts entry by firms
eager to share these profits. As to other determinants,
Duetsch (1975) finds that more intense product promotion is
associated with a lower rate of net entry, via a product diff-
erentiation barrier to entry. This agrees with Orr's (1974)
analysis. The relationship between the level of concentration
and the rate of net entry, on the other hand, is a topic of
disagreement. Orr (1974) finds that a higher level of concen-
tration is associated with a lower rate of net entry, while
Duetsch (1975) finds that concentrated industries are more
likely to be entered than unconcentrated industries.
Gorecki (1975) distinguishes between two types of entry
determinants: barriers to entry, such as scale economies and
product differentiation, and entry-inducing factors, such as
the rate of industry growth. He argues that, although new and
diversifying entrants should be affected similarly by entry-
inducing factors, barriers to entry can be expected to be less
effective for diversifying firms than for new entrants. He
then presents evidence to support this contention. This evi-
dence is consistent with the proposition of Hines (1957) and
Kottke (1966) that the most likely entrants into an industry
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are firms already solidly established in another, generally
closely related, market.
The rapid growth of medical imaging equipment sales
suggests that a relatively high rate of net entry into the
industry is to be expected. The -entry barrier resulting from
the combination of scale economies and product differentiation
in service, on the other hand, is expected to deter entry. On
balance, the rapid pace of technical change in this industry,
given that research and development in medical imaging does
not exhibit substantial scale economies (see Chapter 3), can
be expected to interact with rapid growth and outweigh the
entry barriers due to the importance of service characteristics.
Caves and Porter (1977) present an analysis of mobility
barriers among intra-industry subgroups that is relevant in
this regard. Recall the three-tier structure of this industry:
components producers, fringe firms, and primary firms. Com-
ponents producers are not affected by the repair and mainte-
nance needs of diagnostic imaging equipment users. And a num-
ber of the fringe firms manufacture only imaging equipment
accessories, such as tables or cassette holders, for which
service requirements are minimal. In addition, the products
of the fringe firms are much more likely to be sold through
an independent dealer who may also provide repair and mainte-
nance services (see Chapter 3). Consequently, service char-
acteristics are much more important to equipment users who
purchase from the primary firms than to those who buy from
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the fringe firms or components producers. Therefore, service
characteristics can be expected to be more important in deter-
ing entry into the set of primary firms than in blocking
entry into one of the other industry subgroups.
At the beginning of this chapter, the number of suppliers
of medical diagnostic imaging equipment was presented for vari-
ous categories, e.g., by product line. In this section the
components of the year-to-year changes will be presented, i.e.,
how many firms entered the market and how many exited. One
problem is how to classify changes due to mergers. For pur-
poses of this analysis, an "absorption" merger, in which a firm
already in the market takes over another diagnostic imaging
equipment firm, will be counted as an exit for the acquired
firm (two firms effectively become one). On the other hand,
a "title transfer" merger, in which a firm not currently in
the market takes over a diagnostic imaging equipment firm, will
not be counted as an exit for the acquired firm. Mergers are
discussed in further detail in the next section.
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Industry Entry and Exit
Entry and exit patterns for the medical diagnostic imaging
equipment industry over the period 1971 to 1981 are shown in
Table 2-14. During the period 1971 to 1978 there was a steady
inflow of firms into the industry, with very little exit. The
picture is reversed for the years 1979 to 1981, with a sub-
stantial amount of exit, but little entry. Note, in parti-
cular, the contrast between the period 1974 to 1978, when
seven to ten firms entered the industry each year, and the
period 1979 to 1981, when four to six firms left each year.
This pattern is consistent with the rapid growth of demand and
sales during the 1970's, the shakeout in the late 1970's re-
sulting from overoptimistic sales growth projections and
market saturation. 2 2
It is also instructive to consider the breakdown of enter-
ing and exiting firms by product line. This is shown in Table
2-15, where it is the primary product line of firms entering
the medical imaging equipment industry for the first time or
exiting completely from the industry which is tabulated. X-ray
is the primary avenue of entry into the industry, followed by
ultrasound and then CT, with nuclear imaging being the least
common portal of entry. This is consistent with the relative
sizes of these product markets. For exit, X-ray is the most
common outlet, followed by ultrasound and then nuclear imaging,
with CT being the least common avenue of exit. Note, however,
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Table 2-14
Entering and Exiting Firms,
Medical Diagnostic Imaging Equipment Industry, 1971-81
Number of Firms
at Beginning
Period of Period Entry Exit
W#) NWY#W t
1971-72 42 +4
1972-73 46 +4
1973-74 50 +5 -1
1974-75 54 +9 -1
1975-76 62 +10 -1
1976-77 71 +7 -1
1977-78 77 +9
1978-79 86 +2 -1
1979-80 87 +1 -6
1980-81 82 +1 -4
1971-81 +52 -15
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Table 2-15
Entering and Exiting Firms,
Medical Diagnostic Imaging Equipment Industry,
By Primary Product Line, 1971-81
Nuclear
X-Ray CT Ultrasound Scanning Net
Period Equipment Scanners Devices Equipment Gain/Loss
1971-72 +3 +1 +(#)
1971-72 +3 +1+1 +4
1972-73 +3 +1 +4
1973-74 -1 +2 +3 +4
1974-75 +5 +2 +2 +8
-1
1975-76 +5 +3 +2+9
-1
1976-77 +1 +3 +3 +6
-1
1977-78 +4 +1 +3 +1 +9
+1 +1
1978-79 +1 +1
-1+
1979-80 +1 -5
-2 -1 -1 -2 -5
1980-81 +1 -3
-1 -1 -2
1971-81 +23 +8 +17 +4 +37
-6 
-2 
-4 
-3
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that this is not the whole story, because some entry into a
given market segment occurs within the industry; entry and
exit within each market segment will be examined subsequently.
The size of entering and exiting firms is another import-
ant aspect of industry structure. As noted previously, due to
the prevalence of diversified firms, two measures of firm size
are used here: sales of medical imaging equipment and total
firm sales. As would be expected, virtually all entering firms
are small in terms of medical imaging equipment sales (less
than $5 million annually). The exception is EMI, the firm
which introduced CT and is therefore an unusual case. The size
of entering firms as measured by total firm sales is shown in
Table 2-16: just over 60% of firms entering during the period
1971 to 1981 are small on this scale. Four of the firms exit-
ing the industry over this period (27% of all exiting firms)
are large in terms of medical imaging equipment (sales greater
than $5 million annually). It is notable that all four of
these exits were via merger, i.e., the firms were bought by
other diagnostic imaging equipment firms. And, Table 2-16 shows
the size of exiting firms as measured by total firm sales: 60%
of firms exiting over the period 1971-81 are small on this
scale. Thus, as measured by total firm sales, the percentage
of small entering firms is approximately the same as the per-
centage of small exiting firms. As measured by medical imaging
equipment sales, however, the percentage of small entering
firms exceeds the percentage of small exiting firms.
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Table 2-16
Entering and Exiting Firms,
Medical Diagnostic Imaging Equipment Industry,
By Total Firm Sales, 1971-81
Total Firm Sales
Small
(<$100 million)
+2
+4
-1
+8
+5
-1
+5
Large
(>$100 million)
+4
+2
+1
+1
+4
+2
+4
1971-81 +33
-9
+19
-6
Period
1971-72
1972-73
1973-74
1974-75
1975-76
1976-77
1977-78
1978-79
1979-80
1980-81
Net
Gain/Lo s s
+4
+4
+4
+8
+9
+6
+9
+1
-5
-3
+37
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The medical diagnostic imaging equipment industry experi-
enced a boom period during the 1970's, with rapid sales growth,
a great deal of entry, and little exit. At the end of the
1970's an adjustment period occurred, in which entry was vir-
tually at a standstill and a number of firms left the industry.
The X-ray market segment is the most common avenue for both
entry into and exit from the diagnostic imaging equipment indus-
try. And, whether measured by medical imaging equipment sales
or total firm sales, the majority of firms entering and exiting
this industry are small. In the next four sections, entry and
exit patterns will be examined for each product line.
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X-Ray Equipment
Entry and exit patterns for the manufacturers of diag-
nostic X-ray equipment over the period 1971 to 1981 are shown
in Table 2-17. There was a steady inflow of firms into this
market segment over these years, with relatively little exit.
It is especially interesting that virtually all the entry
into this market segment came from firms entering the diag-
nostic imaging equipment market for the first time. Only two
of the entrants (7%) during this period were firms already
producing another type of medical imaging equipment. Recall
from Chapter 1 that the basic X-ray accounts for the majority
of radiological procedures. Thus, firms entering the imaging
equipment industry often focus first on that product market,
and then consider expanding into other market segments.
It was noted previously that there is a subset of the
X-ray equipment market which produces only components. In
Table 2-18 the firms entering the X-ray market are classified
as systems or components producers. Close to half of the en-
trants into this market over the period 1971 to 1981 were
components manufacturers; the proportion of X-ray firms pro-
ducing only components increased over this period (see Table
2-4). Note that X-ray equipment is the only product line
for which entry by components suppliers is significant.
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Table 2-17
Entering and Exiting Firms,
Diagnostic X-Ray Equipment Market, 1971-81
Number of Firms
at Beginning
of Period(#)
30
33
36
35
39
45
48
52
52
Initial
Industry
Entry
Product
Extension
Entry(#9)
+3
+3
+5
+3
+4
+1
+2 -7
ExitPeriod
1971-72
1972-73
1973-74
1974-75
1975-76
1976-77
1977-78
1978-79
1979-80
1980-81
-1
-1
-1
-2
-2
1971-81 +26
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Table 2-18
Entering and Exiting Firms,
Diagnostic X-ray Equipment Market,
By Systems/Components, 1971-81
Components(#)
+1
Net
Gain/Loss(#)
+3
+3
-1
+3
+3
+4
Period
1971-72
1972-73
1973-74
1974-75
1975-76
1976-77
1977-78
1978-79
1979-80
1980-81 +1
-1
1971-81 +15
-4
+13
-3
Systems
+3
+2
-1
+2
-1
+1
+3
+1
+1
-1
-2
+21
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CT Scanners
Since the CT scanner was not marketed until 1973, Table
2-19 shows the pattern of entry and exit over the lifetime of
this market segment. And, as noted previously, the rate of net
entry into this market parallels the growth of sales: extremely
rapid increase until 1978, followed by a decline in 1979 and
1980. It is particularly notable that well over half of the
entering firms were already active in another diagnostic imaging
equipment market. Recall that CT is technically a type of X-ray
procedure. Therefore, X-ray firms were well positioned to move
quickly into the production of CT (most of the product exten-
sion entry into CT was from the X-ray market).
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Table 2-19
Entering and Exiting Firms,
CT Scanner Market, 1973-81
Number of Firms
at Beginning
Period of Period(#)
Initial
Industry
Entry_(#)
Pro duct
Extension
Entry(#)
+2
+2
+5
-1
+1
+13 -6
Exit(T)
1973-74
1974-75
1975-76
1976-77
1977-78
1978-79
1979-80
1980-81
1971-81
11
16
18
20
19
16
+8
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Ultrasound Devices
The pattern of entry and exit in the diagnostic ultrasound
market over the years 1971 to 1981 is shown in Table 2-20.
Once again there was a steady inflow of firms into the market
until the late 1970's, when substantial exit occurred. In the
case of ultrasound, entry came approximately equally from new
entrants and from firms already established in the medical
imaging equipment market. Ultrasound techniques are based
upon different scientific principles than the radiation-based
procedures, so there is little technological basis for product
extension entry. But, ultrasound is similar to.X-ray equip-
ment in terms of price range, primary users, and sales and
service requirements. And, as with CT, most of the product
extension entry into ultrasound came from the X-ray market.
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Table 2-20
Entering and Exiting Firms,
Diagnostic Ultrasound Market, 1971-81
Number of Firms
at Beginning
Period of Period
(#)
1971-72
1972-73
1973-74
1974-75
1975-76
1976-77
1977-78
1978-79
1979-80
1980-81
7
8
11
16
18
24
28
31
34
34
Initial
Industry
Entry
+3
+2
+3
+3
+3
+1
+1
Product
Extension
Entry
-- M~
+3
+2
+3
+1
+3
+1
+13 
-6
Exit
-1
-2
-3
1971-81 +17
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Nuclear Scanning Equipment
The number of firms entering and exiting the nuclear
imaging market is presented in Table 2-21. Although not as
active as the other market segments, this market also shows
the pattern of steady entry during the 1970's followed by an
increase in exits in the late 1970's. In the nuclear imaging
market most of the entering firms were also entering the
diagnostic imaging equipment market for the first time. This
can be attributed to the fact that nuclear medicine technology
is unique due to the use of radiopharmaceuticals. Also, demand
characteristics differ from those of other imaging techniques
because radiodiagnostic procedures are developed for specific
medical conditions.
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Table 2-21
Entering and Exiting Firms,
Nuclear Scanning Equipment Market, 1971-81
Number of Firms
at Beginning
Period of Period(#)
1971-72
1972-73
1973-74
1974-75
1975-76
1976-77
1977-78
1978-79
1979-80
1980-81
Initial
Industry
Entry
Product
Extension
Entry(#)
11
12
12
+2
14
14
15
15
+1 -3
Exit(7#
+41971-81
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When analyzed by product line, we find that each market
segment follows the same basic pattern of entry and exit as
that prevailing for the industry as a whole: there was much
entry and little exit over the period 1971 to 1978, followed
by little entry and a significant amount of exit during the
years 1979 to 1981. Thus, the forces determining the net rate
of entry in the industry appear to also be governing the
product-specific entry rates. This suggests that the rate of
industry growth was the major force determining the pattern
of entry and exit over this period. The early 1970's were
boom years for the medical imaging equipment industry and many
firms entered this expansive environment in search of profits.
Then the growth rate slackened and firms looked to their current
performance as a prediction of future profits. This led to a
period of consolidation, in which some of the less successful
and solidly based firms decided to leave the industry.
Turning to the type of entry, there are distinct differ-
ences among the various product lines. The X-ray and nuclear
imaging markets are similar in that virtually all the firms
entering those market segments were simultaneously entering
the diagnostic imaging equipment market for the first time.
In the CT and ultrasound markets, on the other hand, there was
an approximately equal amount of entry from firms entering the
industry for the first time and from firms already established
in another market segment (usually the X-ray market, as would
be expected). Thus, we find that over the same period during
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which there was substantial entry into the industry by outside
firms, there was also a substantial amount of intra-industry
entry. And, this trend toward a broader product line is
directly related to changes in relative product sales shares
over this period. It is notable 'that the typical path into
this industry is entry into the X-ray market, with subsequent
expansion into CT and/or ultrasound.
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Primary Firms
In 1968 the following firms had medical imaging equip-
ment sales amounting to more than 5% of total industry sales:,
Picker, General Electric, Philips, Siemens, CGR, and Litton.
In 1974 these same six firms, plus Searle and EMI, composed
the set of primary firms. By 1978 Technicare and Xonics had
become members of the set of primary firms, while Litton and
EMI had dropped out. 23
Until the early 1970's the set of primary firms was
long-standing, solidly established, and sold mainly X-ray
equipment. The rapid growth rate and spate of new product
introductions in the 1970's led not only to a great deal of
entry into the industry, but also to entry into the set of
primary firms.
Searle became a primary firm on the strength of its
patented Anger scintillation camera. As for EMI, its sales
soared with the introduction and rapid initial diffusion of
the CT scanner, but substantial entry into the CT market and
the decline in the sales growth rate reduced its industry
sales share in the late 1970's. Xonics, a fringe firm in
1974, had become a primary firm by 1978 primarily via acqui-
sitions, most importantly the purchase of Litton's X-ray
business. Technicare also made a major acquisition during
this period, buying Unirad, a major supplier of ultrasound.
But, Technicare's increased industry sales share was pri-
marily due to the success of its subsidiary, Ohio-Nuclear,
-169-
a major actor in the CT market.
The primary firms in the early 1970's all began as
leaders in the X-ray market, but eventually moved into other
product lines. For example, General Electric and Siemens
were two of the original X-ray manufacturers, and Picker has
been selling X-ray systems since the 1930's. By the late
1970's, all three of these firms were active in all four pro-
duct markets. This movement from X-ray into other product
lines parallels the decline of X-ray equipment's relative
share of the market.
During a period in which there was a substantial amount
of entry into the medical imaging equipment industry, there
was also entry into the set of primary firms. Picker, Gen-
eral Electric, Philips, Siemens, and CGR maintained their
positions over this period, with Searle, Technicare, and
Xonics entering the set of primary firms. The common denom-
inator of the firms entering or maintaining their position
in the set of primary firms over this period was expansion
from the X-ray market into other product lines.
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Mergers
Mergers, defined as the combination of two or more firms
under a single ownership, can be the source of significant
changes in industry composition. Moreover, although in a
merger the purchased firm technically exits the market, this
is not the same type of exit as a firm which shuts down its
plant and ceases production. Likewise, entry via merger is
not fully equivalent to entry by construction of a new plant.
The difference, of course, lies in the effect on industry
output.
There are five types of mergers: horizontal, vertical,
market extension, product extension, and conglomerate. In a
horizontal merger, both firms sell in the same market, while a
vertical merger involves firms in contiguous stages of the
production process (e.g., a bakery buys a flour miller). In a
market extension merger the firms sell closely related products
in different geographical markets, and in a product extension
merger firms have similar production processes or marketing
channels. Finally, a conglomerate merger involves firms with
no product or market associations (Scherer, 1980).
The theory of mergers is concerned primarily with the
various motives for mergers. Steiner (1975) develops an intri-
cate description of the components of the decision to merge.
A merger is then assumed to occur when the benefits to each
firm outweigh the costs.
The quest for increased market power is one example of a
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motive for merger. Another incentive is the opportunity to
increase profits, either by taking over a non-profit-maximizing
firm or as the result of cost savings due to technological or
managerial scale economies (Mueller, 1969). A merger may also
reduce the tax liability of the combined firm, another means of
increasing profits (Clarkson and Miller, 1982). Finally, merg-
ing may be a desirable alternative to plant expansion as a
means of corporate growth, particularly since growth by merger
does not increase total industry output (Heflebower, 1963).
Table 2-22 presents a chronology and brief description of
merger activity in the medical diagnostic imaging equipment
industry over the period 1973 to 1981. The first thing to
notice is that there were no vertical mergers over this period,
which is consistent with the finding that production activities
are not the source of significant barriers to entry in this
industry.
Horizontal mergers accounted for four of the nineteen
mergers (21%) which occurred during this period. Intra-industry
product extension mergers are technically horizontal mergers,
but have been classified separately in order to highlight the
product line expansion strategy of many of the firms in the
industry. There were five intra-industry product extension
mergers during this period (26% of the total), and these plus
the "pure" horizontal mergers accounted for 47% of the mergers.
Thus, almost half the mergers resulted in a larger market share
for the acquiring firm.
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Table 2-22
Merger Activity, Medical Diagnostic
Imaging Equipment Industry, 1973-81
Acquiring Firm
Already
Produces in
Period this Market? Size*
1973-74
1974-75
1975-76
1976-77
1977-78
1978-79
1979-80
1980-81
yes
yes
yes
no
no
yes
yes
yes
no
yes
no
no
no
yes
no
yes
L/S
L/S
L/L
-/,
-/S
S/L
L/L
Acquired Firm
Primary
Product
Line(s) Size*
X
NM
NM
CT
X
U
U
-/L U
-/L X
-/L X
L/S X
-/L CT,U,NM
-/L X
L/L
-/L
S/S
all
U,NM
CT
S/S
S/S
S/S
s/S
S/S
S/S
S/L
L/S
S/S
S/S
S/s
L/L
L/L
S/S
S/S
L/L
L/L
L/S
L/L
Type of Merger**
Horizontal
Horizontal
Intra PE
Inter PE
Inter PE
Intra PE
Intra PE
Intra PE
Conglomerate
Conglomerate
Inter PE
Horizontal
Inter PE
Conglomerate
Conglomerate
Conglomerate
Horizontal
Inter PE
Horizontal
*First letter refers to sales of medical imaging equipment
(Small,<$5 million; Large,>$5 million). Second letter
refers to total firm sales (Small,<$100 million; Large,
>$100 million).
**Intra-Industry Product Extension and Inter-Industry
Product Extension are abbreviated.
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There were five inter-industry product extension mergers
over the years 1973 to 1981 (26% of all mergers). All of the
acquiring firms in this group were based in a medical instru-
ments and equipment or, in one case, general health-related
industry. This indicates that entering firms looked upon
demand side similarities as helpful in the successful penetra-
tion of the diagnostic imaging equipment market. Finally,
five of the mergers during this period were of the conglomer-
ate type, with the primary industry of the acquiring firms
ranging from household cleaning products to steel.
It is instructive to consider some of the explanations
given in the industry literature for various mergers. Acqui-
sition is frequently mentioned as a method of entering this
promising market. Typical is the comment that Johnson & John-
son purchased Technicare as an admission ticket to the high-
priced diagnostic equipment market.24 As for Technicare, J&J
purportedly offered the "deep pocket" financing necessary for
long-term product development in this industry. In other
cases the purchase of ready-made large-scale manufacturing
capability is cited, as when Xonics acquired Litton's X-ray
business. 2 5 Finally, sales and service establishments are
often the focus of the transaction, as when Omnimedical pur-
chased EMI's North American operations.26 Along these same
lines, it is notable that purchase agreements commonly in-
clude a clause covering continued service for the acquired
firm's equipment already in place. 2 7
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With regard to size, acquired firms tend to be small,
regardless of whether size is measured by medical imaging
equipment sales or total firm sales. And acquiring firms
tend to be large, again by both measures. Although this
agrees with the stereotype of a.merger--small firm absorbed
by large firm--there is, nevertheless, a significant amount of
variation in the sizes of merger participants in this industry.
For example, six of the nineteen mergers (32%) involved an
acquiring firm with total firm sales of less than $100 million.
Thus, in addition to their usual role as the acquired firm,
small firms in this industry were also actively taking over
other firms during this period.
A discussion of merger activity necessarily includes a
consideration of antitrust policy. One of the objectives of
antitrust policy is to restrict the power of firms to control
price. Section 7 of the Clayton Act is designed to achieve
this objective by prohibiting mergers which would "lessen
competition." Legal challenges to mergers are based on the
provisions of this Section 7 and, over time, a generally
accepted body of antitrust law regarding mergers has devel-
oped. And, the U. S. Department of Justice (1982) has pub-
lished a set of merger guidelines which outline the condi-
tions under which the government can be expected to challenge
a proposed merger.
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There have been two recent cases of antitrust action
against mergers in the medical imaging equipment industry.
These cases, discussed below, indicate that for antitrust
purposes, the relevant market is the product market rather
than the industry as a whole. Moreover, the actions involve,
not surprisingly, the two most highly concentrated product
markets, i.e., the CT and the nuclear imaging markets.
In the first case, in the late 1970's EMI was losing
money on its CT business and decided to get out of the imag-
ing equipment market, After a period of negotiation, EMI
announced in April 1980 the sale of its CT business to
General Electric. Note that sale of EMI's CT business to
General Electric assuming 1978 market shares would have in-
creased the Herfindahl index for the CT market from about
18Q0 to about 3000 Csee the discussion of concentration in
the. CT marketl. This would certainly be cause for antitrust
concern under the merger guidelines (see U. S. Department of
Justice, -19821 and the Justice Department stated that it was
planning to file an antitrust suit to block the acquisition.
General Electric consequently agreed to purchase only EMI's
nonNorth American CT operations and Omnimedical, a small CT
manufacturer, afterwards bought the North American portion of
EMIss CT business.2 8
The second case involved G, D. Searle and Co., which
announced in December 1979 that its remaining diagnostic
*maging businesseas (nuclear imaging and ultrasound) were to
be. sold to Siemens, In March. 1980 the Justice Department
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brought suit to block the merger and requested that an injunc-
tion against the sale be granted. The government's claim was
that the proposed acquisition would eliminate Siemens as a
potential rival and thus lessen competition in the nuclear
imaging equipment market, This indicates that, although the
relevant market is defined by product line for antitrust pur-
poses, the Justice Department is well aware of the advantages
of entry from a related product line, particularly for a
primary firm Csee U. S, Department of Justice, 1982). An
injunction against the sale was denied and the sale was com-
pleted in May 1980. Later that year the Justice Department
extended its suit to also block. the ultrasound portion of the
merger. In spite of the fact that an injunction was denied,
the Justice Department pursued the matter and the case came
to trial at the end of 1980. And, although the trial was
completed in January 1981, the court's decision still had not
been published as of January 1983.29
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In summary, there were nineteen mergers in the medical
imaging equipment industry over the period 1973 to 1981.
About half were horizontEl mergers, which resulted in an
increased market share for the purchaser. About a quarter
were product extension mergers, -with the acquiring firm based
in a health-related industry; further evidence of the
prominent role of demand conditions in this market. The
remainder were conglomerate mergers.
Most of the firms acquired in a merger over the years
1973 to 1981 were small and most of the acquiring firms were
large, but this was not a hard-and-fast rule. In particular,
small firms were active on the purchasing side of the merger
scene, Finally, the Justice Department keeps a close eye on
merger activities in this industry, as indicated by two
recent antitrust actions,
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The set of firms in the medical imaging equipment industry
underwent a great'deal of change during the period 1971 to
1981. Over the years 1971 to 1978 there was a steady inflow
of firms into the industry, with little exit. The pattern
then reversed for the years 1979 to 1981, there being little
entry and substantial exit. Entry into and exit from each of
the four market segments followed this same pattern: net entry
during most of the 1970's, followed by net exit at the end of
the period. The participants in these entry and exit movements
tended to be small firms. And, entry into the X-ray or nuclear
imaging markets was generally intial entry into the diagnostic
imaging equipment market, whereas almost half of the entrants
into the CT and ultrasound markets were firms already producing
another type of imaging equipment.
The set of primary firms in the industry also experienced
a considerable amount of change over this period. Between
1974 and 1978, two firms moved into the set of eight primary
firms and two firms moved out. The key to success as a pri-
mary firm over this period was intra-industry diversification,
i.e., the leading firms moved from the X-ray market into other
product lines.
In addition, there was a substantial amount of merger
activity: nineteen mergers occurred over the period 1973 to
1981. Horizontal mergers were the most common, followed by
product extension (the acquiring firm based in a health-related
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industry) and conglomerate mergers. Acquired firms tended to
be small and acquiring firms large, but there were a number of
exceptions to this rule. Lastly, the Justice Department
brought two suits during these years against proposed mergers.
-180-
SUMMARY
The results of this chapter can be summarized as follows:
(1) Both sales and the number of sellers grew rapidly during
the 1970's, followed by a .slowdown in the late 1970's;
(2) There were changes in relative product shares, with CT
and ultrasound gaining ground at the expense of X-ray;
(3) The market has a three-tier structure, with components
manufacturers, fringe firms, and primary firms;
(4) The industry is unconcentrated by the standards of the
U. S. Department of Justice, with the X-ray and ultra-
sound product markets being moderately concentrated,
the CT market moderately to highly concentrated, and
the nuclear imaging market highly concentrated;
(5) There are no substantial economies of scale in produc-
tion and firms in this industry differentiate their
products primarily on the basis of quality attributes
and the provision of repair and maintenance services;
(6) There was substantial entry and little exit during the
period 1971 to 1978, followed by little entry and a
considerable amount of exit over the years 1979 to
1981; and
(7) There was a substantial amount of merger activity over
the period 1973 to 1981, with horizontal mergers
accounting for about half of the total.
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The basic conditions which are the most important deter-
minants of this structure are the nature of the technology and
the demand.conditions. A piece of imaging equipment is compli-
cated, technologically sophisticated, and in general cannot be
directly evaluated by the user. This, combined with the demand
conditions which lead to an emphasis on quality and service, is
primarily responsible for the importance of product differentia-
tion in this market. The growth in demand, also a major force,
was behind the rapid growth in sales and net entry into the
market.
Factors other than the basic conditions, however, are
necessary to understand the structure of this industry. In
particular, the nature of innovation in this industry has been
repeatedly used to explain various structural features. In the
next chapter, innovation and other aspects of conduct will be
examined in detail. And, as we will see, the character of
innovation is crucial not only in understanding market struc-
ture, but also in evaluating industry performance.
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Register, Greenwich, Conn.: Directory Systems, Inc., 1982;
Moody's Bank and Finance Manual, Moody's Industrial Manual,
Moody's International Manual, Moody's OTC Industrial Manual,
New York: Moody's Investors Service, Inc., various years;
Standard & Poor's Register of Corporations, Directors, and
Executives, New York: Standard & Poor's Corp., 1982; Theta
Technology Corp. (1978); selected company annual reports,
various years; Initial Report, Annual Report, and List of
Certified Components data from National Center for Devices
and Radiological Health; questionnaire responses (see Appen-
dix A).
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9Annual Survey of Manufactures, 1980.
10Derived from sources listed in footnote (8).
11Market shares were available for ten of the 35 firms
in the market in 1974, and for seven of 52 in 1978; derived
from sources listed in footnote (8).
12The "Gray Sheet," February 23, 1981.
13 Ibid.
14Market shares were available for 11 of the 20 firms
in the market in 1978; derived from sources listed in footnote
(8).
15The "Gray Sheet," February 23, 1981.
16Market shares were available for five of the 16 firms
in the market in 1974, and for 10 of 31 in 1978; derived from
sources listed in footnote (8).
1 7Market shares were available for eight of the 12
firms in the market in 1973, and for nine of 14 in 1977;
derived from sources listed in footnote (8).
18The "Gray Sheet," March 17, 1980.
1 9G. D. Searle and Co. 10-K report, year ended December
31, 1980.
2 0Market shares were available for 21 of the 74 firms
in the industry in 1974, and for 24 of 86 in 1978; derived
from sources listed in footnote (8).
2 1See Table 2-2 for sales in 1969.
22The "Gray Sheet," February 23, 1981.
2 3Derived from sources listed in footnote (8).
24The "Gray Sheet," October 9, 1978.
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2 5 Ibid., April 10, 1978.
26Ibid., December 8, 1980.
27See, for example, Ibid., September 21, 1981.
2 8 Ibid., May 12, 1980; July 7, 1980; August 11, 1980;
September 1, 1980; December 8, 1980; February 23, 1981.
29Ibid., March 17, 1980; March 31, 1980; August 4,
1980; August 11, 1980; February 9, 1981; G. D. Searle and
Co., 10-K report, years ended December 31, 1980, 1981, and
1982.
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CHAPTER 3: CONDUCT
In this chapter the conduct of firms in the medical diag-
nostic imaging equipment industry is examined. First, pricing
behavior will be discussed, followed by an investigation of
the marketing strategies used by medical imaging equipment
firms. Then the process of innovation, one of the major
forces in this industry, will be analyzed. Finally, nonprice
competition among medical imaging equipment firms will be
examined.
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PRICING BEHAVIOR
The method by which firms set price depends on market
structure, where the relevant market types are pure competi-
tion, monopoly, oligopoly, and monopolistic competition. In
a monopolistically competitive market, there are a number of
firms acting noncooperatively, but each firm perceives a down-
ward-sloping demand curve for its product, i.e., there is pro-
duct differentiation. There is a high degree of product diff-
erentiation in the medical diagnostic imaging equipment indus-
try and the number of sellers ranged from about 40 in 1971 to
about 80 in 1981 (see Chapter 2). This market is best described
as monopolistically competitive.
With so many firms, it is unlikely that firms would be
able to coordinate pricing decisions. In addition, price coor-
dination is especially difficult when products are differen-
tiated, because firms must then agree on quality levels in
addition to price and output. Scherer (1980) comments that
multidimensionality of technical features (an important char-
acteristic of medical imaging products) is the type of product
heterogeneity most likely to lead to conflicts over price
agreements. It is also the case that tacit coordination is
extremely difficult in an industry, such as this one, experi-
encing rapid technical change.
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In a market like this, it is to be expected that, since
firms cannot successfully coordinate their decisions, they
will compete on the basis of price. And, due to the high
degree of product differentiation there should be a wide
range of prices to match the many product characteristics
positions held by various firms in this industry.
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Prices
The retail price of a standard medical X-ray system
(including X-ray generator, control, tube stand, table, and
beam-limiting device) was about $30,000 to $40,000 in 1974.
There were price changes during the 1970's, but price increases
over the period 1967 to 1976 for X-ray equipment (quality
corrected) were not significantly different from price increases
for other industrial commodities. By 1976 the average retail
price for a typical diagnostic X-ray system (including quality
improvements) was about $60,000 (Shope and Rudolph, 1978).
These findings agree with the price range of $17,500 to $75,000
for conventional radiography systems cited by International
Resource Development (1978).
Beyond this standardized product, price comparisons are
problematical. For example, how can a specialized mammography
machine priced at $165,000 be compared to an X-ray attachment
for cardiac imaging with a selling price of approximately
$20,0001? What is apparent from a survey of X-ray equipment
prices is that equipment utilizing the latest technological
advances is in an entirely different price class than conven-
tional systems. For instance, in 1981 a sophisticated cardiac
angiography system cost $625,000 to $875,0002 and Portugal
(1982) observed that an entirely new digital radiography unit
would cost $600,000 to $700,000 ($200,000 to $300,000 to up-
grade an existing X-ray system).
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Turning to CT scanners, Shope and Rudolph (1978) estimated
that in 1976 the average price for a head CT unit was $300,000
and for a body CT unit was $500,000. This agrees with Theta
Technology Corp.'s (1978) survey of CT prices. Their findings
for whole body scanners are presented in Table 3-1. The first
thing to note is that, although there is a wide range of prices,
higher prices are associated with higher quality, measured in
this case by the number of detectors and speed per scan.
Secondly, there is a great deal of price variation even within
the set of market leaders. Compare, for example, General Elec-
tric and EMI's price/quality combinations.
In terms of price changes, one source estimated that the
average price of a CT scanner had risen from $200,000 in 1975
to $500,000 in 1980.3 The problem with such a statement is
that a "scanner" was by no means the same product in 1980 as
it was in 1975. Recall, for example, that between 1973 and
1978 image reconstruction times for an EMI scanner declined
from 16 minutes to less than 15 seconds (Theta Technology
Corp., 1978). It is also notable that over time the range of
prices appears to be widening, as a larger variety of quality
options are offered. For instance, EMI introduced a new line
of CT systems in late 1978, with prices ranging from $295,000
to $1 million, depending on the model's capabilities. And,
by 1981 both Ohio-Nuclear and Omnimedical were selling scanners
priced at less than $150,000, while Pfizer's top-of-the-line
whole body scanner was quoted at $1.3 million.5
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Table 3-1
Comparison of Whole Body CT Scanners, 1977
Artronix
American
Science & Engineering
EMI
General Electric
Ohio-Nuclear (a)(b)
Pfizer (a)(b)
Philips
Picker
Searle
Syntex
Varian
Pric e
(approx.)
$300,000
$700,oo000
$450,000
$595,000
$400,000$525,000
$350,000$500,000
$570,000
$475,oo000
$500,000+
$400,000
$500,000+
Detectors
(#)
512
600
Several
320
1
Several
1
Several
30
60
256
12
Many
Speed per Scan
(sec)
405, 9, 18
5, 10, or 20
20
4.8 or 9.6
120-150
18-34
120-140
30
27+
9
5, 20
60
6
Derived from: Theta Technology Corp. (1978), pg. IX-14.
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Ultrasound equipment exhibits this same pattern of price
dispersion, both across products and across firms. As an
illustration of the first type of price variation, Frost and
Sullivan (1975b) present typical prices for ultrasonic devices
that range from less than $500 for a Doppler fetal heart detec-
tor to $40,000 or $50,000 for a B-scanner. Price here is
clearly related to product capabilities. For cardiac diagnos-
tic equipment in particular, Frost and Sullivan (1980a) quote
prices for representative echocardiographs both by product type
and by firm (see Table 3-2). The price differentials between
the two products stem from quality differentials. An M-mode
echocardiograph prints out a graph of the ultrasonic echo on
a strip chart, while a two-dimensional echocardiograph displays
a cross-sectional image. The price differentials among firms,
on the other hand, are largely due to the variety of options
included when calculating "product" price--again a form of
quality differences.
Like X-ray equipment, innovation in the ultrasound market
is often accompanied by substantial price hikes. For example,
in 1980 an Australian firm introduced an ultrasonic water path
scanner for cycled imaging of the heart. This scanner, which
has capabilities not available in other scanners at the time,
was priced at $120,000 to $140,000, significantly higher than
even other high grade scanners. 6
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Fir
Table 3-2
Prices of Representative Echocardiographs, 1980
m M-mode Two-Dimensional
Advanc ed
Technology Laboratories
Hoffrell
IREX International
Picker
SmithKline
$23,000
$19,545
$16,150
$17,000
$14, 800
$64, 000
$40,205
$65,000
$48,500
$43,500
Derived from: Frost and Sullivan (1980a), pp. 71-72.
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For nuclear scanning equipment, the price of a standard
Anger-type scintillation camera (with little scope for quality
differentiation) has risen steadily from about $60,000 in 1973
(Frost and Sullivan, 1974b) to approximately $75,000 in 1981. 7
The range of prices is wider for'data processing equipment, a
primary source of product differentiation in this market. In
1981 nuclear data processing systems ranged from a hard-wired
scintiview computer with an average price of $30,000 to a
sophisticated multiterminal shared processor typically .priced
at $85,000.8 The emission computed tomography scanner, a sig-
nificant technological advance similar to the CT scanrner
(except that gamma rays are detected instead of X-rays) put
nuclear imaging prices into a whole new realm. Frost and
Sullivan (1979) estimated that in 1978 a typical ECAT brain
scanner was priced at $300,000.
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Discounting
The effective price of a piece of imaging equipment is
based not only on the list price, but also on the terms of
payment and installation and staff training charges. The
present discounted value of all charges is the price which
matters to the purchaser. Moreover, although product differen-
tiation inhibits price comparisons, there may be scope for
price competition within submarkets composed of roughly homo-
geneous products. Therefore, it is important to look at
discounting practices for particular products.
Frost and Sullivan (1974b) found that in the early 1970's
discounting was not prevalent in the nuclear imaging market.
However, by 1978 (Frost and Sullivan, 1979) manufacturers were
offering significant discounts, particularly on gamma cameras.
One firm was allowing hospitals to keep nuclear imaging systems
for introductory trial periods of as long as a year without
charge, gambling that the hospitals would eventually purchase
the units.
Discounting is also frequently used in the CT market
(Theta Technology Corp., 1978). One case is cited in this
source of two hospitals at a CON review, one of which had been
offered a CT scanner list priced at $600,000 for a two-year
period without charge and a final price of $340,000. The other
hospital was offered a $150,000 discount on a scanner listed
at $550,000. The former firm had placed very few of its scan-
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ners, and the (steep) discounting was an attempt to break into
the market. The other firm, more solidly established in the
market, responded by lowering its price, but not as drastically.
Finally, CON regulation can affect pricing practices.
Recall that for capital expenditures exceeding $150,000
($100,000 in some states) CON approval is required. Conse-
quently, medical imaging equipment firms have a strong incen-
tive to price their products at less than $150,000. CT manufac-
turers Ohio-Nuclear and Omnimedical have developed marketing
strategies based on the CON process and have actively promoted
their scanners priced at less than $150,000 as a way for small
hospitals and private physicians' offices to avoid government
red tape. 10 And some firms offer discounts expressly for the
purpose of sidestepping CON. For example, in 1981 ADAC Labora-
tories announced that the base price of its digital subtraction
angiography system was $160,000, but that by changing the terms
of the contract (e.g., eliminating the one-year warranty) the
price could be reduced to less than $150,000.11
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Leasing
Some firms lease imaging equipment rather than selling
it outright. Frost and Sullivan (1975a) estimated that about
35% of 1974 X-ray equipment shipments were made on a lease
basis. For nuclear medical equipment, approximately 20% was
sold on lease; while about 10% of diagnostic ultrasonic equip-
ment was leased. A few years later, Theta Technology Corp.
(1978) found that approximately 25% of nuclear medical equip-
ment was sold on lease, and about 15% of ultrasonic equipment
was leased.
One reason that equipment users may prefer a leasing
arrangement is that it protects them from obsolescence in a
rapidly changing market, i.e., at the end of a few years they
are not stuck with out-of-date facilities, but can sign another
lease for an upgraded class of equipment. This explanation is
not very convincing for medical imaging equipment because it
would imply that the more rapidly changing product markets
would exhibit more leasing activity. Instead, there is more
leasing in the older, more established product markets.
Another argument is that some purchasers may prefer leas-
ing due to the income tax structure (Miller and Upton, 1976).
The idea here is that in some cases users receive a lower
rental rate because the leasing company can specialize in
utilizing tax subsidies for capital equipment. Tax advantages
for leasing will be more attractive to private physicians'
offices, however, than to most hospitals, due to the tax
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benefits of ownership for a non-profit institution.
Lastly, CON regulation may affect the lease/buy decision.
Leasing turns a capital equipment cost into an operating cost,
and thereby sidesteps the regulatory process (although health
systems agencies have become more. aware of this ploy over
time). As before, this avoidance of government bureaucracy
is especially attractive to small hospitals and private phy-
sicians' offices.
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In conclusion, although price comparisons of medical
imaging equipment can be problematical due to the high degree
of product differentiation in this market, the picture which
emerges is of an industry offering a wide range of product
choices, where price is only one of a number of relevant pro-
duct characteristics. And, as would be expected, price tends
to be directly related to the level of quality. Thus, a poten-
tial buyer of diagnostic imaging equipment can choose from a
product menu ranging from a machine with a low price and
limited capabilities to one which embodies state-of-the-art
technology and a price to match.
Firms in this industry do compete on the basis of price,
often by offering various types of discounts. And, leasing
is fairly common, particularly in the more established product
markets. Moreover, certain types of discounting and leasing
activities are a response to CON regulation.
In the X-ray, ultrasound, and nuclear imaging markets,
basic equipment can be purchased at a relatively low price.
However, if the buyer ventures into the latest high technology
portion of the market, prices skyrocket. The CT market is
generally associated with high prices, but over time the range
of CT prices has widened, with inexpensive scanners now also
being offered. It is interesting that the highly publicized
price inflation in this market actually appears to be a
quality inflation fueled by the rapid rate of innovation.
And, due to the prevalence of third-party payment and the
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importance of quality in the demand decision, the providers
of medical care furnished a ready market for the new techno-
logies and accompanying equipment.
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MARKETING STRATEGIES
Marketing strategies vary greatly within the medical diag-
nostic imaging equipment industry. Some firms elect to manu-
facture the equipment and then sell a marketing license to
another medical equipment firm. The extent and nature of such
distribution agreements in this industry will be examined.
The majority of firms, however, choose to do their own market-
ing. For these latter firms, both selling methods and product
promotion activities (including advertising) will be investi-
gated. As we will see, the tiered structure of the industry
is quite useful in explaining which strategies are selected.
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Distribution Agreements
Some firms manufacture medical imaging equipment and then
sell the distribution rights to another firm. The firm pur-
chasing the marketing rights is usually another manufacturer
of medical imaging equipment, but in some cases it is a firm
selling other types of medical equipment. These distribution
agreements are different from technology licensing agreements,
in which a firm sells the right to manufacture a given product.
The latter type of contracts are discussed as an aspect of
innovation.
There are two basic types of distribution agreements. In
an international agreement, the contract specifies that the
equipment can only be marketed in particular countries. The
manufacturer .thus gains access to a foreign market without
having to set up a local sales organization. These contracts
may involve U. S. manufacturers seeking foreign sales, or the
converse. For instance, Ohio-Nuclear (a U. S. firm) signed an
exclusive distribution agreement with Siemens, good until 1981,
for sales and service of its nuclear diagnostic equipment out-
side the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia,
New Zealand, and Japan (Frost and Sullivan, 1979). An example
of a foreign manufacturer using this method to sell in the
United States is Aloka Ltd. of Japan. In the late 1970's,
Narco Bio-Systems was gra±uied an exclusive license to distri-
bute Aloka's diagnostic ultrasound products in the United
12States, Canada, and Mexico. After Narco sold its ultrasound
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business in 1980, Aloka signed a similar agreement with
Pfizer.13
In these international agreements the marketing firm is
generally granted exclusive distribution rights, while the
manufacturer receives the assurance that a specified amount of
equipment will be purchased. Consider, for example, the
agreement between Omnimedical (a U. S. manufacturer of CT
scanners) and the Italian firm Kontron SPA. Under the terms
of the contract, Kontron was granted exclusive distribution
rights in Italy for three years, while Omnimedical was guar-
anteed the sale of a minimum of 14 of its Model 4001 scanners.14
In the second type of agreement, the medical imaging
equipment manufacturer grants general marketing rights to
another firm. The distribution rights tend to be nonexclusive,
with the benefit to the manufacturer coming from the increased
scope for sales. For example, both ADAC Laboratories and
Medical Data Systems market nuclear imaging equipment directly,
and also have sales arrangements with other nuclear diagnostic
equipment manufacturers (Frost and Sullivan, 1979).
An interesting question is why certain firms prefer this
marketing technique to selling directly or through a dealer
network. One answer lies in the importance of personal selling
and service in this market, combined with the diseconomies of
operating a sales and service organization at small scale.
Theta Technology Corp. (1978) observed that foreign sales
depend largely on direct selling and a very strong service
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organization. They noted that when firms do not find it pro-
fitable to set up a foreign sales and service operation, they
then often sign distribution agreements with firms already
having such operations in place. It is clear that the argument
also holds for domestic firms unable to set up a-full-scale
sales and service operation.
Consider, for instance, the marketing agreement signed
between Baird Corp. and Cordis Corp. in 1978. Under the terms
of the contract, Cordis, a supplier of cardiovascular equipment,
agreed to distribute Baird's "System Seventy-Seven" scanning
gamma camera, which is used primarily for dynamic imaging of
the heart. Cordis had an established sales force of about 80,
specialized in selling cardiovascular equipment. It was Baird's
express purpose to use Cordis' expertise as a means of increas-
ing sales penetration in the hospital market. 1 5 However, most
nuclear imaging equipment is purchased by the Radiology (or
Imaging) Department, not by the Cardiology Department. As a
result, Cordis' expertise was not as useful as had been anti-
cipated, the marketing agreement was terminated in 1980, and
Baird subsequently established its own sales organization.1 6
Recall that all the primary firms have the sales
volume to support a full-scale sales and service operation.
Consequently, it would be surprising to find primary firms
using this marketing strategy. And, in fact, of the agreements
referenced in the industry literature, only one involved a
primary firm being the seller of marketing rights. And in
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that case, the Ohio-Nuclear/Siemens agreement was signed before
Technicare, Ohio-Nuclear's parent company, managed to move into
the set of primary firms. Moreover, the original distribu-
tion agreement specified that Siemens could market Ohio-Nuclear's
nuclear diagnostic equipment everywhere except in the United
States, Canada, and the United Kingdom. The agreement was
modified in 1978 to remove Japan, Australia, and New Zealand
from Siemen's marketing territory (Frost and Sullivan, 1979).
Thus, as Technicare grew, it found it profitable to retain more
and more of the sales territory for itself.
Marketing agreements can also be used as a preparation for
entry into a particular market. A classic example of this is
General Electric's entry into the nuclear imaging market in
1971 as a distributor of the Israeli firm Elscint's line of
nuclear medical equipment. The marketing agreement was then
terminated a few years later (Frost and Sullivan, 1979).
General Electric subsequently bought the nuclear medical equip-
ment line of Nuclear Data in 1975 and began manufacturing and
marketing its own line of nuclear imaging equipment (Frost and
Sullivan, 1975a).
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Selling Methods
For the manufacturers which also do their own marketing,
there are four basic ways in which the product is sold:
directly, by a staff of company salesmen; by manufacturers'
representatives; through regional dealers and distributors;
and direct from the factory. Manufacturers' representatives
are independent salesmen who represent one or more medical
imaging equipment firm, while dealers are middlemen for a par-
ticular type of equipment, most commonly X-ray equipment.
Direct factory sales are used primarily by components manufac-
turers, which have individual arrangements with the firms
utilizing their components.
Frost and Sullivan (1974a), in a survey of the selling
methods of medical diagnostic equipment suppliers, found that
51% used central or branch sales offices, 28% used manufacturers'
representatives, 15% used local distributors, and 6% used other
methods. Thus, over half the firms relied on direct selling.
This is consistent with evidence from the diagnostic imag-
ing equipment industry survey, in which firms were asked
whether they maintained a staff of route salesmen, i.e.,
whether they relied primarily on direct selling. The responses
to that question are presented in Table 3-3. For all product
lines, 65% of the responding firms use route salesmen. Firms
selling X-ray equipment are less likely to use staff salesmen,
while firms selling CT scanners and ultrasound devices are
more likely to use staff salesmen. Thus, direct selling is
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Table 3-3
Responses to the Medical Diagnostic Imaging Equipment
Industry Questionnaire,
Selling Methods Question
Question: Do you maintain a staff of route salesmen for
medical diagnostic imaging equipment -- yes or no?
Number Responding
X-Ray Equipment
CT Scanners
Ultrasound Devices
Nuclear Scanning Equipment
For All Companies Responding
Multiproduct Firms Only
"Yes"
8
(53%)
5
(83%)
11
(85%)
4(67%)
17*(65%)
6
(86%)
No "
7
(47%)
1
(17%)
2
(15%)
2
(33%)
9*
(35%)
1
(14o)
*Rows do not sum to this figure due to multiproduct
sellers.
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quite prevalent in this industry, especially in the CT and
ultrasound market segments.
Note that six of the seven multiproduct firms responding
to the survey report using route salesmen. This agrees with
Frost and Sullivan's (1975b, 1979) findings that virtually all
the leading firms in the diagnostic ultrasonic equipment and
nuclear medical equipment markets maintain a staff of imaging
equipment salesmen. Moreover, all the primary firms rely
primarily on direct selling, as indicated by their extensive
sales and service organizations.
This pattern is consistent with the argument that there
are diseconomies to operating a sales and service organization
at small scale. And, it concurs with Frost and Sullivan's
(1975a) observation that for new companies, manufacturers' re-
nresentatives are a low cost method of establishing a national
sales presence, but that, as sales increase, firms begin using
a company sales staff. In general, then, the primary firms
sell directly, while fringe firms are more likely to use manu-
facturers' representatives or dealers.
In the diagnostic imaging equipment industry, the salesman
often acts as a technical interpreter, explaining what the eng-
ineering specifications will mean in practice for the user.
The salesman's job is complicated in the hospital by the dual
lines of authority; determining exactly who has the power to
make the final purchase decision is often problematical, espec-
ially since it can vary greatly from hosp.ital to hospital.
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And, salesmen must have up-to-date information on regulatory,
financing, and tax issues. As a consequence, comprehensive
sales training is crucial in this industry: in addition to
general selling skills, salesmen must have extensive knowledge
about technical product characteristics, the organizational
structure of the hospital, and general issues such as financing
techniques. Moreover, for more expensive equipment, the supp-
lier often offers assistance with the CON approval process.
In the end, the salesman may become a de facto consultant to
the purchaser (Frost and Sullivan, 1980b).
Medical imaging equipment firms tend to concentrate their
selling efforts in the hospital on the physician because in
general the doctors have the final word on which equipment will
be purchased. In addition, selling efforts in the hospital tend
to spill over to private physicians' offices. The most effec-
tive' means of influencing the medical community are endorse-
ments by opinion leaders and personal recommendations (National
Academy of Engineering, 1971). Teaching hospitals are the
primary source of new medical developments and thus serve as
the standard of good medical practice. As a consequence,
doctors at the teaching hospitals receive special attention
from medical imaging equipment firms (International Resource
Development, 1978).
Diagnostic imaging equipment firms recently have moved
toward the use of a product line sales approach, in which a
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firm offers to supply all the medical imaging needs of a given
hospital (Frost and Sullivan, 1980b). There are cost savings
to the firm in such a situation, stemming from more intensive
utilization of the sales and service operation. And hospitals
find substantial time savings in dealing with only one com-
pany's sales and service organization.
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Product Promotion
Although the topic of product promotion is related to both
product differentiation and nonprice competition, it is dis-
cussed here as an aspect of how firms market their products.
In the medical imaging equipment industry, product promotion
includes not only advertising, but also activities such as trade
show exhibits, which are also a form of personal selling.
The classic debate, of course, is whether promotion acti-
vities are primarily informative or persuasive. That this ques-
tion cannot be answered for the economy as a whole is not sur-
prising. It should, however, be possible to come to some con-
clusion about the role of promotion within a given industry.
One point is that purchasers of proCucer goods tend to be well-
informed about objective product qualities and, because they
are profit-maximizers rather than utility-maximizers, not parti-
cularly susceptible to subjective appeals. Consequently, pro-
ducer good advertising is primarily informative. This argument
applies to medical imaging equipment because it is a producer
good, although it should be remembered that the providers of
medical care are not, in general, profit-maximizers. Secondly,
image as a dimension of differentiation is somewhat superfluous
for diagnostic imaging equipment given that there are so many
important elements of actual product quality. Lastly, as we
will see, the methods of product promotion used in this industry
are not those typically associated with "pure" image differen-
tiation, i.e., no catchy jingles and crowds of beautiful people.
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Taken as a whole, medical imaging equipment product promotion
is expected to be primarily informative in nature.
The survey of diagnostic imaging equipment firms included
two questions relating to the nature of product promotion in
this industry. The first question asked each firm what percen-
tage of sales was allotted to advertising; the responses are
presented in Table 3-4. For all companies responding, the mean
advertising-sales ratio was 3.6%. The ratio was least for firms
manufacturing X-ray equipment (1.9%), followed by CT suppliers
(2.8%), and then nuclear scanning equipment firms (3.6%).
Ultrasound manufacturers had the highest advertising-sales
ratio (4.46%). And, firms active in more than one product market
devote a lower percentage of their sales to advertising (2.5%)
than single product firms.
An industry advertising-sales ratio of between 3% and 4%
is somewhat higher than would be expected for a producer good.
But, the pharmaceutical industry, which also markets primarily
to physicians, had an advertising-sales ratio of about 12% in
1972 (Schwartzman, 1976). In general, an advertising-sales
ratio of 3% to 4%o tends to be associated with consumer durable
goods (see, for example, Ornstein, 1977). This finding is
explained by the fact that medical imaging equipment is simi-
lar to an infrequently purchased, complex durable consumer good
for which it is difficult to assess product performance. For
such a product, firm reputation can serve as a signal of qual-
ity (Nelson, 1974), and firms have an incentive to invest in
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Table 3-4
Responses to the Medical Diagnostic Imaging Equipment
Industry Questionnaire,
Advertising Budget Question I
Question: What percentage of your sales is allotted to
advertising?
Mean
(# of Companies Responding)
X-Ray Equipment 1.9% (12)
CT Scanners
Ultrasound Devices
Nuclear Scanning Equipment
For All Companies Responding
Multiproduct Firms Only
4.4o (12)
3.6% (6)
3.6% (22)*
2.5% (7)
*Rows do not sum to this figure due to multiproduct sellers.
2.8% (6)
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firm reputation by advertising. It is also the case, as we
will see, that a large portion of the advertising.budget is
devoted to promotion activities which are technical in nature,
as would be expected for a product of this type.
The second question in the survey relating to product
promotion asked how the advertising budget was allocated among
various types of promotion activities. The responses, shown in
Table 3-5, indicate the importance of convention-associated
promotion in this industry. For all companies responding, 48%
of the advertising budget was devoted to conventions, 32% to
magazines, 11% to direct mail, and 9% to other. This pattern
is fairly consistent across product market segments, except
that there is more "other" advertising than direct mailings in
the other cases (one of the firms active in all four market
segments indicated that it allocates 50% of its advertising
budget to "other").
This emphasis on product promotion at conventions has been
noted by other industry observers. For instance, Frost and
Sullivan (1980b) commented that major promotional efforts are
made at professional meetings and trade shows. A primary char-
acteristic of convention promotional efforts, such as exhibi-
tion booths, slide shows, and equipment demonstrations, is that
they emphasize the technical aspect of purchasing imaging equip-
ment. In addition, such promotional activities are closely re-
lated to personal selling methods, in contrast to, for example,
a billboard sign.
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The magazine advertisements for medical imaging equipment
appear primarily in the professional journals (such as Radio-
logy) and the trade magazines (e.g., Medical World News)
(Theta Technology Corp., 1978). Direct mailings, on the other
hand, are used mainly when the firm can pinpoint the desired
recipients by purchasing names and addresses of radiologists
or other specialists from a medical society or journal.
In addition to those already discussed, another type of
promotion frequently used in this industry is the arrangement
of- seminars for key potential buyers (Frost and Sullivan,
1975a). These seminars are used most often for new, expensive,
high technology equipment and, like convention promotions, are
a mixture of technical education and personal selling.
-21.6-
In summary, although firms use a variety of strategies to
market medical imaging equipment, certain patterns are apparent.
In the first place, the primary firms all market their own
products directly through a network of sales and service offi-
ces. For other firms in the industry, there are disadvantages
to operating a sales and service organization at small scale.
Therefore, when sales volume is low, firms tend to rely on
distribution agreements, manufacturers' representatives, or
dealers as marketing outlets.
Direct selling is the key to marketing medical imaging
equipment. Purchasers rely on the salesman to interpret tech-
nical details and advise on tax and regulatory problems. The
pivotal role of personal selling is also demonstrated by the
fact that convention activities, in which there is direct cus-
tomer contact, account for about half of all promotion expendi-
tures. Other product promotions inclufe advertising in maga-
zines, direct mailings, and seminar presentations.
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INNOVATION
Innovation is defined as any activity which leads to a
new product or production technique (Kamien and Schwartz,
1982). One of the keys to understanding the market for medical
diagnostic imaging equipment is the nature of innovation in
this industry. Technical change is not only an important as-
pect of conduct, but also a major influence on market structure
and performance. In this section the process by which innova-
tion occurs in this industry is examined in detail.
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History
To set the stage for the subsequent analysis, the major
technical advances in the field of medical imaging will be
described. Some of this material was covered in Chapter 1
and, as was the case for the product descriptions, each type
of imaging equipment will be discussed individually.
The industry as a whole has experienced an extremely rapid
rate of technical change, particularly in the last ten to fif-
teen years. For instance, International Resource Development
(1978) estimated that two-thirds of the industry's growth over
the period 1972 to 1978 had been generated by products intro-
duced after 1972. And the CT scanner provides a striking illus-
tration of this rapid change. One of the first CT scanners
installed in the United States was recently placed in the Mayo
Clinic Historical Museum, a historical artifact after slightly
more than five years of use. 1 7
The field of medical imaging has been greatly influenced
by technological progress in other areas. After World War II,
the development of the television tube and the electronic ampli-
fier led to major changes in imaging technology (International
Resource Development, 1978). Then in the 1970's there was a
surge of technical change which was closely linked to develop-
ments in solid state physics and, more importantly, in computer
technology (Portugal, 1982). In particular, micro chips have
been widely incorporated in medical imaging technology and
there have been major strides in the processing of medical
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imaging information as a result of the introduction of fast,
inexpensive micro computers.
Discovered in 1895, X-rays have been used for medical
imaging since the turn of the century. In the early 1900's
various improvements in the X-ray tube were proposed, and in
1913 the prototype of the "hot filament" X-ray tube, still in
use, was invented (Hendee et al., 1977). The image intensifier,
which increased the resolution of fluoroscopic images, was in-
troduced in the 1950's and there were various improvements in
film quality during the 1960's.
Major advances in X-ray technology occurred during the
1970's stemming from various applications of the computer.
Most important was the development of digital radiography, a
technique in which the information contained in an X-ray image
is recorded in a computer. The data can then be manipulated
and displayed in various ways. A major use of this capability
is digital subtraction, in which the computer electronically
subtracts images made before and after injection of contrast
material in order to isolate the anatomical structure of in-
terest. Digital radiography can also considerably reduce the
pati4nt's exposure to radiation in comparison to conventional
X-ray techniques. And, with provision for mass storage, elec-
tronic processing eliminates the need for X-ray film and copies.
CT scanning, invented in 1967, was an offshoot of the
computer revolution. The computer was a necessary prerequisite
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to the development of the CT scanner due to the multitude and
complexity of the mathematical computations necessary for image
reconstruction. And, rapid advances in computer capabilities
were quickly incorporated into CT technology.
Both scanning methods and detectors were made more effi-
cient during the mid- to late-1970's, but the most prominent
improvement was drastic reductions in scanning times. EMI's
scanner introduced in 1973 required 16 minutes for image recon-
struction. By 1978 this had been reduced to an initial recon-
struction time of less than 15 seconds and single slice scanning
times of less than two seconds (Theta Technology Corp., 1978).
As of 1981, state of the art for scan speed was between three
and ten seconds.18
The direction of future progress is indicated by a joint
project between ScienTex and the New York University School of
Medicine to adapt CT technology for neurosurgery. The purpose
of the project is to develop an instrument which will use CT
images to guide a surgical instrument to the desired location
within the brain.19
The basic principles underlying ultrasound have been known
since the early 1900's. However, it was not until the early
19 6 0's that ultrasound was used for medical imaging. Early
applications of ultrasound were limited primarily to imaging of
the fetus because the amniotic fluid is an ideal medium for the
technique. A major advance in ultrasound technology was the
development of gray scale imaging in the late 1960's. This
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technique increases the information obtainable from an ultra-
sound scan because the echo amplitudes can be expressed as
various shades of gray, rather than as dots of set intensity.
Like other imaging technologies, the advent of fast, in-
expensive computers led to major breakthroughs in ultrasound
imaging. Analogous to the application of computer capabilities
to X-ray equipment, the information in an ultrasound image can
be electronically collected, processed, and displayed in a
variety of ways. And, it is notable that some data processing
equipment is designed to function with fluorographic, ultrasound,
and nuclear diagnostic imaging systems.20
Computer processing and enhancement has made feasible the
use of ultrasound for mammographic imaging, which is desirable
since ultrasound is not radioactive. In addition, there have
been major advances in cardiac applications of ultrasound, such
as phased imaging of the heart. Lastly, there have been recent
improvements in real-time imaging capabilities which are parti-
cularly useful for obstetric applications.
Nuclear scanning techniques depend on both the equipment
and the radiopharmaceutical used for the given procedure. The
discussion here refers to major improvements in nuclear scanning
equipment, but discoveries of new radiopharmaceuticals are
equally as important in this field. Soon after it became
practical to produce radioisotopes in quantity in the 1940's,
nuclear techniques were first used for imaging of the thyroid
gland. And the medical applications of nuclear scanning
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increased as new radiopharmaceuticals were discovered.
The rectilinear scanner, the first widely used scanner,
was invented in 1951. Then in 1956 Harold Anger developed the
scintillation camera which eventually replaced the rectilinear
scanner as the workhorse of the nuclear imaging department.
The technology of the gamma camera has remained essentially
the same since the 1960's, although large field-of-view cameras
are now used more frequently than standard field cameras.
The computer has influenced nuclear imaging technology in
much the same way as it has affected X-ray and ultrasound imag-
ing techniques. That is, the information contained in a nuclear
image can be digitalized, processed, and enhanced in various
ways. One development directly attributable to computer capabi-
lities is emission computed tomography (ECT) scanning, a cousin
of CT scanning in which image slices are reconstructed from
gamma radiation emitted from injected or ingested radiopharma-
ceuticals. ECT scanning produces images with much less resolu-
tion than CT scanning, but has the advantage that it can detect
functional, as well as structural, abnormalities.
A totally new type of imaging technology recently developed
is nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR). The scientific basis for
NMR has been around since the late 1940's, but it was only in
the late 1970's that this technology, utilizing magnetic fields
and radiowaves, was applied to medical imaging (Portugal, 1982).
By 1982 NMR units had been placed at four U. S. hospitals for
clinical investigation. A number of companies are actively
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engaged in NMR product development, and some firms are said
to currently be taking orders for future placements. However,
full-scale commercialization of NMR must await FDA premarket
approval of the new technology (Delco, 1983).
Since NMR is still in the experimental stage, a great deal
of attention is being given to improving system performance.
In addition, there are still technical problems with the tech-
nology, primarily involving the magnet systems used in the
equipment. The trial status of NMR means that it must be demon-
strated to be safe for human use. And much of the current re-
search involves determining the full range of clinical uses
for NMR.
There are a number of research projects currently investi-
gating the possibilities of positron emission tomography (PET)
for diagnostic imaging applications. PET constructs images by
detecting positrons emitted from certain radioisotopes. Al-
though very promising as a source of biochemical imaging, PET
is still very much in the development stage due to technical
problems with the production of appropriate radioisotopes.
At one time, medical imaging and X-ray technology were
synonymous. Beginning in the 1950's with the spread of nuclear
imaging procedures, however, the domain of medical imaging has
periodically expanded to encompass new inventions which make
pictures of the human body. Ultrasound was added to the
diagnostic imaging repertoire in the 1960's and CT in the
-224-
1970's. And, if the predictions of industry observers come
true, NMR will be the new imaging technology of the 1980's.
A recurring theme in the chronology of innovation in
medical imaging is the crucial role of computer applications
in this field. Indeed, the acceleration of technical change
is directly related to the advent of fast, inexpensive com-
puters. The computer's data handling capabilities are used
in all four types of imaging equipment to collect, process,
display, and store information. In addition, micro chips are
used as process controllers in some of the more sophisticated
equipment.
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Public Research Support
To understand the process of innovation in this industry,
it is necessary to examine the role of public funding for re-
search activities. This is of interest because many new medi-
cal imaging products have resulted from discoveries by academic
researchers, for whom the government is a primary source of
research support. In particular, of the five major technologi-
cal breakthroughs in medical imaging, four (X-ray, nuclear medi-
cine, ultrasound, and NMR) were based on work by academic re-
searchers. (It is interesting to note that the fifth major
advance, CT, was developed by EMI, a firm outside the diagnostic
imaging equipment industry.)
There are three types of research activities. First,
there is basic research, the search for very general scientific
and engineering principles. Secondly, there is applied re-
search, the use of basic research to solve a specific problem,
often resulting in an experimental model of a new product or
technique. And lastly, there is product development and commer-
cialization, in which the new product or technique moves from
the laboratory to the market.
The fundamental reason that most major advances in medical
imaging have originated outside the industry is that the research
and development (R&D) budgets of medical imaging equipment firms
are devoted almost exclusively to product development or improve-
ment. Basic research in this field is carried on primarily by
academic researchers in the teaching hospitals and medical
-226-
centers. And the bill for this type of academic research is
generally paid by the government (Frost and Sullivan, 1974a,
1975b, 1979).
The Department of Health and Human Services is a frequent
source of such research support. For example, in 1979 it award-
ed a $5.7 million multi-institution grant for a study of the
clinical uses of PET technology.21 In addition to funding re-
search in the universities and medical centers, the government
also sometimes awards research contracts directly to medical
imaging equipment firms. However, in these cases, the research
goal is generally development of a specific product. For in-
stance, American Science & Engineering developed and manufac-
tured a CT scanner under a contract awarded in 1975 by the
National Cancer Institute. 2 2
Although firms are not actively engaged in basic research
in this field, they keep a very close eye on research develop-
ments. In some cases firms maintain informal contacts with
academic researchers for this purpose. In other cases, firms
take advantage of the academic pressure to publish and closely
monitor the academic journals and professional meetings (National
Academy of Engineering, 1971). Once the results of a research
project are considered worth further development, firms use
various technology licensing agreements or, in some cases,
outright acquisition in order to obtain the development and
manufacturing rights to new types of medical imaging equipment.
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The subsequent discussion refers exclusively to R&D acti-
vities by private medical imaging equipment firms. But it is
important to recognize that public funding is an integral part
of the research environment in this industry, and that private
R&D in general refers only to the final stage in the innovative
process.
-228-
Innovation Inputs and Outputs
Once the decision is made to invest in R&D, the firm can
be thought of as having a production function for innovation,
with associated inputs and outputs. R&D expenditures, R&D
employees, and scientific and engineering personnel all have
been used as measures of inputs to innovation. R&D spending
is the most frequently used input variable, but there are prob-
lems with this measure. For one thing, expenditures for R&D
personnel and facilities are a very imperfect measure of the
quality of the innovational effort. There is some evidence,
for example, that more talented technical personnel tend to
prefer working in a smaller firm, which may offer a lower salary
but more autonomy and self-direction (Cooper, 1964).
Evidence on the R&D efforts of medical imaging equipment
firms was obtained from the industry survey. Responses to a
question about the company's R&D budget are shown in Table 3-6.
For all companies responding, the mean R&D budget was 8.9% of
sales. CT firms devoted the smallest percentage of sales to
R&D (6.7%), followed by nuclear scanning equipment firms (7.6%),
and then X-ray equipment firms (8.8%). Ultrasound manufacturers
had the largest R&D budget (8.9% of sales). And, firms active
in more than one product market devote a lower percentage of
their sales to R&D (7.7%) than single product firms.
Thus, medical imaqinq equipment companies devote a
considerable fraction of sales to R&D activities. They
certainly fall within the "high technology" category defined
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Table 3-6
Responses to the Medical Diagnostic Imaging Equipment
Industry Questionnaire,
R&D Budget Question
Question: What percentage of your sales is allotted to
research and development?
Mean
(# of Companies Responding)
X-Ray Equipment
CT Scanners
8.8% (10)
6.7% (5)
Ultrasound Devices
Nuclear Scanning Equipment
For All Companies Responding
Multiproduct Firms Only
8.9% (10)
7.6% (6)
8.9% (20)*
7.7% (5)
*Rows do not sum to this figure due to multiproduct sellers.
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by Grabowski and Vernon (1979) as industries which invest 5%
or more of sales in R&D. And the results are consistent with
evidence from the National Academy of Engineering (1971) study
that biomedical engineering firms (a category encompassing
diagnostic imaging equipment) spend about 8-10% of sales on
internal R&D.
The end result (output) of innovation has been defined to
be a new product (or production technique). Innovational out-
put has been measured by patents awarded, important patents
awarded, number of new discoveries, important inventions, and
sales of new products (Kamien and Schwartz, 1975). Each of
the above variables has certain deficiencies as a measure of
innovational output. For example, not all new products are
patented and various new products may represent different
levels of innovational output.
The use of patents to measure R&D output is inappropriate
in this industry because the scientific principles underlying
most medical imaging technology are long-established and, in
general, unpatentable. And, although specific engineering
techniques can be patented, they are often easily circumvente'
(see Chapter 2). For instance, the scientific phenomenon of
nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) was first discovered in the
late 1940's by physicists at Stanford and Harvard Universities
and since then numerous papers on the subject have been pub-
lished in the scientific journals. Consequently, the scien-
tific basis for NMR is not patentable and there are several
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companies currently developing NMR units for the medical imag-
ing equipment market.
Evidence on R&D output is available as a byproduct of
medical device regulation. The regulatory program administered
by the National Center for Devices and Radiological Health re-
quires all medical device firms to submit a premarket notifi-
cation form (510-K) before introducing a new product. If the
manufacturer can provide evidence in the 510-K that the product
is substantially equivalent to a device already being sold, then
premarket approval is not required and the firm can proceed to
market the product. If the product is not equivalent to a
device already being sold, premarket approval, contingent upon
evidence that the device is both safe and efficacious, is re-
quired.
In practice, a firm will not submit a 510-K unless FDA
acceptance is a virtual certainty. If the firm believes that
it has a truly new product, for which premarket approval will
be required, it first submits an Investigational Device Exemp-
tion (IDE). If the IDE is approved, the firm can then perform
clinical investigations of the product to determine safety and
effectiveness.
IDE submissions are not available to the public, but there
are few products introduced in the medical imaging equipment
market which are so original that extensive premarket testing
is necessary. And, although firms are very secretive about
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product development plans, it is generally known in the indus-
try that most of the IDE's which have been granted by the FDA
are for medical imaging applications of NMR (Delco, 1983).
Information on premarket notifications, on the other hand,
is available and the National Center for Devices and Radiologi-
cal Health provided a list of 510-K submissions for the years
1976 through 1982. The data are collected according to the
following product categories: diagnostic X-ray, diagnostic
ultrasound, and diagnostic nuclear medicine. This classifica-
tion differs from the product market definitions used pre-
viously in several ways. In the first place, the diagnostic
X-ray category includes both conventional X-ray equipment and
CT scanners. Secondly, the diagnostic nuclear medicine cate-
gory includes equipment for in vitro (in glass) diagnostic pro-
cedures, as well as equipment for in vivo (in body) procedures.
Lastly, equipment used for dental diagnostic procedures is in-
cluded. Note also that there are no distinctions among the
various new products. In other words, a major technical advance
such as a sophisticated electronic data processing system is
counted as one new product introduction, as is a relatively
minor development such as an improved X-ray timer control.
The number of firms which introduced new products and
the number of new products over the period 1976 to 1982 are
shown in Tables 3-7 and 3-8 (note that a new product here
refers to a 510-K acceptance). The pattern which emerges is
of an industry in which firms are very active in marketing new
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Table 3-7
Number of Firms Introducing New Products,
Diagnostic X-Ray, Ultrasound, and Nuclear Medicine
Medical Devices, 1976-82
All Firms Primary Firms**
(W) (#) (% of Total)
1976 X-Ray 12 5 42
Ultrasound 6 1 17
Nuclear Medicine 1 1 100
TOTAL 17* 5* 29
1977 X-Ray 19 5 26
Ultrasound 11 2 18
Nuclear Medicine 6 2 33
TOTAL 31* 6* 19
1978 X-Ray 19 5 26
Ultrasound 13 3 23
Nuclear Medicine 13 2 15
TOTAL 39* 6* 15
1979 X-Ray 32 4 13
Ultrasound 20 6 30
Nuclear Medicine 5 0 0
TOTAL 54* 8* 15
1980 X-Ray 28 5 18
Ultrasound 38 5 13
Nuclear Medicine 7 2 29
TOTAL 68* 7* 10
1981 X-Ray 32 5 16
Ultrasound 39 6 15
Nuclear Medicine 24 5 21
TOTAL 84* 8* 10
1982 X-Ray 40 6 15
Ultrasound 34 5 15
Nuclear Medicine 6 1 17
TOTAL 71* 7* 10
* Rows do not sum to this figure due to multiproduct firms.
** Firms with medical imaging equipment sales greater than
5% of total industry sales.
Derived from: Data provided by National Center for Devices
and Radiological Health.
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Table 3-8
New Product Introductions,
Diagnostic X-Ray, Ultrasound, and Nuclear Medicine
Medical Devices, 1976-82
All Firms Primary Firms**
(#) (#) ( of Total)
1976 X-Ray 20 10 50
Ultrasound 7 1 14
Nuclear Medicine 1 1 100
TOTAL 28 12 43
1977 X-Ray 42 21 50
Ultrasound 15 2 13
Nuclear Medicine 10 3 30
TOTAL 67 26 39
1978 X-Ray 58 28 48
Ultrasound 16 5 31
Nuclear Medicine 16 3 19
TOTAL 90 36 40
1979 X-Ray 60 19 32
Ultrasound 22 6 27
Nuclear Medicine 6 0 0
TOTAL 88 25 28
1980 X-Ray 61 21 34
Ultrasound 60 10 17
Nuclear Medicine 12 5 42
TOTAL 133 36 27
1981 X-Ray 75 40 53
Ultrasound 55 13 24
Nuclear Medicine 35 10 29
TOTAL 165 63 38
1982 X-Ray 64 22 34
Ultrasound 61 9 15
Nuclear Medicine 12 5 42
TOTAL 137 36 26
*Firms with medical imaging equipment sales greater than
5% of total industry sales.
Derived from: Data provided by National Center for Devices
and Radiological Health.
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products. Since the data classifications differ, it is not
possible to be precise, but it appears that between a quarter
and a half of the firms in the industry introduce a new pro-
duct in any given year. Moreover, numerous firms have intro-
duced more than one new product a year (the average number of
new products per firm is about two).
For X-ray firms, there was a steady increase in the number
of new products introduced over the period 1976 to 1981, with
a slight decrease in 1982. Introductions of new ultrasound
devices increased slightly over the period 1976 to 1979, in-
creased greatly between 1979 and 1980, and then leveled off
during the years 1980 to 1982. And, new product introductions
of diagnostic nuclear medicine devices have been erratic over
the period 1976 to 1982.
Table 3-8 also presents the number of new products intro-
duced by primary firms over the years 1976 to 1982. Recall
that the primary firms collectively account for 75% to 80% of
total industry sales in any given year. Thus, it is clear that
the number of new product introductions by primary firms is
not proportionate to their share of industry sales. The number
of new product introductions by large firms (medical imaging
equipment sales in excess of $5 million) was also computed and
the result was analogous: the proportion of total new product
introductions by large firms is not commensurate with their
share of industry sales.
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In summary, there is a great deal of innovative activity
in this industry. Firms allocate considerable resources to
R&D activities, as indicated by the average R&D budget of 9%
of sales. And, firms producing only one product devote a
larger percentage of their sales to R&D than do multiproduct
firms. These R&D efforts do lead to innovational outputs, as
shown by the large number of new products introduced each year.
In any given year, a considerable proportion of firms in the
industry introduce at least one new product. And, the primary
firms and other large firms account for a relatively small
proportion of new product introductions in comparison to their
share of total industry sales.
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Innovation as a Competitive Strategy
Theoretically, R&D and innovation can either help or
hinder entry. For industries in which technical change is an
important aspect of competition, the necessity for a minimum
R&D capacity may impose a barrier to entry (Kamien and Schwartz,
1975). On the other hand, invention of a new product is.often
a means of entering a new market, particularly for small firms.
Although no comprehensive data are available, a reading
of the industry press makes it clear that there has been a
substantial amount of entry into the medical imaging equipment
industry on the strength of new product introductions. The
classic example is EMI, which with the introduction of the CT
scanner, not only entered the market with ease, but also became
a primary firm within a few years. There are also numerous
examples of small firms which used a new product. or, more fre-
quently, a product improvement to pave their way into the mar-
ket. For instance, Diagnostic Information, Inc. is a small
firm which was recently purchased by Xonics. The inventor of
an improved fluoroscopic image intensifier founded the company
in 1975 to manufacture and market his product.23
Thus, in spite of the fact that established firms in this
industry both devote considerable resources to R&D activities
and are very active in introducing new products, on balance
innovation appears to be an aid to entry rather than a barrier.
This implies that the minimum level of R&D effort required
must be relatively low or small firms would not have been so
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successful in developing new products. It is important to note,
however, that while innovation has been an avenue of entry into
the industry, it has not, with the exception of EMI, promoted
entry into the set of primary firms. Entry into this group
depends primarily not on innovative efforts, but on the extent
of technical service facilities and the possession of a broad
product line.
As discussed previously, there is sometimes a product
differentiation advantage to being the first to introduce a
new product (Bond and Lean, 1977). And, there is some evidence
that this has been the case for major medical imaging develop-
ments. In particular, most of the primary firms are asso-
ciated with a pathbreaking new discovery in one area of medical
imaging. Siemens and General Electric were two of the original
manufacturers of X-ray equipment, Picker was involved with the
first scanning systems for both nuclear medicine and ultrasound,
Searle developed a production model of the original scintilla-
tion camera, and EMI introduced the CT scanner (International
Resource Development, 1978). Thus, there are advantages to
being a pioneer, but such benefits appear to be substantial
only for major technological breakthroughs.
And, it is apparent that other strategies with respect to
innovation are also successful. For exampleý, Technicare has a
reputation in the industry for "creative copying" (International
Resource Development, 1978). By carefully monitoring innova-
tions by others and investing in rapid development for pro-
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mising products, the company is able to take advantage of new
discoveries without being the pioneering firm. Innovation as
a basis for rivalry among medical imaging equipment firms will
be discussed further in the section on nonprice competition.
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In conclusion, innovation is a major force in the market
for medical imaging equipment. In the first place, pathbreak-
ing new technologies have been introduced periodically since
the 1950's. As a consequence, medical imaging is no longer
synonymous with X-ray technology, but now also encompasses
nuclear scanning, ultrasound, and CT techniques. In addition
to these major technological breakthroughs, there-have been
numerous important product improvements, stemming principally
from application of the computer to medical imaging technology.
And innovation is a constant concern of firms in the industry,
as indicated by the amount of resources allocated to R&D efforts
and the number of new products introduced each year.
Small firms are particularly active in the area of inno-
vation, as shown by the fact that the proportion of new product
introductions by small firms is quite a bit higher than the
industry sales share of small firms. The minimum level of R&D
effort for effective entry appears to be relatively low and,
on balance, innovation has promoted entry into the medical
imaging equipment industry.
Finally, although private companies devote a great deal of
effort to innovative activities, the R&D undertaken by firms is
generally directed at product development or improvement. Most
of the basic research in this field is conducted by academic
researchers and funded by the federal government.
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NONPRICE COMPETITION
In addition to competing on the basis of price, firms in
an industry with a high degree of product differentiation often
search for other ways in which to vie for customers. The most
important bases of nonprice competition among medical imaging
equipment firms are product quality attributes, provision of
maintenance and repair services, and the introduction of new,
technologically prestigious products.
As Lancaster (1966) pointed out, buyers actually demand
a combination of characteristics rather than a monolithic pro-
duct. Consequently, when quality is multi-dimensional, firms
can be thought of as positioning themselves in product charact-
eristics space. For a complex product such as medical imaging
equipment, there are a number of product quality attributes
important to purchasers (see the detailed discussion in Chapter
2). Included are image quality, system throughput rate, data
processing, display and storage options, ease of operation,
and mobility. There is considerable quality competition in
this industry as indicated by the fact that, in the trade press
and journal advertisements, firms emphasize these product attri-
butes and point out that they are proof of the quality of their
product.
A related topic is competition on the basis of firm repu-
tation. As Nelson (1974) observed, when product performance
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is difficult to evaluate, advertising can serve as a signal of
quality. Recall that the advertising-sales ratio in the medi-
cal imaging equipment industry is higher than would be expected
for a producer good and that much of the advertising is techni-
cal in nature. This is evidence that firms in this industry
invest (via product promotion) in firm reputation as a means
of quality competition.
The provision of maintenance and repair services is the
second major basis for nonprice competition in this industry.
In the first place, the existence of a widespread and reputable
service operation is a major factor in the purchase decision
(Kreel, 1979; Frost and Sullivan, 1980b). Furthermore, Frost
and Sullivan (1980b) presented evidence that in many cases
service is more important than technical sophistication as a
determinant of demand. Specifically, they found that often a
firm with a more reliable service operation but a less techno-
logically sophisticated product was selected over firms with
more advanced products but a less dependable service organiza-
tion.
Medical imaging equipment firms are well aware of this
concern on the part of buyers. Consider, for instance, the
statement by EMI that a worldwide service organization is essen-
24
tial to satisfy customers and thus gain new sales. Moreover,
the importance of service as a basis for competition is re-
peatedly stressed by industry observers (see, for example,
Theta Technology Corp., 1978 or Frost and .Sullivan, 1975a).
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Finally, innovation is also a basis for nonprice competi-
tion in the medical imaging equipment industry. In the first
place, firms must innovate simply to survive. The rate of
technical change in this industry over the past fifteen years
has been so rapid that firms which did not introduce new devices
lost market share (Theta Technology Corp., 1978). In response
to this pressure to innovate, firms devote.considerable re-
sources to R&D activities and many new products are introduced
each year. Moreover, product promotion in this industry is
frequently devoted to announcing and touting new products.
For instance, convention-associated activities, the most impor-
tant type of promotion, are generally centered around the intro-
duction and demonstration of new, technologically sophisticated
medical imaging devices. A final aspect of innovation as non-
price competition is the fact that technical advances have been
a primary means of entry into this industry. In these cases,
increased competition as a result of entry is a direct conse-
quence of innovation.
One other competitive strategy used by firms in this in-
dustry should be mentioned here. Recall that during the 1970's
there was a considerable amount of intra-industry entry (i.e.,
entry by a firm already producing one type of imaging equipment
into another market segment). This trend is associated with
the use of a full product line sales strategy, particularly by
the primary firms. In selling to hospitals, these firms
provide a type of "one-stop shopping." The idea is that if
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the firm supplies all the medical imaging needs of the hospital,
it has a greater incentive to provide reliable service (Frost
and Sullivan, 1980b).
Note that this makes it very difficult for a firm to be-
come a primary firm. In order for a firm to expand its
market share, it must not only have a high quality product and
an extensive service organization, but it also must be able to
compete successfully in more than one product market. When
buyers prefer multiproduct sellers, competition, especially
between fringe firms and primary firms, is inhibited.
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SUMMARY
Medical imaging is a complex product and price is only
one of several important product characteristics. The firms
in this industry offer a wide range of products with an accom-
panying wide range of prices. Conventional systems are avail-
able at a relatively low price, while equipment embodying
the latest technological advances is considerably more expen-
sive. Firms in this industry compete on the basis of price,
primarily by offering various types of discounts and also on
the basis of product quality attributes, the provision of
reliable repair and maintenance services, and the introduction
of new, technologically sophisticated products.
Direct selling is the cornerstone of marketing in the
diagnostic imaging equipment industry. Most firms use a staff
of company salesmen to contact potential buyers directly, al-
though for small firms alternatives such as distribution agree-
ments or the use of manufacturers' representatives may be pre-
ferable. The importance of personal contact is also indicated
by the fact that convention activities are the major element
in promotion and advertising campaigns for medical imaging
equipment.
Innovation is a driving force in the market for diagnostic
imaging equipment. For one thing, the industry has expanded
periodically since the 1950's to incorporate the discovery of
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new imaging techniques. In addition, advances in computer
technology have had a major impact on the industry. Firms
allocate considerable resources to R&D efforts, but R&D by
private firms is devoted almost exclusively to product develop-
ment. Basic research in this field depends primarily on public
funding. Every year numerous new products are introduced and,
on balance, innovation has served to promote entry into the
industry.
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11Ibid., May 25, 1981.
12Ibid., April 3, 1978.
13Ibid., November 3, 1980.
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CHAPTER 4: PERFORMANCE
Summarizing the findings of Chapters 1 through 3, medical
imaging equipment, used by doctors as a diagnostic tool, is a
highly technologically sophisticated product. Product quality
is multidimensional, with salient characteristics including
image quality, system throughput rate, reliability, display and
storage options, and ease of operation. Both hospitals and
private physicians' offices purchase diagnostic imaging equip-
ment and these buyers are relatively insensitive to price due
to the prevalence of third-party payment. As a consequence,
the purchase decision is determined primarily by perceived
quality variations.
The industry composed of the manufacturers of medical
imaging equipment has experienced a great deal of change over
the last ten to fifteen years. Real sales have grown, there
has been a substantial amount of net entry into the industry,
and there has been a rapid rate of technical change. The
industry is composed of primary firms, which account for at
least 5% of industry sales, fringe firms, and firms which
manufacture only components. In the aggregate the industry
is unconcentrated, but the X-ray, CT, and ultrasound product
markets are moderately concentrated, and the nuclear imaging
market is highly concentrated. During the period 1971 to 1978
there was substantial entry and little exit, followed by
little entry and a significant amount of exit over the years
1979 to 1981.
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Innovation is a driving force in this industry. Manu-
facturers of medical imaging equipment compete with one
another not only on the basis of price, but also on the basis
of the introduction of new, technologically sophisticated
products, Quality competition is also important. And,
es.peci.ally for the primary firms, the provision of reliable
repair and maintenance services is a major basis for compe-
tition,
This chapter uses these. findings to assess performance
in the medical diagnostic imaging equipment industry, in
part:icular to determine the extent of competition in this
industry, From society's point of view, a competition market
is preferred because it avoids the deadweight loss associated
wtth monopoly pricing,
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When a firm has market power it can raise its price above
that which would be charged under competition. Thus, a measure
of market power is the difference between price and marginal
cost. However, information on marginal costs generally is
unavailable and most empirical studies have used an accounting
rate of return as a proxy for the economic rate of return.
There are serious problems associated with this approach. In
fact, Fisher and McGowan (1983) claim that an examination of
accounting rate of return provides no information about the
presence or absence of monopoly profits. Other researchers,
however, claim that it is appropriate to use adjusted accounting
data to measure market power (see Scherer, 1980).
For medical imaging equipment, even accounting data on
profit rates is not available for all firms. In the first
place, recall that over half of the firms manufacturing diag-
nostic imaging equipment are also active in one or more other
industries (see Chapter 2). These diversified firms tend to
use consolidated accounting methods and sales and income data
are rarely presented by product line. Secondly, a number of
the small firms in this industry are privately held and thus
not required -o provide detailed accounting information to the
public. Nevertheless, some information on profits is avail-
able and is subsequently discussed.
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Technicare Corporation, a primary firm in the industry
after 1976, originally entered the medical imaging equipment
market in 1970 by acquiring Ohio-Nuclear, Inc., a supplier of
nuclear diagnostic equipment. In 1975 the company began to
manufacture CT scanners and then expanded into ultrasound with
the purchase of Unirad Corporation in 1976. Technicare was
subsequently bought by Johnson & Johnson in 1978.
Information on Technicare's diagnostic imaging equipment
net sales and operating income is available for the years 1972
to 1978 and is presented in Table 4-1. The composition of net
sales changed greatly over this period, with the percentage of
total sales accounted for by diagnostic imaging equipment in-
creasing from 16% in 1972 to 76% in 1978. By 1978 Technicare
was primarily an imaging equipment firm. Note that over the
years 1973 to 1977 diagnostic imaging equipment's share of
total operating income equaled or exceeded its share of sales.
Moreover, the firm's after-tax income as a percentage increased
steadily from 1972 to 1977. However, 1978 was not a good year
for the company and then in 1979, the first year of Johnson &
Johnson's ownership, Technicare lost $23,197,000 on sales on
$133,633,000.1  No further information on Technicare's finan-
cial performance is available because Johnson & Johnson does
not provide accounting data by product line.
Xonics, Inc., which became a primary firm with the 1978
purchase of Litton's X-ray business, also has become mainly
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TABLE 4-1
Technicare Corp., Sales and Income,
Fiscal Years 1972-78
Diagnostic Imaging
Equipment
Net Sales
(% of Total
Net Sales)
($1,000)
3,800(16%)
6,100
(17%)
10,565(24%)
18,522
(30%)
52,621(56%)
124,952(76%)
142,803
(76%)
Diagnostic Imaging
Equipment
Operating Income*
(% of Total
Operating Income)
($1,000)
279
(11%)
821
(19%)
1,152(24%)
2,504
(33%)
Fiscal
Year
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
Total
Net Income
After Taxes
as % of
Net Sales
2.9%
4.2%
5.4%
5.8%
8.2%
10.0%
*Operating income is income before extraordinary items and
before allocation of corporate expenses, interest, income
taxes, and amortization of goodwill.
Derived from: Technicare Corp. 10-K Report, years ended
June 30, 1976 and 1978.
11,510(72%)
30,321(92%)
8,585
(74%)
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a medical imaging equipment firm. Xonics produces diagnostic
X-ray and ultrasound equipment, and as Table 4-2 shows, the
share of medical imaging revenues increased from 14% in 1975
to over 90% in 1981. However, the advantages of this move are
not yet apparent--the company has lost money every year since
1977. In addition to a general slowdown in the diagnostic
imaging market in 1978 and 1979, there were problems associated
with changing from a research to a manufacturing orientation
and expanding rapidly by acquisition.
Both Technicare and Xonics are active in more than one
medical imaging product market. EMI Ltd., on the other hand,
sold only CT scanners, from the first commercial scanner place-
ment in 1973 until the firm sold its CT business in 1980.
Table 4-3 presents sales and profit data for EMI over the years
1973 to 1979. EMI's CT sales increased dramatically from
321,000k in 1973 to 93,205,000k in 1977, with profits in-
creasing more than proportionately. This was followed by an
equally dramatic drop in sales in both 1978 and 1979, with the
company losing 26,000,000k on CT sales in these two years.
These losses contributed to the sharp drop in the company's
after-tax profit rate as a percentage of net sales. In 1980
EMI, deciding to cut its losses, sold its CT business outside
North America to General Electric and its North American CT
business to Omnimedical,
Baird Corporation is another firm which is active in only
one diagnostic imaging market, in this case the nuclear imaging
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TABLE 4-2
Xonics, Inc., Revenues and Income,
Fiscal Years 1975-81
Medical Imaging
Revenues
(% of Total
Revenues)
($i,000)
832
(14%o)
1,452
(16%)
4,405
(41%)
8,090
(56%)
82,673
(91%)
(> 90%)
( >90%)
Total Revenues
($1,000)
6,092
9,062
10,741
14,404
90,431
70,067
76,981
Total Income/Loss
After Taxes*
($1,ooo000)
326
211
-4,466
-4,207
-7,320
-4,966
*Before extraordinary items.
Derived from: Xonics, Inc. Annual Report, year ended March 31,
1979; Moody's Industrial Manual, various years.
Fiscal
Year
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
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Table 4-3
EMI Ltd., Sales and Profits, Fiscal Years 1973-79
-Medical Electronics*
Sales
(% of Total Sales)
(1,000o )
321
(0.1%)
5,076(1%)
20,406(4%)
42,104
(6%)
93,205
(11%)
66,542(8%)
43,691(5%)
Medical Electronics*
Profits
Before Interest
and Taxation
(% of Total Profits
Before Interest
and Taxation)
(1,o000o)
-67(-0.2%)
1,242
(3%)
9,230
(21%)
12,502
(19%)
14,711
(20%)
-13,175(-35%)
-12,788(-45%)
Profit
After Taxes**
as % of
Net Sales
3.3%
2.6%
3.6%
3.3%
1.0%
0.2%
*Medical electronics is mainly CT scanners.
**Before extraordinary items.
Derived from: EMI Ltd. Annual Report, years ended June 30,
1978 and 1979.
Fiscal
Year
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
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equipment market. Baird's sales and income for the years 1978
to 1982 are shown in Table 4-4. Medical diagnostic systems
sales accounted for about 10% of total company sales over
this period. Operating profits for medical diagnostic systems
were off in 1978 and 1979, and then returned to a level commen-
surate with the share of total sales. The after-tax rate of
profit for the firm varied between 1% and 4% over this period.
The last firm for which profit data are available is
G. D. Searle & Co., principally a pharmaceutical firm, but
also, until 1979, a supplier of CT, ultrasound, and nuclear
imaging equipment. Table 4-5 presents sales and earnings infor-
mation for Searle over the period 1973 to 1978. Diagnostic
product sales increased over the period, but in 1976, 1977,
and 1978 the company lost money on diagnostic product sales
even before the allocation of corporate overhead expenses.
And these losses contributed to the reduction in the after-tax
profit rate as a percentage of net sales for the period 1976
to 1978 in comparison with the preceding years. In light of
these losses, Searle decided in 1979 to divest itself of all
diagnostic imaging operations.
Comprehensive profit information is not available for the
diagnostic imaging equipment industry. Nevertheless, a look at
sales and profits for five imaging equipment manufacturers makes
it clear that high profits are not the norm in this industry.
Some firms, here EMI and Technicare, did very well in the
rapidly expanding markets of the mid-1970's. But 1978 and 1979
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Table 4-4
Baird Corp., Sales and Income, Fiscal Years 1978-82
Medical Diagnostic
Systems*
Sales
(% of Total Sales)
($1,000)
2,835
(9%)
3,371
(10%)
4,544
(12%)
4,106
(9%)
3,918(9%)
Medical Diagnostic
Systems*
Operating Profit**
(% of Total
Operating Profit)
($1,000)
-126
(-2%)
259(4%)
845
(12%)
735
(9%)
509
(9%)
Total Income
After Taxes***
as % of
Net Sales
3.0%
3.4%
3.8%
2.7%
0.8%
*Medical diagnostic systems is mainly gamma cameras.
**Operating profit is profit before allocation of overhead
expenses.
***Before extraordinary items.
Derived from: Baird Corp. Annual Report, years ended
September 30, 1977, 1978, 1979, and 1982.
Fiscal
Year
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
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Table 4-5
G. D. Searle & Co., Sales and Earnings,
Fiscal Years 1973-78
Diagnostic
Diagnostic Products*
Products* as % of
as % of Total Total
Fiscal Total Net Operating
Year Net Sales Sales Profit**
($1000)
1973 10% 425,270 2%
Total
Operating
Profit**
($1000)
71,806
Earnings
After Taxes***
as % of
Net Sales
14%
9% 531,285
613,367 2%
660,174 -2%
749,583 -6%
9% 848,380 -11%
*Diagnostic products are ultrasonic scanners,
scintillation cameras and related equipment.
nuclear imaging
**Exclusive of corporate administrative expenses.
***For continuing operations.
Derived from: G. D. Searle & Co. 10-K Report, years ended
December 31, 1977 and 1978.
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
10%
10o
10o
88,647
99,633
88,515
97,434
115,622
13%
14%
10%
5%
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were bad years for all the firms examined here, and in light
of their losses, EMI and Searle decided to exit the industry.
Although scanty, the information on profits suggests that
the medical imaging equipment industry is competitive.
The competitiveness of an industry can also be
assessed by looking at evidence other than profits. For
example, free entry and exit is a necessary condition for a
competitive market. Recall that in this industry there was
substantial net entry over the period 1971 to 1979 (the number
of firms doubled over this period), while the years 1979 to
1981 were characterized by a considerable amount of net exit.
This is a picture of a responsive, competitive industry. Signi-
ficant new discoveries and increased demand led to rapid sales
growth and large profits for certain highly visible firms
(such as EMI) in the early 1970's. In response to these oppor-
tunities, a number of firms entered the industry hoping to share
in the boom. Then in the late 1970's sales stopped growing so
rapidly, there were many firms competing for each sales dollar,
and a number of firms decided to cut their losses by leaving
the industry. Judging by the substantial numbers of firms
moving in and out of the industry, there appear to be minimal
barriers to entry (or exit) in this market.
Another point is that firms in this industry compete not
only on the basis of price and the provision of repair and
maintenance services, but also on the basis of quality and
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innovation. This multi-level rivalry combined with the rapid
rate of technical change creates an environment in which firm
rankings can change very quickly. And in fact, market shares,
even of the primary firms, are quite variable--not an outcome
to be expected when firms have substantial market power.
Lastly, the level of concentration is important in assess-
ing industry competitiveness. For instance, the level of con-
centration has long been a focus of antitrust policy because
concentration is assumed to affect the likelihood that firms
could collude and/or exercise market power (U. S. Department
of Justice, 1982). The X-ray and ultrasound markets have many
firms and are moderately concentrated, while the CT market is
moderately to highly concentrated. Collusion is unlikely in
these markets not only because of the number of firms, but also
because coordination is very difficult when products are tech-
nically complex. Although the nuclear imaging market has fewer
firms and is highly concentrated, there appears to have been
considerable competition in this market as indicated by the
fact that even though Searle was the market leader, it experi-
enced substantial losses and was forced to leave the market.
One other way to assess the extent of competition in an
industry is to find out what the firms themselves have to say
about it. Self-reporting is not necessarily objective, but
any glaring inconsistencies should be exposed by comparing
accounts from several sources.
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Not surprisingly, firms considering leaving the industry
are especially sensitive to competitive pressures. For example,
EMI in its 1979 annual report discussed the strong competition
in the CT market and then sold its CT business in 1980. Like-
wise, in 1980 SmithKline commented on the formidable competitive
array in the ultrasound market 2 and subsequently sold its medi-
cal ultrasound business in 1981. In addition to those feeling
the pinch, however, other medical imaging equipment firms also
see the industry as competitive. In its 1978 10-K report,
Technicare notes that the nuclear diagnostic equipment and
ultrasound markets are highly competitive and that pricing and
service are the principal competitive factors. It also dis-
cusses the intense competition in the CT market, fueled by
rapid product innovation. And General Electric, in its 1982
10-K report, described the medical imaging equipment market as
being characterized by vigorous competition, especially with
respect to price and technical innovation.
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In conclusion, medical imaging equipment appears to be
sold in a competitive market. An examination of sales and
profit data for five manufacturers revealed that high profits
are not the norm in this industry. Some firms have made sub-
stantial profits in the short run,'but such an occurrence was
then followed by rapid entry of firms seeking to share in
these profits. The numbers of firms moving in and out of the
industry suggest that there are minimal barriers to entry in
this market, a condition conducive to competition. Overall,
the technological complexity of the equipment and the rapid
rate of innovation, combined with the ease of entry, promote
competition in this industry.
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FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER 4
Johnson & Johnson Annual Report, year ended December 30,
1979.
2The "Gray Sheet" (Medical Devices, Diagnostics, and
Instrumentation Reports), November 17, 1980.
3Ibid., November 16, 1981.
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CHAPTER 5: POLICY
The government regulations which are relevant for medi-
cal diagnostic imaging equipment were described in Chapter 1.
This chapter is a consideration of how these regulations have
affected the industry. Both radiation safety regulation and
medical device regulation directly affect the manufacturers
of imaging equipment. The effects of these regulatory programs
on market structure and innovation are examined in detail.
Then two types of hospital regulation, certificate-of-need
and prospective reimbursement, are discussed with respect to
the consequences for the suppliers of imaging equipment.
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RADIATION CONTROL ACT
Radiation safety regulation, designed to protect the
public from the hazards of long-run low-level radiation ex-
posure, operates primarily by means of performance standards
which set minimum safety standards for any radiation-emitting
electronic product. The regulation applies to the manufacture
of X-ray, CT, and ultrasound equipment.
In the case of medical imaging equipment, the purpose of
the regulation is to protect both patients undergoing diagnos-
tic imaging tests and operators of the equipment from "unneces-
sary" radiation exposure. The most important aspects of the
regulatory program are: (1) a maximum allowable leakage of
radiation per exposure, (2) limitation of the range of the
X-ray beam, (3) requirements for reproducibility and consis-
tency of exposure, and (4) positive beam limitation, a system
which prevents exposure unless the size of the beam is properly
adjusted to the size of the image receptor. Compliance with
these requirements is enforced by plant inspections, inspection
of products in use, laboratory checks (dissection), and life-
time testing. Other elements of the regulatory program are
labeling and safety information requirements, specified quality
control procedures, and recordkeeping and reporting require-
ments (see Chapter 1).
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Effects on Market Structure
A regulatory program involving performance standards and
reporting requirements can be expected to increase the costs
of production (provided that the regulatory constraints are
binding). The effect of such regulation on market structure
depends on how costs change. If small producers face a higher
average cost of regulation and/or there are economies of scale
in regulatory compliance, then market concentration is expected
to increase. With respect to exit and entry patterns, if costs
rise substantially, then alternative investments will be rela-
tively more attractive, leading to a higher exit rate and re-
duced entry rate after regulation. Thus, the expected effects
of product safety regulation on market structure depend on the
magnitude and nature of the change in production costs.
In the case of radiation safety regulation, the regula-
tory constraints were binding, i.e., the regulatory program
did change the manufacturers' behavior. For instance, the
positive beam limitation system, designed to avoid operator
error, was not in general use prior to the implementation of
the regulatory program. And, new quality control programs
and other design changes were also necessary.
Evidence on how radiation safety regulation has affected
production costs is available in a report prepared by the
Bureau of Radiological Health (Shope and Rudolph, 1978). The
report refers only to diagnostic X-ray equipment, a category
encompassing both conventional X-ray equipment and CT scanners;
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the radiation hazard of ultrasound devices was not considered
to be serious enough to warrant the imposition of performance
standards. The report found that, after regulation, the costs
of manufacturing diagnostic X-ray equipment increased in the
following ways:
(1) The major costs of radiation safety regulation stem
from the positive beam limitation requirement for sta-
tionary, general-purpose X-ray systems. It is esti-
mated that the added cost per system due to positive
beam limitation is about $4000 (in 1976$).
(2) There were start-up costs in 1974 associated with the
initiation of the regulatory program. These costs
arose from: (a) the need for new administrative capabi-
lities, (b) detailed initial reporting requirements,
(c) design changes to comply with the standards, and
(d) the need for additional quality control and testing
programs. These costs were estimated to be about 10%
of annual (product) sales.
(3) Annual costs increased as a result of administrative
and quality control requirements and new safety features
other than positive beam limitation. These cost in-
creases were estimated at about 5% of annual sales.
Calculations in the report were based on aggregate data. No
consideration was given to the possibility of differential
cost increases for small and large producers.
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These findings indicate that the average cost of radia-
tion safety regulation is approximately the same for small and
large producers (e.g., positive beam limitation requirements
lead to uniform added per unit costs). There may be some re-
duction in average cost as output increases due to gains from
specialization and indivisibilities (e.g., a large firm could
hire a full-time safety engineer). However, any such economies
of scale in regulatory compliance are likely to be minimal.
Evidence as to the magnitude of the post-regulatory
change in production costs is also provided by the survey of
firms in the medical imaging equipment industry. One of the
questions in the survey asked how radiation safety regulation
had affected production costs. The responses, shown in Table
5-1, indicate that radiation regulation did not have a size-
able effect on production costs. Of the 25 companies respond-
ing to the question, only 4 (16%) claimed that radiation
safety regulation substantially increased the cost of manu-
facturing imaging equipment. When analyzed by firm size,
large producers (medical imaging equipment sales greater than
$5 million) were slightly more likely to find a large effect
on production costs (2 of 8) than small producers (2 of 17).
Overall, then, radiation safety regulation is expected
to have had negligible effects on market structure. There do
not appear to be significant economies of scale in compliance
for this type of regulation and small firms do not report a
greater increase in (average) costs than large firms--the level
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Table 5-1
Responses to the Medical Diagnostic Imaging Equipment
Industry Questionnaire,
Effects of Radiation Safety Regulation Question I
Question: "How has radiation safety regulation by the Bureau
of Radiological Health affected your production
costs -- a little, some, or a lot?"
Number of Companies Responding
"a little" "some" "a lot"
Total Number
of Companies
Responding
X-Ray
Equipment
CT Scanners
Ultrasound
Devices
TOTAL
Multiproduct
Firms Only
*Rows do not sum to this figure due to multiproduct sellers.
154(27%)
2
(33%)
4
(31%)
8
(32%)
2(29%)
7(47%)
2
(33%)
7(54%)
13
(52%)
3(43%)
(27%)
2
(33%)
2
(15%)
4(16%)
2
(29%)
13
25*
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of concentration should be unchanged. And the impact on pro-
duction costs was slight--entry and exit patterns should not
be altered after regulation.
Evidence on the level of concentration is contained in
Chapter 2. Radiation safety standards went into effect in
1974 and firms would not have instantaneously adjusted to the
new environment. Thus, we can examine the effects of radia-
tion safety regulation on the level of concentration by com-
paring 1974 and 1978 values.
Referring to Table 2-8, we find that in the X-ray market
both the four-firm concentration ratio and the Herfindahl in-
dex declined, but only slightly, between 1974 and 1978.
Thus, concentration in the X-ray market was essentially un-
changed after regulation. Note that, since the introduction
of the CT scanner coincided with the onset of radiation safety
regulation, it is not possible to compare pre- and post-regu-
latory concentration levels for the CT market. For the in-
dustry as a whole, as Table 2-12 shows, both the four-firm
concentration ratio and the Herfindahl index decreased, but
again, only slightly. Thus, concentration in the medical
imaging equipment industry was not changed after regulation.
Chapter 2 also presents evidence on exit and entry pat-
terns for the years 1971 to 1981. Since radiation safety
standards went into effect in 1974, the pre-regulatory portion
of this data set is 1971 to 1974, the post-regulatory portion
1974 to 1981,
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As Table 2-18 shows, one firm exited the X-ray equipment
market during the years 1971 to 1974, while six left over the
period 1974 to 1981. Table 5-2 presents a contingency table
for these data, arraying firm exit behavior against the periods
1971-74 and 1974-81. The entries in the contingency table
were used to test the null hypothesis that the qualitative
variables firm exit behavior and pre- and post-regulatory
periods were independent over the years 1971 to 1981. The
chi-square statistic is 3.12; the null hypothesis cannot be
rejected.
Exit patterns for the industry as a whole are shown in
Table 2-15; one firm exited the industry during the years
1971 to 1974, while fourteen left over the period 1974 to
1981. These data are also presented in Table 5-2 in a con-
tingency table format, and were used to test the null hypo-
thesis that firm exit behavior over the years 1971 to 1981
was independent of the pre- and post-regulatory periods. The
chi-square statistic is 10.06; the null hypothesis is rejected
at a 1% level of significance.
Note, however, that ten of the fourteen exits in the post-
regulatory period occurred in the two-year period 1979 to 1981.
The five-year lag between the onset of regulation and this
large number of exits is suspicious. Recall also that both
the growth rate of industry sales and the rate of entry into
the industry slackened considerably in the late 1970's. This
suggests that forces other than regulation may have been
-273-
Table 5-2
Exit Patterns Before and After
Radiation Safety Regulation
X-Ray Equipment
Market
Exit
No Exit
1971-74
1
x2(1) = 3.12
Medical Diagnostic
Imaging Equipment
Industry
1971-74
Exit
No Exit
1
41
x 2(1) = 10.06
1971-74
Exit
No Exit
X2(1) = 1.23
2 (1) = 6.63
.01
1974-81
6
29
1974-81
14
40
1974-79
4
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responsible for the high exit rate during 1979 to 1981.
Another contingency table is presented in Table 5-2 arraying
firm exit behavior against the periods 1971-74 and 1974-79.
The entries in the table were used to test the null hypothesis
that firm exit behavior over the years 1971 to 1979 was inde-
pendent of the periods 1971-74 and 1974-79. The chi-square
statistic is 1.23; the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.
As to entry patterns, Table 2-18 shows that six firms
entered the X-ray equipment market during the years 1971 to
1974, while 22 entered over the period 1974 to 1981. Note
that the entry rate is actually higher in the post-regulatory
period. Table 5-3 presents a contingency table for these
data, arraying firm entry behavior against the periods 1971-74
and 1974-81. The entries in the table were used to test the
null hypothesis that firm entry behavior and pre- and post-
regulatory periods were independent over the years 1971 to
1981. The chi-square statistic is 4.97; the null hypothesis
cannot be rejected.
For the industry as a whole, Table 2-15 shows that 13
firms entered the industry during the years 1971 to 1974,
while 39 entered over the period 1974 to 1981, the entry rate
again being higher in the post-regulatory period. These data
are also presented in Table 5-3 in a contingency table format,
and were used to test the null hypothesis that firm entry
behavior over the years 1971 to 1981 was independent of the
pre- and post-regulatory periods. The chi-square statistic
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Table 5-3
Entry Patterns Before and After
Radiation Safety Regulation
X-Ray Equipment
Market
Entrant
Existing
Firm
X2 (1) = 4.97
Medical Diagnostic
Imaging Equipment
Injdustry Entrant
Existing
Firm
x 2(1) = 5.04
1971-74 1974-81
22
3530
1971-74 1974-81
42
39
54
2
01 .01
(1) = 6.63
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is 5.04; the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.
Overall, there is no evidence that market structure in
the diagnostic imaging equipment industry has been signifi-
cantly affected by radiation safety regulation. The level of
concentration, both for the X-ray. market and for the industry
as a whole, was essentially unchanged after regulation. And,
neither exit nor entry patterns for the X-ray market and the
industry appear to have been significantly affected by the
Radiation Control Act.
The effect of regulation on small firms is an important
policy concern. In particular, it is widely believed that
government regulation places a disproportionate burden on
small firms. For example, Business Week comments: "Regula-
tion has always weighed more heavily on small companies ...
This sentiment is expressed repeatedly in the general press,
in the trade literature, and in government publications.2
The problem was considered to be so serious that Congress
passed the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-354),
which has the express purpose of minimizing the "unnecessary"
regulatory burdens on small firms.3 This concern is especi-
ally pertinent in the medical imaging equipment industry since
small firms are very active in the innovational process (see
Chapter 4).
As noted previously, the effects of regulation on market
structure depend on how production costs are affected. With
respect to the industry size distribution, small producers are
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at a disadvantage after regulation if they face a higher aver-
age cost of regulation and/or if there are economies of scale
in regulatory compliance. It was shown that concentration was
not significantly increased in the period after radiation
safety regulation was instituted,' one indication that small
firms were not adversely affected by this type of regulation.
Another indication of the effect of regulation on small
firms is the change in the relative number of small firms. The
number of firms by size is reported in Table 5-4 both for the
X-ray market and for the industry as a whole over the years
1971 to 1981. In both the X-ray market and the industry, the
relative number of small firms increased over the period, evi-
dence that radiation safety regulation did not have the effect
of driving small firms from the market. To the contrary, the
proportion of small firms increased steadily over the period,
there being no perceptible change associated with the onset
of the regulatory program.
Thus, in the diagnostic imaging equipment industry, radia-
tion safety regulation does not appear to have had an adverse
impact on the relative position of small firms. Regulation
has neither affected the level of concentration nor decreased
the relative number of small firms. Small firms seem to be
especially successful in a dynamic industry such as this, in
which there is a high rate of technical change and frequent
shifts in relative position within the industry. The ability
of small firms to respond very quickly to market changes is a
valuable asset in this type of industry.
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Number of Manufacturers of X-Ray and
Medical Diagnostic Imaging Equipment,
By Firm Size, 1971-81
X-Ray Equipment Market
Medical Diagnostic
Imaging Equipment Industry
Number of
Small* Firms
Year (% of Total)
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
21(70%)
24
(73%)
27(75%)
26
(74%)
30(77%)
36(80o%)
39(81%)
42(81%)
43(83%)
41(80%)
41(80%)
Number of
Large** Firms
(% of Total)
9
(30%)
9(27%)
9(25%)
9(26%)
9
(23%)
9
(20%)
9
(19%)
10
(19%)
9
(17%)
10
(20o%)
10(20%)
Number of
Small* Firms
(% of Total)
30
(71%)
34(74%)
38(76%)
41
(76%)
49
(79%)
58(82%)
62
(81%)
69
(80%),
70(80%)
66
(80%)
64(81%)
Number of
Large** Firms
(% of Total)
12
(29%)
12
(26%)
12
(24%)
13(24%)
13(21%)
13(18%)
15
(19%)
17(20%)
17(20%)
16
(20%)
15
(19%)
*Small defined as annual medical
of less than $5 million.
**Large defined as annual medical
of more than $5 million.
imaging equipment sales
imaging equipment sales
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Effects on Innovation
Another major policy concern involves the effect of regu-
lation on innovational activities. The firm's decision to
invest in research and development (R&D) is generally analyzed
in a capital budgeting framework, in which the firm accepts
only projects for which the expected present discounted value
is positive. The salient factors in the decision to invest in
an R&D project are thus the project cost, length of the devel-
opment period, net sales, product life span, probability of
project success, and discount rate. If regulation affects any
of these factors, then the decision to invest in R&D and thus
innovation outputs will be affected.
As noted previously, radiation safety regulation can be
expected to increase the costs of production, due primarily to
the costs of complying with the safety performance standards.
However, this type of regulation does not require premarket
approval procedures (see the next section on medical device
regulation). Consequently, radiation safety regulation is
likely to have a negligible effect on innovation.
Firms in the industry agree with this, as indicated by
responses to the industry survey. One of the questions in the
survey asked how radiation safety regulation had affected the
introduction of new products. The responses, shown in Table
5-5, indicate that radiation regulation did not have a sizeable
effect on the introduction of new products. Of the 24 companies
responding to the question, only 3 (13%) claimed that radiation
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Responses to the Medical Diagnostic Imaging Equipment
Industry Questionnaire,
Effects of Radiation Safety Regulation Question II
Question: "How has radiation safety regulation by the Bureau
of Radiological Health affected introduction of
new products -- a little, some, or a lot?"
Number of Companies Responding
"a little" "some" "a lot"
Total Number
of Companies
Responding
X-Ray
Equipment
CT Scanners
Ultrasound
Devices
TOTAL
Multiproduct
Firms Only
*Rows do not sum to this figure due to multiproduct sellers.
2
(14%)
146(43L%)
3(40%)
4
(31%)
9(38%)
2
(33%)
6(43%)
2(60%)
8(62%)
12
(50%)
4(67%)
1(8%)
3
(13%)
24*
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safety regulation significantly affected the introduction of
new products.
Since the data series used in Chapter 4 to examine inno-
vation outputs is for the period 1976 to 1982, it is not
possible to compare new product introductions before and after
regulation. Referring to Table 3-8, however, we can see that
radiation safety regulation did not seriously hamper innova-
tional efforts, as indicated by the fact that the number of
new product introductions by diagnostic X-ray firms more than
tripled over the period 1976 to 1982. And, in general, it
appears that radiation safety regulation has not significantly
affected innovation in the medical imaging equipment industry.
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MEDICAL DEVICE AMENDMENTS
The Medical Device Amendments of 1976 were enacted in
order to ensure the safety and efficacy of medical devices in-
tended for human use. All four types of medical imaging
equipment fall within the authority of this legislation.
Note that radiation safety regulation is aimed at protecting
the public from unnecessary radiation exposure, while the
scope of medical device regulation is substantially broader--
its mandate is safety and efficacy in general.
The provisions of the Medical Device Amendments call for
medical devices to be classified into one of the following
groups according to the extent of regulatory control: Class I,
General Controls; Class II, Performance Standards; and Class
III, Premarket Approval. The four primary types of medical
imaging equipment are Class II devices, with the radiation
safety performance standards for X-ray equipment and CT scanners
doubling as the medical device performance standards for those
products. NMR, on the other hand, is a Class III device,
subject to premarket approval.
All medical devices must comply with the general controls.
These include labeling requirements, establishment registra-
tion and device listing for manufacturers, premarket notifica-
tion procedures, and compliance with good manufacturing practice
standards (quality control and testing, recordkeeping). All
medical device firms are required to submit a premarket noti-
fication form (510-K) before introducing a new product. If the
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manufacturer can provide evidence in the 510-K that the product
is substantially equivalent to a device already being sold,
then the firm can proceed to market the product. In prac-
tice, a firm will not submit a 510-K unless FDA acceptance is
a virtual certainty. If the firm has a truly new product,
then its safety and efficacy must be demonstrated before it
can be marketed. One frequently used method of securing pre-
market approval is to first apply for an Investigational Device
Exemption (IDE) in order to perform clinical investigations.
The results of the investigations can then be used to establish
safety and efficacy.
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Performance Standards
The performance standards for X-ray equipment and CT
scanners originally developed for radiation safety regulation
were adopted as the medical device safety standards for those
types of equipment. Consequently, the expected effects of
these standards on market structure and innovation are the
same for both types of regulation, i.e., negligible. Moreover,
standards for ultrasound devices and nuclear scanning equip-
ment (not yet published) which involve similar added adminis-
trative and quality control requirements can reasonably be
assumed to entail cost increases of the same magnitude as those
for other types of imaging equipment. Recall that cost in-
creases due to product safety regulation for X-ray equipment
and CT scanners were estimated at about 5-10% of annual sales.
Evidence as to the effects of medical device regulation is
obtained from the survey of firms in the medical imaging equip-
ment industry. One of the questions in the survey asked how
medical device regulation had affected production costs. The
responses, shown in Table 5-6, indicate that device regulation
did not have a sizeable effect on production costs. Of the 23
companies responding to the question, only 2 (9%) claimed that
medical device regulation substantially increased the cost of
manufacturing imaging equipment.
Another question in the survey asked how medical device
regulation had affected the introduction of new products.
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Table 5-6
Responses to the Medical Diagnostic Imaging Equipment
Industry Questionnaire,
Effects of Medical Device Regulation Question I
Question: "How has medical device regulation by the Food
and Drug Administration affected your production
costs -- a little, some, or a lot?"
Number of Companies Responding
"a little" "some" "a lot"
Total Number
of Companies
Responding
X-Ray
Equipment
CT Scanners
Ultrasound
Devices
Nuclear
Scanning
Equipment
TOTAL
Multiproduct
Firms Only
*Rows do not sum to this figure due to multiproduct sellers.
1(8%) 134(31%)
1
(17%)
2
(17%)
1
(17%)
8
(35%)
0
1(8%)
8
(62%)
5
(83%)
9(75%)
5
(83%)
13(57%)
7(100%)
12
2
(9%)
23*
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Table 5-7 reports the responses; of the 23 companies respond-
ing to the question, 5 (22%) claimed that device regulation
had substantially affected the introduction of new products.
Note that, while still relatively minor, firms report a greater
effect of device regulation on the introduction of new pro-
ducts than on production costs. The greater concern with
effects on innovation is probably due to the fact that medi-
cal device regulation includes premarket approval requirements
in addition to performance standards. The provisions for pre-
market approval also affect innovation and will be discussed
further in the next section.
As we have seen, radiation safety performance standards
are identical to medical device performance standards for
X-ray equipment and CT scanners. In addition, firms in the
industry do not report substantially increased production
costs or substantially decreased introduction of new products
as a result of medical device regulation. Consequently, it is
expected that the safety performance standards provisions of
device regulation will not materially affect market structure
or innovation activities. The data presented in the previous
section on the patterns of concentration, exit and entry, and
new product introductions are also relevant here--there is no
evidence that medical device safety standards have had an
adverse impact on market structure or innovation in the
diagnostic imaging equipment industry.4
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Table 5-7
Responses to the Medical Diagnostic Imaging Equipment
Industry Questionnaire,
Effects of Medical Device Regulation Question II
"How has medical device regulation by the Food
and Drug Administration affected introduction
of new products -- a little, some, or a lot?"
Number of Companies Responding
"a little" "some" "a lot"
Total Number
of Companies
Responding
X-Ray
Equipment
CT Scanners
Ultrasound
Devices
Nuclear
Scanning
Equipment
TOTAL
Multiproduct
Firms Only
*Rows do not sum to this figure due to multiproduct sellers.
Question:
4
(31%)
1(17%)
1(8%)
1
(17%)
7
(30%)
0
6(46%)
3
(50%)
8(67%)
3
(50%)
11(48%)
5(71%)
12
3
(23%)
2
(33%)
3(25%)
2
(33%)
5
(22%)
2(29%)
23*
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Premarket Approval
The distinguishing characteristic of medical device regu-
lation is the requirement that new devices must be demonstrated
to be safe and effective before they can be marketed. While
the FDA has not yet published official regulations for pre-
market approval, it has issued guidelines for premarket appro-
val applications. The clearance process entails well-controlled,
but not always clinical, investigations. Although new devices
must be shown to be both safe and effective, safety is the
primary focus of the legislation. As long as a device is safe,
effectiveness is interpreted narrowly in the approval process.
Note also that the legislation contains no reference to eco-
nomic criteria for approval. In other words, cost-effectiveness
is not to be considered in the approval decision (National Aca-
demy of Sciences, 1979).
Since it applies to new products, a major policy concern
is the effect of premarket approval on innovation. Recall that
a capital budgeting framework is generally used to analyze the
decision to invest in R&D and that the salient factors in the
decision to invest in an R&D project are the project cost,
length of the development period, net sales, product life span,
probability of project success, and discount rate.
Premarket approval requirements affect several of the
factors determining the decision to invest in R&D. Reductions
in the net present value of a proposed project are likely to
result from increased project costs, a lengthened development
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period, and the possibility that approval will not be received.
The investigations necessary to convince the FDA of the pro-
duct's safety and efficacy lead to higher project costs and a
longer development period. And the possibility that a new
product will not prove to be safe. enough for human use de-
creases the probability of project success. Working in the
other direction are effects of premarket approval on net sales
and product life cycle. Some industry observers argue that
once an approved product is released, net sales will be larger
because there will be greater market acceptance and less com-
petition. And, it is conjectured that the product life span
will lengthen, again because there will be greater market
acceptance and because the development period for competing
innovations is lengthened (Vanden Brink, 1979; Theta Technology
Corp., 1978).
How premarket approval affects R&D investment depends on
the relative magnitudes of these effects. With respect to pro-
ject costs, once premarket approval procedures are well-estab-
lished, firms can mitigate the increased cost of R&D attribut-
able to safety investigations by performing the safety studies
at the same time that the product is in the final stages of
development. There is some evidence, for example, that the
experimental placements of NMR have been used both to iron out
technical problems and to demonstrate patient safety (Delco,
1983). Lengthened development periods may result from addition-
al time for safety studies or from regulatory delays. As to
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the latter, by 1981 the average processing time for a medical
device premarket approval application was less than eight
months.5
The aggregate effect of premarket approval on innovation
depends not only on the effects on R&D decisions, but also on
how frequently premarket clearance is necessary. The most
important consideration with regard to medical imaging equip-
ment is that most new product introductions occur within
already established product classes and thus do not require
premarket approval. Only major new developments, which are
rare, require premarket clearance. To date, NMR is the only
medical imaging development since medical device regulation
was instituted for which premarket approval is relevant.
Overall, premarket approval is expected to have only slight
effects on innovation in the diagnostic imaging equipment
industry primarily because it is necessary in very few cases.
Recall that the industry survey asked a question regard-
ing the effect of medical device regulation on the introduction
of new products (see Table 5-7). Less than a quarter of the
firms responding to the question claimed that device regula-
tion had substantially affected the introduction of new pro-
ducts. Since device regulation includes both performance stan-
dards and premarket approval, this is evidence that firms in
the industry do not believe that device regulation, as imple-
mented to date, has had a seriously adverse impact on innova-
tion. The qualification "as implemented" is an important
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caveat--if the necessity for premarket approval were inter-
preted more widely (e.g., to apply also to new diagnostic
ultrasound products), then innovation might well be retarded.
Another question in the survey asked how the firm would be
affected if extensive premarket approval procedures were re-
quired. Of the 23 companies responding to this question,
16 (70%) indicated that the effects would be severe.
The primary difficulty in assessing the impact of pre-
market approval is that NMR is the only medical imaging devel-
opment to date for which premarket clearance has been an issue.
The problems are that firms are very secretive about NMR pro-
jects, no FDA approvals have yet been received, and data on
Investigational Device Exemption (IDE) applications are not
available to the public. Consequently, there is little infor-
mation on which to base an evaluation and a more complete exam-
ination of the effects of premarket approval on this industry
must await a later date when more information is available.
One area of particular policy concern has been the impact
of medical device regulation on small firms. Small firms have
been a major source of innovation in the medical devices field
in the past and it was feared that such firms would find the
premarket approval process too lengthy, expensive, and uncer-
tain to warrant their participation (see Grabowski and Vernon,
1979; U. S. Department of Commerce, 1979). As mentioned pre-
viously, premarket approval has not affected the introduction
of new products already classified as one of the four primary
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types of imaging equipment. In addition, the relative number
of small firms in the industry was constant at approximately
80% over the years 1976 to 1981 (see Table 5-4), the period
following the onset of device regulation. And it is interest-
ing to note that of the six companies known to be currently
active in the NMR market, a small company, Fonar, is said to
be likely to be the first to receive FDA approval (Delco,
1983). In general, medical device regulation does not appear
to have put small medical imaging equipment firms at a serious
disadvantage.
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Lessons From Pharmaceutical Regulation
Under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 and the
1962 amendments to the Act, drug manufacturers must demonstrate
the safety and efficacy of any new pharmaceutical preparation
to the FDA before the drug can be offered for sale. This
legislation served as the model for the 1976 Medical Device
Amendments. The effects of drug regulation on market structure
and innovation have been widely studied and it has been sug-
gested that the findings of these studies are also applicable
to the regulation of medical devices (U. S. Department of
Commerce, 1979).
The most important component of drug regulation is the
premarket approval process in which a new drug must be shown
to be safe for human use and therapeutically efficacious. The
approval process entails animal toxicity tests and clinical
investigations. The major findings as to the impact of pre-
market approval requirements on the pharmaceutical industry
are: (1) increased costs for new product introductions;
(2) reduced rate of new product introductions; and
(3) increased concentration in the supply of new drugs.
(See surveys in Grabowski and Vernon, 1979; National Academy
of Sciences, 1979; and U. S. Department of Commerce, 1979.)
Because there are similarities between drug and medical
device regulation, some observers have argued that the effects
of drug regulation are a good predictor of the effects of
device regulation (U. S. Department of Comierce, 1979). There
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are two problems with this conclusion as it applies to diag-
nostic imaging equipment. In the first place, every new drug
is subject to premarket clearance, so drug regulation affects
all new product introductions. For imaging equipment, on the
other hand, only infrequently occurring major new developments
must receive premarket approval. Secondly, although the
Medical Device Amendments were broadly patterned on drug regu-
lation legislation, the authors of the device legislation were
aware of the problems associated with drug regulation. As a
consequence, medical device regulation differs from drug regu-
lation in several important ways. For one thing, the three-
level classification system was designed to differentiate among
levels of potential risk and to avoid the over-regulation of
devices acknowledged to be clearly safe and effective. Further-
more, in an attempt to encourage flexibility and responsiveness,
the legislation provides for the use of advisory committees,
composed of experts primarily from the scientific community,
to review proposed regulations and applications for premarket
approval. Finally, manufacturers of Class III devices can
submit a proposed product evaluation procedure to find out
beforehand whether the testing program is adequate in the eyes
of the FDA (National Academy of Sciences, 1979).
Although superficially similar, there are enough substan-
tive differences between drug and medical device regulation
and between the pharmaceutical and diagnostic imaging equipment
industries that a priori there is no reason to expect device
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regulation to adversely affect the imaging equipment industry.
And the indication from the industry survey is that device
regulation has not had a seriously negative impact on produc-
tion costs or the introduction of new products. Overall, it
appears that device regulation has not materially affected
either market structure or innovation in the medical imaging
equipment industry. Thus, the lessons from pharmaceutical
regulation are that some of the adverse effects of product
safety regulation may be avoided by distinguishing among
levels of potential consumer risk and by building responsive-
ness and adaptability into the regulatory process.
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CERTIFIC ATE-OF-NEED PROGRAMS
Certificate-of-need (CON) programs require hospitals to
demonstrate "need" to a health systems agency before making a
capital equipment purchase of greater than $100,000 or $150,000
(the threshold varies by state). The purpose of CON review is
to restrain hospital cost inflation, but since there are sub-
stantial differences among the state CON programs, the methods
used to achieve this objective also vary greatly from state to
state. With regard to medical imaging equipment, CON regula-
tion has the potential to reduce demand for equipment priced
above the CON threshold.
The effect of CON on hospital costs and particular classes
of equipment has been the subject of a number of studies.
Cromwell et al. (1976) found that CON did not have a signifi-
cant effect on the adoption of diagnostic nuclear medicine.
Likewise, Russell (1978) presented evidence that the diffusion
of diagnostic nuclear techniques was not affected by CON. In
a broader study, Salkever and Bice (19'(9) examined the impacts
of CON on hospital costs over the years 1968 to 1972. They
found that there were no significant savings in hospital costs
stemming from CON regulation. Their findings agree with Sloan
and Steinwald's (1980) conclusion that CON regulation had little
effect on hospital costs over the period 1970 to 1975. Finally,
Joskow (1981), using data for the period 1973 to 1979, could
find no statistical evidence that CON regulation had affected
hospital expenditures. This latter study also included a
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case study of CT scanners; the evidence indicated that CON
regulation had not affected the supply of CT scanners.
Firms frequently compain about the delay and uncertainty
associated with CON regulation. Evidence on regulatory delay
is available in a Frost and Sullivan (1980b) study reporting
the results of a telephone survey of hospitals which had sub-
mitted CON applications to their local health systems agency
for approval. The responses, shown in Table 5-8, indicate
that, for X-ray equipment, gamma cameras, and ultrasound equip-
ment, the application was processed within six months for over
half of the hospitals. CT scanner applications were processed
within six months 40% of the time. For all types of imaging
equipment, only very rarely (5% or less of the time) did the
processing take longer than a year.
Based on these various pieces of evidence, it is unlikely
that CON has had a significantly retarding effect on demand for
diagnostic imaging equipment. X-ray equipment and ultrasound
devices generally are not affected by CON because their prices
are usually below the threshold (the exceptions being the lat-
est technological advances, such as digital radiography). As
for nuclear scanning equipment, the empirical evidence indi-
cates that CON has not affected the diffusion of nuclear diag-
nostic techniques or, by implication, demand for the equipment.
Finally, the stock of CT scanners does not appear to have been
affected by CON regulation. And, for all types of imaging
equipment, the regulatory delay due to CON is usually less
than six months.
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Table 5-8
Responses to Hospital Survey,
Post-Submission Waiting Times For CON
Number of Months Before
Acceptance or Rejection
<6 6-12 >12
Total Number
of Responses
X-Ray Equipment
CT Scanners
Gamma Cameras
Ultrasound
Equipment
Derived from: Frost and Sullivan (1980b), pg. 118.
192(61%)
25(40%)
(5 )
(517)
16
(5%)
3(5%)
106
(34%o)
34(55%)
49(46%)
51(49%)
314
62
106
104
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With respect to CT scanners, recall that the extremely
rapid rate of scanner diffusion in 1975 and 1976 was followed
by a sudden decline in the diffusion rate in 1979 and 1980.6
This resulted in losses for many CT firms and four firms
exited the market over the period 1979 to 1981, most notably
EMI and Pfizer, two firms which accounted for about 35% of
CT sales in 1978. The sentiment in the industry was that CON
regulation had contributed largely to a lessening of demand. 7
However, this conclusion has not been supported by the empiri-
cal evidence.8 Moreover, the Office of Technology Assessment
released a policy report on CT in 1981 which claimed that firms
may have substantially overestimated the potential market for
scanners by predicting growth rates on the basis of the first
few years of explosive expansion. 9 Overall, the problems in
the CT market in the late 1970's appear to be the result of
uncertainty about a new product and the ensuing market adjust-
ments rather than the consequence of CON regulation.
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REIMBURSEMENT REGULATION
In the past, cost-based retrospective reimbursement was
the most common method for determining third-party repayment
schedules. Beginning in the 1970's, there was a movement to-
ward prospective reimbursement, in which repayment rates are
set in advance. The objective of prospective reimbursement is
to restrain hospital cost inflation by imposing a binding
budget constraint on the hospital. Rate regulation is not a
federal program. Consequently, there is a great deal of varia-
tion among the states' approaches to how reimbursement rates
should be determined. As of the end of 1980, eight states had
mandatory rate regulation programs, four had mandatory rate
review programs, and there were private rate regulation programs
in 12 states (Joskow, 1981).
The effects of rate regulation are difficult to determine
given the lack of uniformity in the rate determination methods,
coverage, and organizational structure of the various state
programs. Policy Analysis (1980), using data for the years
1970 to 1976 and constructing various indexes to quantify
differences among states, found that direct rate regulation
did appear to have a significant effect on the rate of growth
in hospital expenditures. The empirical evidence in Joskow
(1981), based on the years 1973 to 1979, indicates that reim-
bursement regulation appears to have significantly reduced
the growth rate in hospital expenditures, but that the effects
were fairly small. This study also pointed out that the
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states with the highest hospital costs were the first to in-
stitute rate regulation. If there were more scope for initial
savings (e.g., from the use of better management techniques)
in these states than in states with a less serious hospital
cost inflation problem, then the empirical findings may result
from the artifact of which states chose to regulate rates,
rather than from the method of reimbursement regulation per se.
Given that the effects of rate regulation on hospital
expenditures appear to be fairly small, prospective reimburse-
ment is not expected to have had a significant impact on the
demand for diagnostic imaging equipment to date. Recall that
demand for diagnostic imaging equipment has increased steadily
over the past 15 years (see Chapter 1). Although this could
be consistent with effective rate regulation, i.e., the growth
rate would have been even higher without hospital regulation,
it does show that rate regulation has not led to a decrease in
the demand for imaging equipment. Note, however, that if more
states move to this method of hospital regulation and/or if the
financial constraints begin to necessitate difficult choices
among input quantities and, more importantly, quality rather
than simply forcing the more efficient use of hospital resour-
ces, then demand for medical imaging equipment may well be
affected. This would be especially true for expensive, state-
of-the-art imaging equipment.
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SUMMARY
Radiation safety regulation, effective only for X-ray
equipment and CT scanner manufacturers, was found to have in-
creased production costs, but only slightly. Firms in the
industry did not find that this type of regulation had sub-
stantially affected either production costs or the introduction
of new products. And, radiation safety regulation does not
appear to have significantly increased concentration, driven
small firms from the market, or seriously hampered innovation.
Medical device regulation, covering all types of imaging
equipment, includes both performance standards and premarket
approval. A survey of firms in the industry indicated that
device regulation had not substantially affected either pro-
duction costs or the introduction of new products. Since the
four primary types of medical imaging equipment are Class II
devices, not subject to premarket approval, the premarket
clearance process, although potentially costly and time-con-
suming, has not been required for most new medical imaging
products. And, because medical device regulation differenti-
ates among product risk classes and promotes flexibility, some
of the problems associated with drug regulation have been
avoided in the case of diagnostic imaging equipment.
Finally, neither certificate-of-need nor reimbursement
regulation of hospitals appears to have significantly decreased
the demand for medical imaging equipment. The well-publicized
problems in the CT market in the late 197Q's seem to be the
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result of mis-estimation of market potential and intense com-
petition rather than a consequence of hospital regulation.
However, reimbursement regulation does have the potential for
seriously affecting demand for imaging equipment if stringent
budget controls were to be enacted.
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FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER 5
1Business Week, November 3, 1980, p. 100.
2 See, for example, Baram (1978) and U. S. Department of
Commerce (1979).
3 U. S. Code Congressional and Administrative News, 96th
Congress, 2nd Session, 1980, p. 2788.
Contingency table tests for exit and entry patterns were
performed using 1971-76 as the pre-regulatory period and
1976-81 as the post-regulatory period. The resulting chi-
square statistics were insufficient to reject the null hypo-
thesis of variable independence.
5The "Gray Sheet" (Medical Devices, Diagnostics, and
Instrumentation Reports), June 29, 1981.
6Ibid., February 23, 1981.
7Ibid.
8 Note that lengthy regulatory delays (e.g., longer than
one year) do affect short-run demand; the empirical work cited
here refers to the effects of CON over time.
9 The "Gray Sheet," February 23, 1981.
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CONCLUSION
This study has examined the economics of the medical diag-
nostic imaging equipment industry. First, the basic conditions
of the industry were described. Then market structure and con-
duct were analyzed in detail, followed by an assessment of in-
dustry performance. Finally, the effects of various govern-
ment policies were evaluated. In addition to a variety of
other sources, the study utilized two new data sets: a survey
of firms in the industry and a constructed data file of indus-
try composition and firm characteristics over the period 1971
to 1981. A summary of results follows.
Medical imaging equipment takes pictures used to diagnose
a wide variety of medical conditions, and there are four pri-
mary types of imaging equipment: X-ray equipment, CT scanners,
ultrasound devices, and nuclear scanning equipment. Quality
characteristics are important because the product is techni-
cally complex; there are numerous dimensions to product qual-
ity, including image quality, speed, reliability, and display
and storage options. Both hospitals and private physicians'
offices purchase diagnostic imaging equipment and these buyers
are relatively insensitive to price due to the prevalence of
third-party payment. As a consequence, the purchase decision
is often based on perceived quality variations.
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There has been a great deal of change in the industry
composed of the manufacturers of medical imaging equipment
over the past ten to fifteen years. The number of firms in
the industry roughly doubled between 1971 and 1981, (real)
sales have increased steadily, and there has been a great
deal of movement both into and out of the industry. The in-
dustry includes primary firms (imaging equipment sales of at
least 5% of total industry sales), fringe firms, and firms
which manufacture only components. In the aggregate the in-
dustry is unconcentrated, but the X-ray, CT, and ultrasound
product markets are moderately concentrated, and the nuclear
imaging market is highly concentrated. During the period
1971 to 1978 there was substantial entry and little exit,
followed by little entry and a considerable amount of exit
over the years 1979 to 1981.
Innovation is very important in this industry. Path-
breaking new technologies have been introduced roughly every
ten years since the 1950's and there have also been numerous
important product improvements, many the result of applying
computer capabilities to imaging technology. And, firms
allocate considerable resources to R&D efforts, although
most basic research is funded by the federal government.
Firms in this industry compete with one another not only on
the basis of price, but also on the basis of product quality,
the provision of reliable repair and maintenance services,
and the introduction of new, technologically sophisticated
products.
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Medical imaging equipment appears to be sold in a com-
petitive market. Although firms occasionally have made sub-
stantial profits in the short run, other firms have been quick
to enter the industry seeking to share in such profits. And,
the numbers of firms moving in and out of the industry sug-
gest that there are minimal barriers to entry in this market,
a condition conducive to competition.
Radiation safety regulation affects only the manufac-
turers of X-ray equipment and CT scanners. The program,
which operates primarily by means of performance standards,
was not found to have substantially affected market structure
or innovation in this industry. Medical device regulation,
which covers all types of imaging equipment, includes both
performance standards and premarket approval procedures.
There is no evidence that device safety standards have affect-
ed market structure or innovation. And, since premarket
approval is required only for a small subset of all new
imaging products introduced, innovation has not been seri-
ously hampered by the device premarket clearance process.
Finally, neither certificate-of-need nor reimbursement regu-
lation of hospitals appears to have significantly decreased
the demand for medical imaging equipment.
The results of this study have implications for several
topics of public concern. With respect to the problem of
hospital cost inflation, the analysis suggests that the issue
of quality competition among hospitals must be incorporated
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in an effective regulatory program. This would appear to be
particularly important for diagnostic imaging equipment and
other types of technologically sophisticated medical equip-
ment. Secondly, given that product safety regulation has
become much more prevalent over the past 20 years and given
that the regulation of drugs has been found to have had ad-
verse impacts on the drug industry, it is interesting that
product safety regulation has not affected market structure
or innovation in this industry. It appears that some of the
negative effects of product safety regulation can be avoided
by distinguishing among levels of potential consumer risk and
by incorporating the advice of outside experts, such as aca-
demic scientists, knowledgeable about the products involved,
but not tied to either the government or industry. Finally,
the combination of competitiveness and a high rate of techni-
cal change in an industry is very likely to be beneficial for
the economy as a whole.
One promising area for further research is a broader
investigation of medical device regulation. Specifically,
it would be interesting to see how device regulation has
affected other industries. The policy implications of this
topic are extensive. For example, the fact that this type
of product safety regulation did not adversely affect the
medical imaging equipment industry may be due to the nature
of the regulation or to the nature of the industry. The
answer to such a question would be very useful to regulators
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of product safety. Secondly, the process of innovation is
an interesting research topic. Innovations in the medical
care sector frequently follow a path from academic researchers
to small firms to large firms. It would be useful to inves-
tigate the economic interactions among these stages in the
course of technical change.
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APPENDIX A
In order to collect first-hand information, a question-
naire was mailed to all firms identified as being manufacturers
of medical diagnostic imaging equipment as of 1982. Addresses
were obtained from Hale and Hale (1978), Medical Device Reg-
ister (Greenwich, Conn.: Directory Systems, Inc., 1982),
Dun & Bradstreet's Million Dollar Directory (Parsippany, N.J.:
Dun's Marketing Services, 1982), and Standard & Poor's Reg-
ister of Corporations, Directors, and Executives (New York:
Standard & Poor's Corp., 1982).
The cover letter and questionnaire are shown as Exhibit
A-i. A special effort was made to keep the questionnaire
short and easy to complete. To this end, the categories
"a little," "some," and "a lot" were used instead of numeri-
cal scales where appropriate.
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MAILING
A total of 73 questionnaires was mailed, with the set of
firms to which they were mailed having the following charact-
eristics (as determined using the constructed data file of
firms in the industry, see Chapter 2):
(i) 63
10
(ii) 48
25
(iii) 48
25
(iv) 42
18
3716
(86%)
(14%)
(66%)
(34%)
(66%)
(34%o)
(58%)(25%)
(51%)(22%)
to
to
to
to
to
to
firms with sales of medical imaging
equipment of less than $5 million
firms with sales of medical imaging
equipment of more than $5 million
firms with total firm sales of less
than $100 million
firms with total firm sales of more
than $100 million
firms which make only one type of
medical imaging equipment
firms which make more than one type of
medical imaging equipment
firms which make X-ray equipment
firms which make CT scanners
firms which make ultrasound devices
to firms which make nuclear scanning equipment
(Does not sum to 100% due to multiproduct sellerso)
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RESPONSE RATE
Of the 73 questionnaires mailed, six were turned back by
the post office as undeliverable and 26 were returned. Thus,
the gross response rate was 36% (26 of 73) and the response
rate for questionnaires received was 39% (26 of 67). This is
a sizeable sample of the industry. As a means of comparison,
a portion of the Frost and Sullivan (1980b) study was based
on a questionnaire mailed to all hospitals with a medical
imaging department. This mailing had a response rate of 6.2%.
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ANALYSIS OF RESPONSES
In order to gauge the representativeness of the sample,
the characteristics of answering firms are compared to those
of the companies to which the questionnaire was mailed:
(i) 6
20
(ii) 18
8
(iii) 19
7
(23%)
(77%)
(69%)
(31%)
(73%)
(27%)
(iv) 15 (58%)
6 (23%)
13 (50%)
6 (23%)
(Does not
from firms with sales of medical imaging
equipment of less than $5 million
from firms with sales of medical imaging
equipment of more than $5 million
from firms with total firm sales of less
than $100 million
from firms with total firm sales of more
than $100 million
from firms which make only one type of
medical imaging equipment
from firms which make more than one type of
medical imaging equipment
from firms which make X-ray equipment
from firms which make CT scanners
from firms which make ultrasound devices
from firms which make nuclear equipment
sum to 100% due to multiproduct sellers.)
The first thing to note is that 77% of the responding
firms claimed sales of medical imaging equipment in excess of
$5 million, whereas 14% of the mailed questionnaires were to
firms of this size. However, since only 10 questionnaires
were mailed to firms in this size range and 20 replying firms
claimed sales of this magnitude, it is clear that either
imaging equipment sales were overestimated on a systematic
basis or the instructions were misunderstood and firms in-
cluded sales of other medical equipment when answering this
question.
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In general, the proportion of responding firms by total
sales, and number and type of medical imaging equipment sold
is similar to that for the firms to which the questionnaire
was mailed. The exception is that firms producing only one
type of medical imaging equipment appear to be somewhat over-
represented in the set of responding firms.
This.comparison of responding firms with those to which
the questionnaires were mailed utilized questions (1), (8),
and (9). Questions (3), (6), (7), (14), (15), and (17) were
not answered on a systematic basis and thus have been excluded
from the analysis. Answers to part of question (13), part of
(18), and (21) and (22) are comments, sometimes lengthy, which
are available on request. Finally, replies to the remaining
questions are tabulated in this appendix and discussed in the
appropriate portion of the text.
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Economies of Scale
Question (4): Regarding production, does the cost of one unit
of output decrease as volume increases --
a little, some, or a lot? (by product line)
(i) For firms making X-ray equipment (15):
4 (27%) "a little"
11 (73%) "some"
0 (0%) "a lot"
(ii) For firms making CT scanners (6):
1 (17%) "a little"
4 (67%) "some"
1 (17%) "a lot"
(iii) For firms making ultrasound devices (13):
2 (15%) "a little"
9 (69f%) "some"
2 (15%) "a lot"
One of these respondents makes only ultrasound compon-
ents and answered "a lot"; another respondent returned
two questionnaires, one for ultrasound systems ("some")
and one for ultrasound components ("a lot").
(iv) For firms making nuclear scanning equipment (6):
O (0%) "a little"
5 (83%) "some"
1 (17%) "a lot"
(v) Overall, for 40 responses (distributed as noted above):
7 (18%) "a little"
29 (72%) "some"
4 (10%) "a lot"
(vi) For the multiproduct firms (total of 21 responses):
5 (24%) "a little"
16 (76fo) "some"
0 (0%) "a lot"
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Economies of Scope
Question (5): Are there cost savings when this equipment is
produced along with other products -- yes or no?
(by product line)
(i) For firms making X-ray equipment responding (14):
12 (86%) "yes"
2 (14%o) "no"
(ii) For firms making CT scanners responding (5):
3 (60%) "yes"
2 (40%) "no"
(iii) For firms making ultrasound devices responding (12):
6 (50%) "yes"
6 (50%) "no"
One of these respondents makes only ultrasound compon-
ents and answered "no"; another respondent returned
two questionnaires, one for ultrasound systems ("no")
and one for ultrasound components ("no").
(iv) For firms making nuclear scanning equipment (6):
3 (50%) "yes"
3 (50%) "no"
(v) Overall, for 37 responses (distributed as noted above):
24 (65%) "yes"
13 (35%) "no"
(vi) For the multiproduct firms responding (6; total of
18 responses):
12 (67%) "yes"
6 (33%) "no"
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Distribution of Demand
Question (10): What percentage of your sales are -- to hospi-
tals, to physicians/physicians' offices, to
other companies, or other?
(i) Overall, for 25 firms responding, on average:
48% "to hospitals"
27% "to physicians/physicians' offices"
15% "to other companies"
10% "other"
(ii) Excluding two firms which make only components, one
firm which sells only for clinical research ("other"),
and one firm which sells primarily to consumers
("other"):
55% "to hospitals"
31% "to physicians/physicians' offices"
11% "to other companies"
3% "other"
(iii) For firms making X-ray equipment responding (14):
54% (60%) "to hospitals"
21% (22%) "to physicians/physicians' offices
17% (15%) "to other companies"
8% (3%) "other"
(with exclusions as in (ii) )
(iv) For firms making CT scanners responding (5):
67% "to hospitals"
17% "to physicians/physicians' offices"
14%o "to other companies"
2% "other"
Note that of the five respondents, one replied "20% to
hospitals," while the others replied "70%," "75%,"
"80%," and "90% to hospitals."
(v) For firms making ultrasound devices (13)s
61% (66%) "to hospitals"
29% (31%) "to physicians/physicians/ offices"
7% (1%) "to other companies"
3% (2%) "other"
(with exclusions as in (ii) )
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(vi) For firms making nuclear equipment responding (5):
51% (65%)
26% (32%)
2% (2%)
21% (1%)
"to hospitals"
"to physicians/physicians' offices"
"to other companies"
"other"
(with exclusions as in (ii) )
(vii) For the multiproduct firms responding (6):
79% "to hospitals"
17% "to physicians/physicians' offices"
2% "to other companies"
2% "other"
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Advertising
Question (11): What percentage of your sales are allotted
to advertising?
(i) Overall, for 22 firms responding, on average:
3.6%
(ii) Excluding two firms which make only components:
3.9%
(iii) For firms making X-ray equipment responding (12):
1.9% (2.0% with exclusions as in (ii) )
(iv) For firms making CT scanners (6):
2.8%
(v) For firms making ultrasound devices responding (12):
4.4%o (4.9% with exclusions as in (ii) )
(vi) For firms making nuclear scanning equipment (6):
3.6%
(vii) For the multiproduct firms (7):
2.5%
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Question (12): What percentage of your advertising budget
is allotted -- to magazines, to direct mail,
to conventions, or other?
(i) Overall, for 20 firms responding, on average:
32% "to magazines"
11% "to direct mail"
48% "to conventions"
9% "other"
(ii) Excluding two firms which make only components:
31% "to magazines"
8% "to direct mail"
51% "to conventions"
10% "other"
(iii) For firms making X-ray equipment responding (10):
28% (31%) "to magazines"
12% (7%) "to direct mail" (with exclusions)
48% (48%) "to conventions"
12% (14%) "other"
(iv) For firms making CT scanners responding (4):
28% "to magazines"
11% "to direct mail"
46% "to conventions"
15% "other"
(v) For firms making ultrasound devices responding (9):
32% (26%) "to magazines"
10% (9%) "to direct mail" (with exclusions)
45% (51%) "to conventions"
13% (14%o) "other"
(vi) For firms making nuclear equipment responding (5):
22% "to magazines"
14% "to direct mail"
42% "to conventions"
22% "other"
(vii) For the multiproduct firms responding (4)s
19% "to magazines"
12% "to direct mail"
41% "to conventions"
28% "other"
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Selling Methods
Question (13): Do you maintain a staff of route salesmen for
medical diagnostic imaging equipment --
yes or no?
(i) Overall, for all firms (26):
17 (65%) "yes"
9 (35%) "no"
(ii) Excluding two firms which make only components:
16 (67%) "yes"
8 (33%) "no"
(iii) For firms making X-ray equipment (15):
8 (53%) "yes" ( 7 (50%) with exclusions )
7 (47%) "no" ( 7 (50%) with exclusions )
(iv) For firms making CT scanners (6):
5 (83%) "yes"
1 (17%) "no"
(v) For firms making ultrasound devices (13):
11 (85%) "yes" ( 11 (92%) with exclusions )
2 (15%) "no" ( 1 (8%) with exclusions )
(vi) For firms making nuclear scanning equipment (6):
4 (67%) "yes"
2 (33%) "no"
(vii) For the multiproduct firms (7):
6 (86%) "yes"
1 (14%o) "no"
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Research and Development
Question (16): What percentage of your sales are allotted
to research and development?
(i) Overall, for 20 firms responding, on average:
8.9%
(ii) Excluding two firms which make only components:
9.1%
(iii) For firms making X-ray equipment responding (10):
8.8% (8.6% with exclusions)
(iv) For firms making CT scanners responding (5):
6.7%
(v) For firms making ultrasound devices responding (10):
8.9% (9.3% with exclusions)
(vi) For firms making nuclear scanning equipment (6):
7.6%
(vii) For the multiproduct firms responding (5):
7.7%
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Patents
Question (18): Are patents important for medical imaging
equipment -- yes or no?
(i) Overall, for 25 firms responding:
13 (52%) "yes"
12 (48%) "no"
(ii) Excluding two firms which make only components:
11 (48%) "yes"
12 (52%) "no"
(iii) For firms making X-ray equipment responding (14):
6 (42%) "yes" ( 5 (38%) with exclusions )
8 (57%) "no" ( 8 (62%) with exclusions )
(iv) For firms making CT scanners (6):
3 (50%) "yes"
3 (50%) "no"
(v) For firms making ultrasound devices (13):
8 (62%) "yes" ( 7 (58%) with exclusions )
5 (38%) "no" ( 5 (42%o) with exclusions )
(vi) For firms making nuclear scanning equipment (6):
4 (67%) "yes"
2 (33%) "no"
(vii) For the multiproduct firms (7):
4 (57%) "yes"
3 (43%) "no"
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Effects of Regulation
Question (19a): How has radiation safety regulation by the
Bureau of Radiological Health affected your
production costs -- a little, some, or a lot?
(i) Overall, for 25 firms responding:
8 (32%) "a little"
13 (52%) ' "some"
4 (16%) "a lot"
(ii) Excluding two firms which make only components:
7 (30%) "a little"
12 (52%) "some"
4 (17%) "a lot"
(iii) For firms making X-ray equipment (15):
4 (27%) "a little"
7 (47%) "some"
4 (27%) "a lot"
( 3 (21%) with exclusions )
( 7 (50%) with exclusions )( 4 (29%) with exclusions )
(iv) For firms making CT scanners (6):
2 (33%) "a little"
2 (33%) "some"
2 (33%) "a lot"
(v) For firms making ultrasound devices (13):
"a little"
"some"
"a lot"
( 4 (33%) with exclusions )( 6 (50%) with exclusions )
( 2 (17%) with exclusions )
(vi) For the multiproduct firms (7):
2 (29%) "a little"
3 (43%) "some"
2 (29%) "a lot"
4 (31%)
7 (54%)
2 (15%)
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Question (19b): How has radiation safety regulation by the
Bureau of Radiological Health affected
introduction of new products -- a little,
some, or a lot?
(i) Overall, for 24 firms responding:
9 (38%) "a little"
12 (50%) "some"
3 (13%) "a lot"
(ii) Excluding two firms which make only components:
8 (36%) "a little"
11 (50%)' "some"
3 (14%) "a lot"
(iii) For firms making X-ray equipment responding (14):
"a little"
"some"
"a lot"
( 5 (38%) with exclusions )
( 6 (46%) with exclusions
2 15%) with exclusions
(iv) For firms making CT scanners responding (5):
2 (40%) "a little"
3 (60%) "some"
0 (0%) "a lot"
(v) For firms making ultrasound devices (13):
"a little"
"some"
"a lot"
( 4 (33%) with exclusions )
( 7 (58%) with exclusions )( 1 (8%) with exclusions )
(vi) For the multiproduct firms responding (6):
2 (33%)4 (67%)
0 (0%)
"a little"
"some"
"a lot"
6 (43%)
6 (43o)
2 (14%)
4 (31%)8 (62%)
1 (8%)
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Question (20a): How has medical device regulation by the
Food and Drug Administration affected your
production costs -- a little, some, or a lot?
(i) Overall, for 23 firms responding:
8 (35%) "a little"
13 (57%), "some"
2 (9%) "a lot"
(ii) Excluding two firms which make only components:
7 (33%) "a little"
12 (57%) "some"
2 (10%) "a lot"
(iii) For firms making X-ray equipment responding (13)s
4 (31%) "a little" ( 3 (25%) with exclusions )
8 (62%) "some" ( 8 (67%) with exclusions )
1 (8%) "a lot" ( 1 (8%) with exclusions )
(iv) For firms making CT scanners (6):
1 (17%) "a little"
5 (83%) "some"
0 (0%) "a lot"
(v) For firms making ultrasound devices responding (12):
2 (17%) "a little" ( 2 (18%) with exclusions )
9 (75%) "some" ( 8 (73%) with exclusions )
1 (8%) "a lot" ( 1 (9%) with exclusions )
(vi) For firms making nuclear scanning equipment (6)s
1 (17%) "a little"
5 (83%) "some"
0 (0%) "a lot"
(vii) For the multiproduct firms (7):
0 (0%) "a little"
7 (100%) "some"
0 (0%) "a lot"
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Question (20b): How has medical device regulation by the
Food and Drug Administration affected
introduction of new products -- a little,
some, or a lot?
(i) Overall, for 23 firms responding:
7 (30%) "a little"
11 (48%) "some"
5 (22%) "a lot"
(ii) Excluding two firms which make only components:
6 (29%) "a little"
10 (48%) "some"
5 (24%) "a lot"
(iii) For firms making X-ray equipment responding (13):
4 (31%) "a little" ( 3 (25%) with exclusions)
6 (46%) "some" ( 6 (50%) with exclusions)
3 (23%) "a lot" ( 3 (25%) with exclusions)
(iv) For firms making CT scanners (6):
1 (17%) "a little"
3 (50%) "some"
2 (33%) "a lot"
(v) For firms making ultrasound devices responding (12):
1 (8%) "a little" ( 1 (9%) with exclusions)
8 (67%) "some" ( 7 (64%o) with exclusions)
3 (25%) "a lot" ( 3 (27%) with exclusions)
(vi) For firms making nuclear scanning equipment (6):
1 (17%) "a little"
3 (50%) "some"
2 (33%) "a lot"
(vii) For the multiproduct firms (7):
0 (0%) "a little"
5 (71%) "some"
2 (29%) "a lot"
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Exhibit A-1
Cover Letter and Questionnaire
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MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02139
March 1, 1983
Dear Sir:
I am a doctoral student in the Department of Economics at
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. My dissertation is
a study of the medical diagnostic imaging equipment industry;
in particular, it is an analysis of market structure and how
regulation has affected this industry. As part of my research,
I am conducting an industry survey.
Enclosed you will find a questionnaire regarding your firm's
activities in various areas. I would greatly appreciate it if
you would take the time to answer these questions. Please note
that confidentiality is assured: you are not asked to name your
firm, the data will be used only for this academic purpose, and
in no case will information on individual firms be made public.
If you do not feel free to answer certain questions, please
return the survey anyway--a partial response is much more valuable
than no response at all. Your cooperation would be greatly
appreciated.
Sincerely yours,
Niccie L. McKay
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